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 My experience with water “law” for irrigated agriculture first occurred at the age of 5 
when I moved with my family to a home on small acreage in the Elephant Butte Irrigation 
District on the Rio Grande.  There I played in the irrigation water, visited with the ditch rider and 
picked wild asparagus from the ditch banks.  I developed a childhood understanding that the 
water necessary to grow the cantaloupes, cotton, onions and sorghum in the fields around my 
home came not from the clouds but from the ditches delivering water to each field in turn 
throughout the valley.  It was a place where I could smell the water approaching through the 
ditches the same way you can smell the rain approaching in the desert.  My great grandparents 
and grandparents tried to farm on their homesteads in central New Mexico using water from the 
clouds, dry-land bean farming, and they soon switched to cattle grazing. 
 Many years later I arrived in a law school class on water law taught by Frank J. Trelease 
the preeminent water lawyer of the 20th Century.  The study of water law with Prof. Trelease  
confirmed my views about the ownership of water.  It must be beneficially used and every 
irrigator knows water cannot be wasted—it is not only illegal, but immoral in that waste on one 
field means the field at the end of the ditch will remain dry.  The right to the water is owned.  It 
is measurable and it is defensible against others who interfere with that right.  In the southwest if 
there is a shortage of water the most junior users go without, first in time is first in right.  This is 
the way it is! 
 During my career I have been very fortunate to have opportunities to represent tribal 
governments in the determination of their water “rights.”  The Tribes of the southwest have 
water “claims” which may only be converted to “rights” by a court decree or legislation.  Most 
ii 
 
“claims” were ignored for more than 100 years but in recent decades these claims have converted 
to rights through general stream adjudications and water rights settlements. 
 It is with this background that I entered the classroom of Stephen C. McCaffrey in 
International Water Law in the 2004 spring semester and began the intellectual quest to 
understand the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization and equitable and reasonable 
participation; a form of water law not based on priority or volumetric measures.  This 
dissertation is an attempt to discuss the legal difference between these systems of water 
allocation—the local use based on rights to water and the international and transboundary 
allocations based on equality of right and is a reflection of my learning about the process of 
water allocations.  Throughout this 200 page discussion of water law, local to international, the 
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“In a group of mountains a small river has its source.  A dozen or a score of creeks unite 
to form the trunk.  The creeks higher up divide into brooks.  All these streams combined form the 
drainage system of a hydrographic basin, a unit of country well defined in nature, for it is 
bounded above and on each side by heights of land that rise as crests to part the waters.  Thus 
hydraulic basin is segregated from hydraulic basin by nature herself, and the landmarks are 
practically perpetual.  In such a basin of the arid region the irrigable lands lie below; not chiefly 
by the river’s side, but on the mesas and low plains that stretch back on each side.  Above these 
lands the pasturage hills and mountains stand, and there the forests and sources of water supply 
are found.  Such a district of country is a commonwealth by itself.  The people who live therein 
are interdependent in all their industries.  Every man is interested in the conservation and 
management of the water supply, for all the waters are needed within the district.  The men who 
control the farming below must also control the upper region where the waters are gathered 
from the heaven and stored in the reservoirs.  Every farm and garden in the valley below is 
dependent upon each fountain above. 
 All of the lands that lie within the basin above the farming districts are the catchment 
areas for all the waters poured upon the fields below.  The waters that control these works all 
constitute one system, are dependent one upon another, and are independent of all other systems.  
Not a spring or a creek can be touched without affecting the interests of every man who 
cultivates the soil in the region.  All the waters are common property until they reach the main 
canal, where they are to be distributed among the people.  How these waters are to be caught 
and the common source of wealth utilized by the individual settlers interested therein is a 
problem for the men of the district to solve, and for them alone. 
 But these same people are interested in the forests that crown the heights of the 
hydrographic basin.  If they permit the forests to be destroyed, the source of their water supply is 
injured and the timber values are wiped out…. 
 Then the pasturage is to be protected.  The men who protect these lands for the water 
they supply to agriculture can best protect the grasses for the summer pasturage of the cattle and 
horses and sheep that are to be fed on their farms during the months of winter….   
 Thus it is that there is a body of interdependent and unified interests and values, all 
collected in one hydrographic basin, and all segregated by well-defined boundary lines from the 
rest of the world.  The people in such a district have common interests, common rights, and 
common duties, and must necessarily work together for common purposes.”1 
  
John Wesley Powell painted this vision of utopian water management for the western United 
States in the late nineteenth century.  It did not come to pass.  Political borders were drawn to 
create states in the vast western territory of the United States, as in all the rest of the world, 
                                                
1 John Wesley Powell, Institutions for the Arid Lands, originally appearing in Century Magazine 40:111-16, May 
≈2≈ 
without regard to the boundaries established by “nature herself.”  Farms in low lands develop 
water delivery infrastructure and the systems, rules and laws for distribution and sharing.  The 
pasturage is protected by those who run livestock and the forests by the timber interests.  The 
challenge is that each of these regions may be within a different local jurisdiction which has its 
own priorities for water management that do not and cannot control those within another 
jurisdiction.   
We live in an age of globalization and interconnectedness, however, too many of us live as 
though the small segment of the hydraulic basin in which we are located is disconnected from 
our downstream neighbors or that our use of a transboundary watercourse does not have 
consequences within the basin.  We do not recognize the natural system that Powell described 
more than 100 years ago as the same system that provides our water.  The natural system 
operates without regard to political boundaries but it is greatly impacted by those boundaries. 
The legal systems for allocating and sharing water within and across political boundaries are 
explored herein.  Each hydraulic basin is unique in its natural systems and development history 
such that agreements, allocations, and management do not easily transfer from one basin to 
another.  However, frameworks for analyzing systems and lessons learned from one hydraulic 
basins are crucial to effective management in another.  Within all basins water laws are used to 
resolve conflicts among users and provide security for continued water use. 
The nature of water law is explored in its many variations beginning with local water laws 
such as prior appropriation which is based on property law, riparian rights protected in tort, water 
agreements treated as contracts and equitable apportionment.  Each discipline of law; property, 
tort, contract and equity, operate on the same resource at the same time.  Water laws may be as 
complex and varied as the resource to which they are applied. 
≈3≈ 
The following quote from the Restatement First, Torts, captures some of these complexities.  
 “Water, like air and light, is a fugitive, wandering thing, flowing over and through land, 
but seldom remaining for any length of time in one place or within the confines of any 
one person’s possession.  One’s dominion over it while it is upon his land is temporary, 
and since it ordinarily flows onto the lands of other persons, it is a thing common to the 
lands of all through whose possession it passes.  Unlike air, it is limited in quantity, and a 
substantial use of it by one may prevent others from having it.  This does not mean that 
individual rights or privileges in respect to it are different in principle from what they are 
in respect to other physical things.  It simply means that there is more likely to be a 
conflict of interest over the use of waters than over the use of other things, and that the 
rights and privileges of individual users are subject to greater limitation out of regard for 
the common interests of all.”2 
 
 In addition to the various water laws, another broad theme discussed herein is the 
confluence of two legal systems governing utilization of a single water source.  Local laws for 
allocation of water among individuals and sectors of society develop at the local level and reflect 
the natural conditions, the culture of the population and the most common utilization of the 
water.  Local laws develop from the bottom and work their way up into state, provincial or 
regional laws.  The principles of international and transboundary water law have developed at 
the highest levels of government and impact water allocation and utilization from the top down.  
The principles of international water law are set forth in watercourse agreements negotiated state 
to state and those which have crystallized as customary international law binding on all states.  
Transboundary water law developed in the United States in the jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Court when called upon to resolve disputes among the states of the United States.  
The first part of this paper examines local laws for the allocation of water noting that these 
develop to accommodate the natural hydraulic system and the needs of the people.  At the local 
level, law often creates “rights” to the use of water and this concept is explored.  Transboundary 
(interstate and international) water laws often do not create “rights” to water, but establish 
equitable principles for sharing a fluctuating natural resource.  These equitable principles are 
                                                
2 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF Torts, §850 Scope Note (1939). 
≈4≈ 
deconstructed and distinguished from the “rights” which may be held at the local level.  Theories 
of legal pluralism are used to explain the relationship between the local and transboundary laws 
governing the same resource.   
Part II explores building a bridge between a rights based system at the local level and the 
equitable principles for sharing water that guide utilization of a transboundary river.  That bridge 
is a negotiated agreement among the basin states.  This part discusses the role of law in 
watercourse negotiations.  Law may establish the boundaries within which negotiations take 
place and level the playing field among states within a basin with asymmetric power distribution.  
Also discussed is a methodology to incorporate local water rights into an equitable 
transboundary system using the Winters reserved rights doctrine of the United States. 
Part III is an examination of selected transboundary agreements examining different water 
sharing arrangements and the institutions created to implement the arrangements.  Flexibility 
within basin institutions is essential to respond to changing natural conditions and human uses.   
For this exploration of water law, we start with the application of a classic discussion of law, 
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, by Guido 







                                                
3 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
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Water Allocation: Local and International 
 
What is water law?  What is international water law or as is described, the law of 
international watercourses?  Part I examines the first question from the bottom-up, looking at 
local water law development that may, or may not be codified by a governmental entity.  The 
latter question is examined from a top-down perspective, the development of legal principles 
through customary practice and agreement of nations as codified in an international convention 
negotiated at the highest level of global governance.4 
Calabresi and Melamed in their seminal article, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,5 assert that society establishes entitlements through 
the legal systems it adopts.6 The rules of property, liability and inalienability within that legal 
system protect the entitlements by favoring one party over another in a conflict.7   
The first issue which must be faced by any legal system is one we call the problem of 
“entitlement.”  Whenever a state is presented with the conflicting interests of two or more 
people, or two or more groups of people, it must decide which side to favor.8 
 
This statement is the foundation of a legal system.  However, the law governing a single 
watercourse exists at multiple levels, top to bottom, within multiple societies.  The Colorado 
River in the western United States is a highly developed transboundary watercourse and the 
                                                
4 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, UN Doc. 
A/Res/51/869, May 21, 1997 [hereinafter 1997 UN Convention]. 
5  Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. R. 108 (1972). 
6 Id. at 1090. 
7 Other scholars writing about entitlements maintain that the classifications of property, liability and inalienability 
are types of entitlements, not rules for their protection.  See Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 
CORNELL L. REV. 822 (1992-1993). 




subject of multiple transboundary agreements,9 the oldest nearly a century old,10 as well as scores 
of judicial opinions.11 Within the United States the Constitution and the cases interpreting it 
create a hierarchy of laws from international to local.  Making a simplistic example of the 
Colorado River, the River is first divided to meet the Treaty obligations between the United 
States and Mexico.12  Next, the portion of the river available for use in the United States is 
divided into an upper and lower basin according to the terms of an interstate compact approved 
by Congress.13  The upper division states apportion their share of the river by Compact14 and the 
lower division states apportion their share of the river according to the terms of an Act of 
Congress.15  Each state within each basin has its own “water law” that governs the rights and 
privileges of users within that state.  If the water within the Colorado basin is not sufficient to 
supply all legal uses the individual users may have their rights limited by state, states are limited 
by the Compact establishing the lower or upper division apportionments, and the upper and 
lower basin apportionments are limited by international treaty obligations.  Each level may use 
only that portion available after division among the “higher” levels of apportionment. 
 I use the term “vertical legal pluralism” to describe this transboundary legal structure.  
Vertical legal pluralism affects all transboundary watercourses.  Chapter I examines elements of 
                                                
9 The term “transboundary agreements” is used to include treaties among states and compacts among states of the 
United States. 
10 La Plata River Compact November 27, 1922, 43 Stat. 796 (1925). 
11 See Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931), Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558 (1936), Arizona v. California, 
344 U.S. 919 (1953), Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964), 
Arizona v. California, 547 U.S. 150 (2006) among others that have been decided by the United States Supreme 
Court. 
12 Treaty between the United States and Mexico relating to the Utilization of the Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana 
Rivers, and the Rio Grande (Rio Bravo) from Fort Quitman, Texas to the Gulf of Mexico, Feb. 3, 1944 and 
supplementary Protocol Nov. 14, 1944, 3 U.N.T.S. 314. 
13 Colorado River Compact, signed November 24, 1922, Ariz, Cal., Colo. Nev., N.M., Ut., Wyo.  The 1922 Compact 
was approved by Congress through the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928) which provided 
that the 1922 Compact would enter into force upon the approval of 6 of the 7 basin states and by proclamation of the 
President.  This occurred with the proclamation of President Hoover on June 25, 1929. 
14 Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, 1948, Ariz., Colo., N.M., Ut., Wyo., 63 Stat. 31 (1949) 




this vertical structure beginning with selected examples of local laws and an examination of the 
various legal principles upon which water laws are based.   
Chapter Two examines the law governing international watercourses16 as a top-down 
legal system.  This chapter provides an in-depth examination of the international legal principles 
of equitable utilization and reasonable use.   
Chapter Three explores the tension between rights-based local water laws and principles 
of equitable and reasonable utilization upon which international law is based and asks if the law 
of international watercourses has faced what Calabresi and Melamed describe as the first issue of 
any legal system, the problem of entitlement.17  In other words, the question posed is whether the 
term “water rights” means the same thing up and down the vertical spectrum of legal pluralism.   
In Chapter Four the dispute over the Vermejo River,18 a small transboundary stream in 
the states of New Mexico and Colorado, is examined as an example of the relationship between 
the law of transboundary equitable apportionment and the local laws of prior appropriation and 
reasonable use. 
                                                
16 The definition of “international watercourse” is that from the 1997 UN Convention supra note 1 “A watercourse, 
parts of which are situated in different States.” (Art. 2(b))   A watercourse is defined as “a system of surface waters 
and groundwaters constituting by virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a 
common terminus.” (Art. 2(a)).  
17 Calabresi & Melamed supra note 2 at 1090. 





Chapter	  1:	  Local	  Water	  Law	  
 Irrigation societies around the world have developed water governance systems to meet 
their local needs. 19  The systems of governance are similar in that each includes a mechanism to 
determine who may use the water and for what purposes and each has a mechanism to make 
adjustments when either the watercourse or the uses change. 20  Many of the local systems base 
the right to use water in property law.  Some even permit the selling of a water right separate and 
severed from the land on which the water was originally used.  A survey of local water 
governance systems from around the world reveals that “cultivators from the valleys of northern 
Laos to the tributary creeks of the upper Rio Grande in New Mexico physically constructed the 
apparatus for water diversion and socially constructed locally recognized and locally defensible 
access to the appropriated water.”21   
 The examples in this chapter illustrate that the normative rules for use of a common 
resource develop within the community that shares the resource.  Institutions legitimize and 
enforce the rules, however, the water law for allocation of the resource to users remains 
inherently local developing from the bottom up. 
 William Eskridge22 provides three assumptions regarding law from the bottom-up: 
• Law comes from the bottom up.  Official law is influenced, often decisively, by what 
goes on in communities subject to their commands.  What officials say is law neither 
exhausts the subject nor ends debate. 
                                                
19  NEGOTIATING WATER RIGHTS (Bryan Randolph Bruns & Ruth S. Meinzen-Dick eds., International Food Policy 
Research Institute, 2000). 
20 H.L. Joep Spiertz, Water Rights and Legal Pluralism: Some Basics of a Legal Anthropological Approach in 
NEGOTIATING WATER RIGHTS supra note 16, 162, 165-175 (2000).  
21 E. Walter Coward, Jr., Preface, NEGOTIATING WATER RIGHTS supra note 16, 17 (2000). 
22 William N. Eskridge, Jr. in his article Public Law from the Bottom Up (97 W. VA. L. REV. 141 (1994)) makes the 
argument that changes to public law develop through a struggle of “nomic” communities within society and develop 




• Choice of law is not neutral.  It is deeply ideological, generational, and subject to shift in 
response to changed circumstances. 
• Our obligation to obey the law is based upon its normativity and not just its official 
pedigree.  Every time the polity tries to suppress a vision of law, it risks its legitimacy, 
because it risks alienating groups whose vision has been suppressed. 
 
 Eskridge emphasizes that while law may “effervesce” up from the bottom, state 
institutions interdependent of each other, influence the development of law through the local 
community anticipation of their responses and the potential veto or displacement of the emerging 
changes in law.23 
 Lundqvist states the “need for clarification of rights and obligations” in water 
management and maintains that effective water management occurs at the user level.24  When 
state institutions become separated from the user, water management is not cohesive and national 
water laws and national control of resources may either be ignored or de-legitimized creating a 
situation in which water law is not accepted by the water user.25 Within a system of vertical legal 
pluralism the legitimacy of each level of water law depends on the legitimacy of each subsidiary 
level.  
 The water laws of prior appropriation, acequias, riparian rights, Moroccan springs and 
subaks, are discussed below as examples of local water laws that “evolve from the bottom-up as 
individuals competing for resource uses assert their claims to be free of other competing uses.”26  
The local water laws discussed herein are those dealing with the creation of rights and 
entitlements to the use of a watercourse.  These rights may be private or communal, but all 
                                                
23 Id.  at 163-164. 
24 Jan Lundqvist, Rules and Roles in Water Policy and Management, Need for Clarification of Rights and 
Obligations, 25  IWRA, WATER INTERNATIONAL 194, 196 (2000). 
25 Id. 
26 Terry L. Anderson & J. Bishop Grewell, Property Rights Solutions for the Global Commons: Bottom-Up or Top-




include methods for allocation and the protection and enforcement of those uses considered 
legitimate.27   
 H. L. Joep Spiertz analyzes the conflict among competing laws regulating the utilization 
of a water resource in his work on legal pluralism.28   
Legal anthropology teaches researchers in the field of natural resource management, 
property regimes, and water rights, not to start from the normative oratory of the legal 
profession, nor from the recitals of local traditional law.  Instead, the place to begin lies 
in people’s daily experience regarding their normative environment, with all its 
ambiguity, variation and contradiction.  It explicitly draws attention to what can be called 
“the how, and the when and where” of the significance of law in social practice.29 
 
 Spiertz urges a study of water law by examining the  practices of users which includes the 
local law developed from the bottom-up.  The sovereign control of water resources, a top-down 
approach, may incorporate local law, as is discussed in the context of prior appropriation below, 
or it may be in conflict with local law in which case it risks losing local legitimacy. 
 Jan Lundqvist urges the same approach.  Water users are the ultimate stakeholders in any 
government, regulatory or management plan.  It is the human dimension, the societal rules and 
understandings of water use that management must consider in addition to the engineering of 
water availability.30 
“It is, of course, important to have an overriding policy and regulatory arrangements 
through which the multiple and vital functions of water in society and in ecosystems can 
be handled.  From this perspective, governments have a critical role to play.  However, 
due to historical circumstances, in particular the colonial impassible rule and its 
aftermath, the governments in many countries in the south have developed water and 
environmental policies that have tended to separate people from management tasks 
previously part of a social, cultural, and community based system and instead have 
spearheaded grand engineering solutions.”31 
 
                                                
27 Id. at 79-83. Local bottom-up development of these rights conserves on resources and enforcement costs as 
homogenous societies develop cultural norms for right and wrong behavior in relation to the resource. Id. 
28 Spiertz supra note 17.    
29 Spiertz supra note 17 at 184. 
30 Id. 




The 2003 United Nations World Water Development Report identified the importance of 
rights to water for effective governance.32  In the chapter on Governing Water Wisely for 
Sustainable Development the report notes that “In many developing countries, local regulations, 
customary laws and traditional rights assign rights and responsibilities that differ from state 
regulations.  It is therefore important for formal rights to consider traditional practices.”33 
Referencing the work by Lundqvist the report emphasizes the importance of “water 
rights” that are clearly defined in order to have effective water governance.  Water rights and 
obligations “stipulate who is entitled to what quantity and quality of water, and when they are 
entitled to it.”34  They are most often based in property law. 
The Report identifies and defines four types of property rights in water: 
• “Open access property:  There is no defined group of users or owners and the 
water resource is open to anyone. 
• Common property: The group in charge of the resource, such as a local 
community or a particular user group, has a right to exclude non-members from 
uses and benefits. Members of the management group have both rights and 
obligations with respect to use and maintenance of the water resource. 
• State property: Water users and citizens in general have an obligation to observe 
use and access rules determined by the controlling government agencies. 
• Private property: Within the existing institutional framework the owner has the 
right to decide on water access and uses. Those without rights or financial means 
to acquire water are excluded from consumption.”35 
  
The following discussion of selected local water laws begins with the prior appropriation 
doctrine of the western United States and the acequias which are located primarily in northern 
                                                
32 WATER FOR PEOPLE, WATER FOR LIFE, THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT, Ch. 15 
(2003). 
33 Id. at 374. 
34 Id.  




New Mexico a state which follows the doctrine of prior appropriation. The other examples 
include riparian rights as developed in the eastern United States, allocation of spring flows in 
Morocco, and the subak system in Bali which is similar to the historic system for water 
allocation in Sri Lanka.36   
Prior	  Appropriation	  
 In the arid regions of the western United States a system of water law developed which 
gives a priority of use to the first person or entity to utilize the watercourse.37  This priority is 
good against all later users regardless of their location on the watercourse so long as the use is 
beneficial.  The meaning of “beneficial use” and the determination of which uses are beneficial 
develops within each legal system as conflicts arise over water allocations.  Most prior 
appropriation systems define “beneficial use” as including mining, agricultural, domestic and 
municipal uses.38  However, as societal preferences change, in-stream flows for ecological 
protection and recreation have been added as legally protected beneficial uses.39 
 Once the water is applied to beneficial use a priority date is established.  If demand 
exceeds supply, as often occurs in the arid regions of the western United States, the first in time 
to utilize the water has the first right to its continued use and the later priority rights holders do 
not receive water.40  Water may be diverted and conveyed hundreds of miles from the 
watercourse.41 
                                                
36 Water allocation within Sri Lanka is described by the International Court of Justice Vice President Weeramantry 
in his separate opinion in the Case concerning the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project. Case concerning the Gabcíkovo-
Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment of Sept. 25, 1997, 1997 ICJ 7; repr. in 37 ILM 162 (1998), also 
available on the ICJ web site, www.icj-cij.org. 
37See,  Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855) and Clough v. Wing, 17 P. 453 (Ariz. 1888) 
38 See DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 97 (1997) (1984).  
39 See JOSEPH L. SAX, ET AL, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 141-143 (4TH ed 2006).  
40 SAX, ET AL supra note 36 at Ch. 3, GETCHES, supra note 35 Ch. 3. 




 Using the definitional matrix from the World Water Development Report set forth above 
the owner of a prior appropriation right has a private property right. 42  Each user who complies 
with the prescribed common law and statutory requirements43 obtains a usufruct right which may 
be enforced against junior appropriators through the judicial system.  The doctrine of prior 
appropriation is summarized by the phrase “first in time, first in right.”  The first person to divert 
water from a watercourse and put that water to beneficial use, as that term is described under 
local law, has the superior legal right to the continued use of water subject to laws for 
abandonment and forfeiture of the right.  When a watercourse becomes fully appropriated, the 
rights equal or exceed the supply, “those without rights…are excluded from consumption”44 
unless a market or transfer mechanism is established. 
The prior appropriation doctrine is traced to gold miners in California in the mid-
nineteenth century.45  Public lands were open for mineral exploration with property rights 
granted from the United States to the first person to stake a claim to the minerals.  The right to 
water, which was essential to the mining operations, developed along with the rights to the land.  
The first reported judicial opinion addressing prior appropriation, Irwin v. Phillips,46 notes the 
inapplicability of riparian law in a region in which much of the riparian land is owned by the 
government.47  With the statement that “[c]ourts are bound to take notice of the political and 
social condition of the country which they judicially rule,”48 the court upheld the local practice to 
                                                
42 Supra note 32.  See also GETCHES supra note 35 at 82-85 for a discussion of prior appropriation and private 
property. 
43 GETCHES supra note 35 at 74-75. Many states have added a requirement to register or obtain a permit. 
44 Supra note 32.  
45 See John D. McGowen, The Development of Political Institutions on the Public Domain, 11 WYO. L. J. 1, 8-14 
reproduced in FRANK J. TRELEASE, WATER LAW 20-22 (3rd ed. 1979). 
46 5 Cal. 140 (1855). 
47 Id at 145. 




respect the use of water by the person who first diverted it, and the doctrine of “prior 
appropriation” was recognized.  
 The rapid development of the arid western states was facilitated by the prior 
appropriation doctrine.  The doctrine was developed to meet the needs of an expanding and 
growing economy based on agriculture and mining.  However, it encouraged a “race to the river” 
and an over-appropriation of water.  It supported the western philosophy that a drop of water 
reaching the ocean is a drop of water wasted.49     
   In summary, the United States Supreme Court described the doctrine of prior 
appropriation as follows: 
The common-law rule respecting riparian rights in flowing water never obtained in either 
state [Wyoming and Colorado]. It always was deemed inapplicable to their situation and 
climatic conditions. The earliest settlers gave effect to a different rule whereby the waters 
of the streams were regarded as open to appropriation for irrigation, mining, and other 
beneficial purposes.  The diversion from the stream and the application of the water to a 
beneficial purpose constituted an appropriation, and the appropriator was treated as 
acquiring a continuing right to divert and use the water to the extent of his appropriation, 
but not beyond what was reasonably required and actually used. This was deemed a 
property right and dealt with and respected accordingly. As between different 
appropriations from the same stream, the one first in time was deemed superior in right, 
and a completed appropriation was regarded as effective from the time the purpose to 
make it was definitely formed and actual work thereon was begun, provided the work 
was carried to completion with reasonable diligence. This doctrine of appropriation, 
prompted by necessity and formulated by custom, received early legislative recognition 
in both territories and was enforced in their courts. When the states [Wyoming and 
Colorado] were admitted into the Union it received further sanction in their Constitutions 
and statutes and their courts have been uniformly enforcing it.50 
 
The doctrine of prior appropriation does not support conservation and gives little 
consideration to the ecology or “natural” resources associated with the watercourse including 
native fish and vegetation.  Such uses do not fit the statutory requirements for diversion of water 
for defined beneficial uses resulting in an increasing list of endangered native fish in the western 
                                                
49 See A. Dan Tarlock, International Water Law and the Protection of River System Ecosystem Integrity, 10 BYU J. 
PUB. L. 181, 186-188(1996). 




United States.  In many states the doctrine has not evolved to meet the needs of an urbanizing 
society.  It is politically difficult to address these issues in part because of the private property 
nature of the water rights.51  However, rarely are junior appropriators without water nor has a 
lack of water slowed growth and development as states build additional water storage, bring 
water through major works from other basins, modify restrictions on groundwater withdrawal 
and encourage market based water transfers.52 
Acequias	  
 “Acequia” is the Spanish word for ditch, in particular an irrigation ditch.  But the use of 
this term in the northern part of the state of New Mexico means much more.  Acequias include 
governance, community and culture all of which coalesce around the acequia that delivers the 
water.53  The water is the common property of the acequia community.54 
 The state of New Mexico has an ancient history of indigenous Pueblo irrigation societies 
within the Rio Grande valley.  The Spanish first settled near these Pueblos in 1598 and remained 
until driven out during the Pueblo Revolt of 1680.  Upon reconquest in the late 17th century the 
Spanish settled in ranchitos developing an irrigation society around acequias.   Under Spanish 
rule the early settlers developed “acequias de commún” or “de communidad” (shared ditches) to 
develop the physical infrastructure necessary for a village to survive in the arid and often hostile 
region.  Labor for construction and maintenance was divided proportionately based on benefit.55 
                                                
51 See generally ARIZONA WATER POLICY, MANAGEMENT INNOVATIONS IN AN URBANIZING, ARID REGION, BONNIE 
G. COLBY & KATHERINE L. JACOBS EDS. (2007) for a discussion of the difficulties of managing a water system using 
laws which do not integrate the natural water cycle. 
52 A. Dan Tarlock,  NATURAL RES. J.  (2001). 
53 See generally JOSÉ A. RIVERA, ACEQUIA CULTURE, WATER, LAND & COMMUNITY IN THE SOUTHWEST (1998) and 
SYLVIA RODRÍGUEZ, ACEQUIA, WATER SHARING, SANCTITY, AND PLACE (2006). 
54 See WORLD WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT supra note 29. 




Within many acequia communities today water remains a public good shared by all 
within the community.  The diversion works, the physical acequias, are community assets the 
maintenance of which is performed by the community for the benefit of all.  The community 
selects a commission and a mayordomo56 who is the “ditch boss” and community leader.  He 
divides the water and the maintenance responsibilities among the parciantes, a term used to 
describe both the land parcels and the owners.  Each community has its own rules of governance 
and methods for sharing the resource.   
 Among the earliest written rules for water delivery are those for the Margarita Ditch in 
San Patricio, New Mexico.  In 1903 the community documented the community rules, the 
“Reglas y Reglamentes,” setting forth the basic governance of the acequia.  The mayordomo   
is instructed to deliver water for 1 ½ days to each derecho de aqua (water right) beginning with 
the farthest downstream and rotating to all members,57 except that on Sundays the waters are 
reserved for irrigation of family gardens.58   The derecho de aqua is described as a share with 
each share measured by diversion time. Large parcientes might have more than one share while 
individuals using water only for domestic purposes have less than one share. 
 The history and operations of the acequias in the Taos Valley in northern New Mexico 
are documented by Rodríquez.59  The upper reaches of the Rio Pueblo de Taos is within the Taos 
Pueblo and used for irrigation and domestic purposes by the Native Americans within the 
Pueblo.  The downstream acequia communities also rely on the Rio Pueblo for irrigation and 
domestic purposes.  Conflicts between the Pueblo and acequia communities erupted in the late 
                                                
56 Rivera notes that historically the superintendent of the irrigation ditch settled on mayordomo sometime before 
1852 when legislation called for annual elections by all local ditch irrigators of a mayordomo.  RIVERA supra note 
47at  55. 
57 Id. at 80-82. 
58 Id. 




19th century.  Rodríquez reports that after legal battles in Territorial Court, representatives of the 
Pueblo and the Town of Taos met at the courthouse and agreed upon a water sharing 
arrangement.  In times of shortage the residents of the acequia community of Fernando de Taos 
are permitted to divert the water from twilight Friday until dawn on Monday.  The irrigators 
taking from the Acequia Madre (the “mother ditch” or main irrigation canal) have its use all day 
Monday.  The rest of the time the Pueblo may divert all the water.60  Most years the 
mayordomos, charged with delivery of water to the acequias, and the Governor of Taos Pueblo, 
charged with delivery of water within the Pueblo, meet to discuss and confirm this arrangement 
and their shared responsibilities.61  This major division of water between the Taos Pueblo and the 
downstream communities is still followed more than 100 years after the agreement was 
reached.62 
 Among the parciantes within the Taos valley the water is allocated using a time rotation 
similar to what is described above on the Margarita Ditch.  However, when sufficient water is 
available for all, diversions are made upon request to the mayordomo who delivers it based upon 
who requested the water first.  In times of shortage, all within the acequia share what is 
available.     
 The El Rito de La Lama Acequia in Taos County distributes water based on shares with 
each share measured in units of time.  Each parciante may open its gate on the ditch for the 
assigned amount of time which is determined by the use to be made of the water.  The 1998 
litigation among the parciantes of El Rito Acequia highlights the concepts of shares in water and 
the customary governance of acequias.   
                                                
60 Id. at 36-39. 
61 Id. at 40-42. 




El Rito Acequia Association has water rights that were adjudicated in state court in 1963 
and 1980.   For purposes of this discussion, water rights are measured by shares with one share 
equal to a diversion of the full flow of the ditch for one hour once a week.  The Association 
holds 168 shares.  One parciante owned by the Wilsons has rights to 102.5 shares, the equivalent 
of 61% of the water.  Disputes within the Association arose over the Wilsons’ horses and their 
contamination of the water in the ditch which is used by “downstream” parciantes as their sole 
domestic supply.  The Association voted to require the Wilsons to fence their horses away from 
the acequia.  The Wilsons attempted to take control of the Association and challenged the 
election of commissioners and the mayordomo.    
Each acequia member had one vote in the election of the commissioners and the 
mayordomo.  The Wilsons argued that New Mexico law required voting to be in proportion to 
water use.  The New Mexico Supreme Court upheld the traditional method of governance 
holding that no single method of voting was prescribed by New Mexico law.63  Custom and the 
rules of the acequia control its governance noting that most acequias vote for the commissioners 
and mayordomo based on one vote per parciante.  However, sharing the responsibility and cost 
for ditch maintenance varies among acequias with most basing assessments on water shares.  .  
 Distribution of water according to acequia rules is recognized in the laws of the territory 
and later the state of New Mexico.  The traditional practices were first codified in the Kearny 
Code for the New Mexico Territory in 184664 and incorporated in the Treaty of Guadalupe 
                                                
63 Wilson v. Denver, 961 P.2d 153 (N.M. 1998). The acequia commission voted to require the upstream parciante 
using 61% of the water to fence the acequia to prevent contamination from his horses and protect the water quality 
for downstream domestic use.  The land owner sued in state court claiming the voting process was invalid claiming 
that New Mexico law required voting based on percentage of water use.   
64 ORGANIC LAW FOR THE TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO COMPILED UNDER THE DIRECTIONS OF GENERAL KEARNY, in 




Hidalgo between the United States and Mexico in 1848.65  The New Mexico territorial laws of 
1851 and 1852 confirmed the acequia rules and incorporated them into territorial law.66 
 The acequia system is incorporated in New Mexico law by statute.67 
The New Mexico Constitution adopted in1910 recognizes acequia water rights in Article XVI 
Section 1: “All existing rights to the use of any waters in this state for any useful or beneficial 
purpose are hereby recognized and confirmed.”  The New Mexico Constitution further provides 
that “The unappropriated water of every natural stream, perennial or torrential, within the state of 
New Mexico, is hereby declared to belong to the public and to be subject to appropriation for 
beneficial use, in accordance with the laws of the state.  Priority of appropriation shall give the 
better right.”68  Thus, New Mexico law recognizes the acequia system within the state water law 
system of prior appropriation. 
 These two systems of allocation are not always compatible.  The surface waters within 
the state are over-appropriated.  Market transfers of water rights which are severed from the 
appurtenant land permits growth and development within the existing supply of water.  Conflicts 
arise between acequias that do not permit or want water to be removed from the community and 
the state law permitting market transfers.  The state legislature passed a law requiring the State 
Engineer to consider impacts to the community and water users within the community prior to 
                                                
65 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement between the United States of America and the United 
Mexican States, signed at Guadalupe Hidalgo, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat.922. 
66 Sec. 8, Rev. Statutes and Laws of the Territory of New Mexico, Ar. I, ch. I, Act of the 20th July, 1851, “Que de las 
acequias ya establicidas no se embaraze su curso.”[That the course of ditches (acequias) already established shall 
not be disturbed.]; Sec. 9, Act of 7th Jan. 1852, “Que todos los ríos y Corrientes de aqua en este Territorio, 
anteriormente conocidos como acequias públicas, son por este decreto establecidos y declarados a ser acequias 
públicas.  [That all rivers and streams of water in this Territory, formerly known as public ditches (acequias), be, 
and are hearby [sic] established and declared to be public ditches (acequias).  Sec. 21, Act of 7th Jan. 1852, “El 
arreglo de las acequias que ya están trabajadas quedar establecido tal como se hizo y permanace hast ahoy….[the 
regulations of ditches (acequias) which have been worked, shall remain as they were made and remain up to this 
day….] Quoted from José Rivera, Irrigation Communities of the Upper Rio Grande Bioregion: Sustainable 
Resource Use in the Global Context, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 731, 737-8 (1996). 
67 N.M.STATUTE ANNOTATED §72-1-1 to §72-19-103. 




approving a severance and transfer of water rights.  This does not resolve all disputes between 
the culture and life within the ancient acequia societies and the modern demands for water.69  
When one parciante within an acequia no longer takes its diversion of water and no longer 
assumes its responsibilities, it creates technical difficulties for water conveyance and increases 
the maintenance burdens for the remaining parcientes. 
 The legal issues created when an equitable system of water rights held by the members of 
the acequia community are incorporated into the quantitative rights system of prior appropriation 
are presented in the state of New Mexico.  State law permits individuals to sever and sell water 
rights.  Yet, the priority right may be held by the acequia Association with individuals having 
shares of that right or it may be held by the parciantes.  These issues remain to be resolved. 
Moroccan	  Springs	  
In the piedmont region of Morocco springs supply water for irrigation.  Geertz70 reports 
on two systems for allocation of water rights among the local farmers.   The first is a timed 
system, l-ma dyal s-sa’a (water by the hour) or b-l magana (by the clock) and the second is a 
queue system called mubih.71  Within each system “the underlying principle…is individual 
personal ownership of water … underneath them all is the concept that water, like land, housing, 
clothing,…is property, something that someone owns.”  The right to water may be bought, sold, 
leased, loaned and inherited separate from land because it is private property.72  
 The timed system, l-ma dyal s-sa’a, is based on water delivery from a particular spring 
measured by the flow of the ditch for a specified amount of time.  The time for water delivery is 
scheduled at fixed intervals so that a water right might be scheduled for nighttime on Wednesday 
                                                
69 See RIVERA supra note 47 Ch. 5 & 6 for a discussion of current and anticipated future difficulties for acequias. 
70 Clifford Geertz, The Wet and the Dry: Traditional Irrigation in Bali and Morocco, Human Ecology Vol. 1, No. 1 
at 23 (1971). 
71 Id. 




for 3 ½ hours and again every 6 days. All users have ownership of the diversion rights as 
measured by the diversion system.  
 The queue system, mubih, establishes a rotation of users from a particular ditch.  Each 
water right holder receives sufficient water to irrigate his land then the water flows down the 
ditch to the next land and continues in turn along the ditch system until it is again the turn of first 
land owner.  Each water right is for a particular purpose.  If additional water is needed because of 
a change in use or for a particular purpose such as planting, the owner negotiates with the other 
users along the ditch.  An observer of this system describes it as characterized by trading and 
bargaining.73  The system or combination of systems is particular to the spring and the 
community that relies on that spring. 
 In 1995 Morocco adopted a national Water Law to regularize what were characterized as 
haphazard water laws.  The Water Law confirms that all waters are under the public domain and 
are not subject to private ownership.  Use is by concession and payment of charges.  However, 
the Water Law recognizes ancient customary rights whether or not registered with the national 
government.74  The local uses and water rights developed by custom have been incorporated in 
each national water law of Morocco which is continued by the current Water Law.75  The 
property rights developed at the local level remain intact within a system of state ownership of 
the resource.76 
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74 SALMAN M.A. SALMAN & DANIEL D. BRADLOW, REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS FOR WATER RESOURCES 
MANAGEMENT: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 85-92 (2006). 







 Bali and Sri Lanka irrigation is organized using a communal system that delivers water 
from storage reservoirs or tanks to lands within a well defined service area.  Irrigation is part of a 
complex cultural and religious society.77  Within Bali the subak irrigation system provides each 
landowner within the subak an equal right to enough water to irrigate his rice fields.  Bali has an 
abundance of water in its equatorial climate however the timing of delivery of water is critical to 
the maintenance of rice production.  The subak system is locally organized with each land owner 
having a share of responsibility for construction and maintenance of the irrigation system.  The 
amount of water is allocated annually after negotiations with farmers and officials based on the 
land area to be irrigated.  Minor adjustments are made over time to allow for differing soils and 
drainage features on individual lands permitting more or less water to be diverted by the 
irrigators.  The collective system assigns a water right to each plot of land that remains with the 
land if the land transfers ownership.  The subak also includes social, cultural and religious 
relationships to water.  All irrigators within one subak plant at the same coordinated time which 
is also coordinated with subaks within the same region using common water resources.   
 Vermillion reports on a group of Balinese farmers who migrated to North Sulawesi, 
Indonesia and started the subak system on new parcels of land.78  The water requirements and 
timing of deliveries had to be established for each new field.  The farmers are described as 
“borrowing” water from their neighbors or from the system until the fields were adequately 
prepared and drainage patterns established.  In summary, the Bali system of “rights” is one that 
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attaches sufficient water to the land parcel to produce rice.79  When lands are uniform, each 
parcel receives the same amount of water, when the lands vary in their characteristics the amount 
of water necessary to grow rice is adjusted.80  The “rights” within a subak are enforced through a 
complex structure of societal norms and religious practices. 
 The tank system in Sri Lanka is similar in its organization to the subaks of Bali, however 
the availability of water each season is more variable.81  Sri Lanka “is renowned for its hydraulic 
civilization in which natural resources have been managed over thousands of years.”82  The 
system of water allocation in Sri Lanka is characterized by seasonal planning.  Like Bali, an 
ancient system of “tanks” captures water during the rainy season.83  The tank system permits 
farmers to determine the available supply of water for irrigation during the dry season.    At the 
beginning of each irrigation season, the farmers, sometimes along with government 
representatives, meet and negotiate the distribution of the available supply.  “Underlying water 
allocation for irrigation are two generally recognized principles.  The first is that of equity of 
water distribution.  Equity is defined as ensuring that every farmer gets water in proportion to 
landholdings and second, priority is given to standing crops over those not yet planted.”84 
 This system developed to meet the needs of the local communities and is described as 
“suited to irrigation systems with storage capacity, a single dominant crop, and variable water 
supplies.”85  The water resources are managed as a public good with users continuing the 
centuries old practice of contributing to maintenance of the systems for storage and delivery but 
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do not make any payment for water use.86  Sri Lanka is attempting to implement a new water law 
to accommodate changes in use from agriculture to industrial uses within the southern Ruhuna 
Basins.87  The centuries old system which provides water for social and cultural uses in addition 
to agriculture may be difficult to change.  Fears over the loss of these traditional rights prevent 
acceptance among many farmers.88 
Riparian	  Rights	  
In the water rich eastern region of the United States water rights are based common law 
riparian principles.89  The use of a watercourse is an aspect of the ownership of riparian land 
provided that the water is used on riparian lands.  
Riparian law in the United States is based on the English common law of natural flow.90  
Each riparian has a right to the natural flow of an undiminished watercourse adjacent to his 
property.  Diversions for domestic use and irrigation of personal garden plots are permissible 
uses even though the natural flow is somewhat diminished.  However, return flows from riparian 
lands theoretically replenish the watercourse and are available for use downstream.  Riparian law 
based on natural flow fostered navigation and mill use, but did not accommodate consumptive 
use91 of water for other economic purposes. 
As waterways lost significance for navigation and “milling,” the common law changed 
from riparian rights based on natural flow to rights based on reasonable use.  The concept of 
reasonableness is discussed more fully in connection with utilization of an international 
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watercourse,92 but for this purpose reasonableness is measured by the impact of one use on the 
uses by other riparians.93  If one property owner diminishes the flow of the watercourse such that 
another riparian may no longer use her water in the same reasonable manner as before the new 
use may be unreasonable. It is a comparative determination.  What constitutes a reasonable use 
has changed as the economics of water use and the demands for water for economic development 
have changed.  However, within a riparian system users who comply with the requirements for 
land ownership and make a reasonable use of the water obtain water rights which they are able to 
protect from interference by others using the same watercourse.94 
The reasonable use standard is enforceable in tort by the riparians who are impacted by a 
use alleged to be unreasonable.  This one-on-one enforcement does not promote economic 
development or efficiencies within a watercourse.  Today, most states following the riparian 
doctrine of reasonable use have assumed control of water resources and issue water permits.95 
Conclusion	  
  The above examples illustrate that legal rights to water are established under different 
legal systems from the bottom-up by the users within a local area.  This is “water law” 
throughout the world.  The governmental system of laws often recognizes and incorporates the 
local water law within the regulatory scheme.  In the case of prior appropriation, the courts 
acknowledged and accepted the system of water allocation in existence along the streams which 
was then adopted and adapted in other states and incorporated into state constitutions and 
legislation.  The acequias exist within a state system of prior appropriation and as demand for 
water continues to grow in this region of the United States, the policy decisions must be made to 
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maintain the community system or defeat it by permitting individual sale and transfer of water 
rights from within the acequia communities.  The 1995 Water Law of Morocco incorporates the 
local traditional uses including the private property rights to water which are contrary to the 
national policy.  Reports from Sri Lanka indicate that farmers who rely on the traditional local 
water law are resisting national efforts to implement a national water policy that might alter their 
traditional rights.  Local water laws become an aspect of community and support traditional 
users.   In locations of variable water availability such as Bali and Sri Lanka, the variability is 
incorporated within the water allocation system.  As water availability becomes more variable 
throughout the globe, those local laws that are the strongest and provide the most protection 
against loss of water may be the most resistant to the changes required to adapt to changing 
conditions.  It is at the local water user level that adaptation to global climate change must occur. 
 The next section moves to the opposite end of the pluralistic legal structure; the allocation 
of water among states sharing a common watercourse.  It examines the international law of 
equitable and reasonable utilization asking if the state has a “right” to water in the same sense as 
the private property rights recognized at the local level in the examples of prior appropriation 
and the Moroccan springs discussed above or is international water law more like the traditional 
law of riparian rights based on reasonable use.  This begins with a look at the customary 





Chapter	  Two:	  International	  Water	  Law	  	  
 This chapter discusses the two major principles of international water law as codified in 
the 1997 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses;96 equitable and reasonable utilization and the prevention of significant harm to 
other riparians.  As of this writing the 1997 UN Convention has not entered into force97 however 
it remains the primary authority for international water law.  The Convention is based on draft 
articles prepared by the International Law Commission after 20 years of extensive study of 
international agreements and practices.98  It was approved by resolution of the United Nations 
General Assembly on May 21, 1997 after negotiations in the Sixth Committee convened as a 
Working Group of the Whole in which all states had the opportunity to participate.99  The 
principles upon which it is based were discerned by the ILC from state practice and have 
crystallized into customary international law.100   
This chapter first examines the origins of the doctrine of equitable and reasonable 
utilization in the work of the International Law Association and the International Law 
Commission and then examines the meaning of “equitable” separate from the meaning of 
“reasonable” in relation to utilization of watercourses.  With this background, Chapter three uses 
the litigation over the Vermejo River in the state of New Mexico to discuss the vertical pluralism 
on a transboundary watercourse.  This builds a foundation for a discussion of the complexity of 
water law.  
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Equitable	  and	  reasonable	  utilization	  
 Equitable and reasonable utilization is a comparative principle by which a use or a 
planned use in one state is measured against uses in other watercourse states.101  As discussed in 
the following section, “equitable utilization” and “reasonable utilization” are different 
comparative standards, however, international instruments and publicists use the terms together 
and sometimes interchangeably.102   
 The equitable and reasonable standard may be more effective when applied in the 
negative to determine which uses are not equitable and reasonable.  The International Court of 
Justice made such a determination in the Danube Case103 when it was asked to determine 
whether a diversion by Slovakia was an equitable and reasonable utilization of the Danube.   
 In 1977 Czechoslovakia and Hungary entered a treaty for the joint development of the 
Danube to improve navigation, provide flood control and produce hydropower.104  The works 
were to be headed by a dam at Dunakiliti to divert the flow through a canal to a hydroelectric 
plant at Gabčíkovo constructed by Czechoslovakia.  The works contemplated by the 1977 Treaty 
terminated with a dam downstream at Nagymaros to be constructed by Hungary.105  When 
Hungary failed to complete the works at Dunakiliti and failed to construct the dam at Nagymaros 
in violation of the treaty, Czechoslovakia proceeded to construct a diversion dam wholly within 
its territory at Čunovo in order to use the facility at Gabcíkovo and partially develop the 
hydropower aspects of the project.  The Čunovo Dam diverted eighty to ninety percent of the 
flow of the Danube into a canal in Czechoslovakia to supply the hydropower plant at Gabcíkovo 
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before returning the flow to the Danube downstream.  The 1977 Treaty calls for diversion of this 
same amount of water from the joint dam at Dunakiliti, however since the Čunovo diversion was 
not a joint work the ICJ determined that it was not part of the treaty regime.  Therefore, the ICJ 
applied the customary international law principle of equitable and reasonable sharing of an 
international watercourse concluding that the unilateral assertion of control over the river by 
Czechoslovakia was an internationally wrongful act which deprived Hungary of its equitable and 
reasonable share of the watercourse.106  
 This case provides guidance about the meaning of equitable and reasonable utilization.  
First the ICJ determined that as a matter of international law each state has a “basic right to an 
equitable and reasonable sharing of the resources of an international watercourse.”107  Second, 
the Court held that a unilateral diversion of 80 to 90 percent of the flow deprived the downstream 
state of its share of the watercourse.108  The Court did not establish what would have been an 
equitable or reasonable diversion, instead, the Court urged the parties to continue to cooperate to 
reach an agreement for the continued operation of the works as constructed.109 
 Equitable and reasonable utilization are recognized by the Court as principles of 
customary international law that have crystallized and been codified in the 1997 UN Convention.  
The following section discusses equitable utilization and reasonable utilization as two distinct 
standards.  The former is based on the principles of equitable apportionment developed in the 
litigation between states of the United States and the latter based on the principles of riparian 
law. 
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 The ILC preparatory work for the 1997 Watercourse Convention developed the term 
“equitable and reasonable utilization” but focused on equitable utilization in the commentary 
with little discussion of the term reasonable.110   The discussion of reasonable use which follows 
is primarily based on riparian law in the United States.    As is discussed below, the 
determination of reasonable use at the user level informs the meaning of reasonable utilization 
of an international watercourse.   
Equitable	  utilization	  
 McCaffrey and others111 have written extensively on equitable utilization and the 
counterpart in the domestic law of the United States, equitable apportionment.  This section 
briefly describes equitable utilization.   
Born of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in interstate apportionment cases beginning 
in the early twentieth century, and supported by decisions in other federal states, the 
doctrine of equitable utilization was applied to international watercourses as the basic, 
governing principle by the International Law Association’s 1966 Helsinki Rules.  Its 
status as the fundamental norm in the field has recently been confirmed by the decision of 
the International Court of Justice in the Case concerning the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros 
Project (Hungary/Slovakia)….[T]he 1997 UN Convention also appears to treat equitable 
utilization as the overarching principle governing the use of international watercourses, as 
did the draft articles adopted by the ILC on second reading in 1994.112 
 The International Law Commission notes that the rule of equitable utilization can not be 
applied unilaterally by any state to determine “the amount of water a State may divert, the 
quality of water to which it is entitled, or the uses it may make of an international 
watercourse.”113  Implementation of this standard “depends ultimately upon the good faith and 
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co-operation of the States concerned.”114  Equitable utilization is also described as a post hoc 
measure and a standard to be used by a third party to resolve a dispute among a limited number 
of conflicting uses.  It is difficult to apply prospectively. 
 McCaffrey says, “According to the doctrine of equitable utilization, each state has a 
legally protected interest in an equitable share of the uses and benefits of an international 
watercourse.”115  The comparative basis of this standard is discussed below, but first a more in-
depth look at reasonable utilization. 
Reasonable	  utilization	  
 Turning now to the concept of reasonable utilization; reasonableness is a legal standard 
under domestic law in the United States for individual conduct when determining negligence or 
liability.  Tort law requires an examination of all the facts and circumstances measuring the act 
against an “objective” standard of a reasonable person in the same situation.  Riparian rights are 
based in tort.  Reasonable use is not “immoderate” or “excessive.”116  It is defined as “fair,” 
“proper,” “just,” “moderate,” “suitable under the circumstances,”  being synonymous with 
“equitable.”117   
 For purposes of this deconstruction of “equitable and reasonable utilization” the author 
does not assume that the two terms are synonymous for to do so would mean one or the other is 
irrelevant to the law of international watercourses.   Whereas equitable utilization may be 
conceptualized as dividing the whole of the watercourse among the watercourse states and other 
watercourse interests such as ecological preservation, fisheries and navigation, reasonable 
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utilization looks at water applied for a particular purpose to determine if the purpose for which 
the water is being used is reasonable given the facts and circumstances on the river.  
  Reasonable as a riparian standard  
   Reasonable is a term of art in riparian water law in the United States.  It is not the focus 
of this paper to explore the derivation and nuances of reasonable within the laws of the various 
states of the United States.    Therefore the following discussion of reasonable use in riparian 
law is based on those common law principles set forth in the American Law Institute 
Restatement (First118  and Second119) of the Law of Torts. 
 The standard of reasonableness developed in the courts to resolve disputes between two 
competing users. The party alleging injury must first establish that her use of water is reasonable 
and second, that the other party’s use interferes with her reasonable use.120  If the complaining 
party cannot establish that her water use is reasonable she does not have a legally protected 
interest.  This initial determination is not a comparative analysis and is based on the first four 
factors of §850A: “the purpose of the use, the suitability of the use to the watercourse or lake, the 
economic value of the use, [and] the social value of the use.”121 
 This basic principle of reasonable use in riparian law is set forth the Restatement Frist, as 
follows:  
The Reasonable Use theory.  Under the Reasonable Use theory the primary or 
fundamental right of each riparian proprietor on a watercourse or lake is merely to be free 
from an unreasonable interference with his use of the water therein.  Emphasis is placed 
on a full and beneficial use of the advantages of the stream or lake, and each riparian 
proprietor has a privilege to make a beneficial use of water for any purpose, provided 
only that such use does not unreasonably interfere with the beneficial uses of others.  
Reasonable use is the only measure of riparian rights.  Reasonableness, being a question 
of fact, must be determined in each case on the peculiar facts and circumstances of that 
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case.  Reasonableness is determined from a standpoint of a court or jury and depends not 
only upon the utility of the use itself, but also upon the gravity of its consequences on 
other proprietors.122 
 
 Conflicts over the use of a watercourse are resolved by first examining if the use by the 
complainant is reasonable.  If not, the complainant does not have a legal interest in the water that 
the court will protect.  The reasonableness of the interfering use is then examined.  If both uses 
are reasonable and they conflict, the court uses the factors in Restatement Second Torts §850A123 
to determine an equitable solution. 
 The reasonable use theory of riparian law contains three basic principles; 1) water is 
shared by riparians on an equitable basis, 2) no single user may unreasonably interfere with the 
reasonable use of another riparian, and 3) if there are conflicting uses the utility of the use must 
outweigh the gravity of the harm in order to be considered reasonable.124   
 Another point of note in the Restatement First description of reasonable use quoted above 
is the type of legal right held by a riparian.  “[E]ach riparian proprietor has a privilege to make a 
beneficial use of water for any purpose provided only that such use does not unreasonably 
interfere with the beneficial uses of others.”125  This privilege is shared by all riparians on a 
watercourse.126  It is a privilege because each riparian may exercise it, but each of the uses is 
subject to being reduced or defeated when another riparian holding the same privilege exercises 
hers.  Each riparian may interfere with the use by each other riparian so long as the use is 
reasonable.  If one use is not reasonable there is no legal privilege or right to continue the use 
and an injunction may issue.  If both uses are reasonable a conflict of uses is resolved by an 
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examination of “the practicality of avoiding harm by adjusting the use or method of use”127 and 
“the practicality of adjusting the quantity of water used by each proprietor.”  In the event an 
equitable adjustment is not possible to permit both uses to continue simultaneously the factors of 
§850A are used.  These situations are explained as follows: 
If two uses can coexist, because one causes no substantial harm to the other, or because 
harm can be avoided by adjusting the quantity or method of one use or the other or 
because sharing a temporarily short supply is reasonable, the rights may be said to be 
equal. If, however, the normal water supply is insufficient for all potential uses, equal 
treatment may be impossible. One riparian's right to make a new use may be affected by 
the fact that other riparians have already put the water to use. To allow the new use will 
wholly or partially destroy the existing use or take one riparian's supply of water from 
him and give it to the new user. In these cases the law must choose one use or the other 
on the basis of the factors stated in §850A, Clauses (h) and (i), and discussed in the 
Comments to those Clauses.128 [§850A is reproduced at the end of this chapter.] 
 
 A water right based on reasonable use is a comparative standard under which “one cannot 
always be absolutely sure just what uses he can or cannot lawfully make of the water; and even 
though a use may, in its inception, be reasonable, circumstances may change to such an extent 
that it will become unreasonable.”129 
	   	   Reasonable	  in	  international	  instruments	  
 The term reasonable as used to describe the utilization of an international watercourse 
appears in draft articles prepared by the International Law Commission without definition or 
much explanation.  In contrast, the term “equitable” is discussed extensively with a significant 
body of state practice, case law from federal states, and treaty language to assist with the 
interpretation.  This section will trace the inclusion of reasonable utilization in the 1997 UN 
Convention as a separate concept from equitable utilization.  
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 Helsinki Rules:  The Helsinki Rules130 adopted by the International Law Association in 
1966 were the first comprehensive documentation of legal principles for utilization of 
international watercourses.  Article IV provides that “each basin State is entitled, within its 
territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an 
international drainage basin.”131  Article V indicates that “what is a reasonable and equitable 
share within the meaning of article IV [is] to be determined in the light of all the relevant factors 
in each particular case….”132 
 Reasonable as used in Articles IV and V relates to each state’s share of water.  The 
factors to determine that share are listed in Article VI  and include “the comparative costs of 
alternative means of satisfying the economic and social needs of each basin State,133 the 
availability of other resources, 134 the avoidance of unnecessary waste in the utilization of 
waters,135 the practicability of compensation to one or more of the co-basin States as a means of 
adjusting conflicts among uses;136 and the degree to which the needs of a basin State may be 
satisfied, without causing substantial injury to a co-basin State.”137  These factors are very 
similar to the factors in the Restatement that determine the reasonableness of a riparian right.138 
 Reasonableness as a measure of use is reinforced by examining Articles VII, VIII, and X 
of the Helsinki Rules.  Article VII provides that the “present reasonable use” of a watercourse 
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cannot be denied in order to reserve water for future uses in another state.139  Article VIII, 
paragraph 1 provides that “an existing reasonable use may continue in operation unless the 
factors justifying its continuance are outweighed by other factors leading to the conclusion that it 
be modified or terminated so as to accommodate a competing incompatible use.”140  Modifying 
“use” with reasonable indicates that only reasonable uses are protected.  This is reinforced in 
Paragraph 3 of Article VIII confirming that a use that is not reasonable does not receive legal 
protection, “A use will not be deemed an existing use if at the time of becoming operational it is 
incompatible with an already existing reasonable use.”141  The concept of reasonableness as used 
in the Helsinki Rules appears to be the basic measure of an equitable share in the same manner it 
is the measure of a riparian right. 
 The next sections trace the incorporation of reasonable in the work of the International 
Law Commission which led to the draft articles adopted by the UN General Assembly as the 
1997 UN Convention. 
 Schwebel, ILC Draft Articles:  In 1981 Special Rapporteur Stephen Schwebel included in 
his Third Report142 the first complete set of draft articles on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses 
of International Watercourses.143  This draft does not use the word reasonable to modify or 
describe utilization of an international watercourse.  Draft Article 6, Equitable participation, 
provides: 
1. The waters of an international watercourse system shall be developed and used by 
system States on an equitable basis with a view to attaining optimum utilization of 
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those waters, consistent with adequate protection and control of the components of 
the system. 
2. Without its consent a State may not be denied its equitable participation in the 
utilization of the waters of an international watercourse system of which it is a system 
State. 
3. An equitable participation includes the right to use water resources of the system on 
an equitable basis and the duty to contribute on an equitable basis to the protection 
and control of the system as particular conditions warrant or require.144 
 
 The Schwebel commentary on this draft article indicates that the “right of each State to 
share equitably in the uses of the waters of an international watercourse system is indisputable 
and undisputed”145 explaining that States have the right to “reasonable and equitable sharing of 
the uses of the waters.”146  
 Schwebel discusses the Helsinki Rules and ILA Commentary thereon regarding equitable 
and reasonable use147 yet the concept that use by each basin state must be reasonable was not 
included in his Draft Articles.  Schwebel discusses of reasonable use as the basis of the United 
States argument in the dispute with Canada over the Kootenay River,148 but uses this discussion 
to support equitable use in the draft articles.  However, the factors for determination of an 
equitable use incorporated in the Schwebel Draft Article 7 include those from the Helsinki Rules 
which are very similar to the factors used to determine the reasonableness of a riparian use.  
These include: comparison of uses by other states,149 the “social and economic need for the 
particular use,”150 the “efficiency of use of water resources of the system,”151 and the potential of 
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the use to cause pollution.152 Each of these factors relate to the use of water within a State, which 
may be a measure of reasonableness.153  
 Evensen, ILC Draft Articles:154  In 1984 the ILC Special Rapporteur Jens Evensen 
prepared a revised set of draft articles.  His Article 6 includes reasonable as a measure of a 
state’s share of an international watercourse.  
Article 6 General principles concerning the sharing of the waters of an international 
watercourse. 
1. A watercourse State is, within its territory, entitled to a reasonable and equitable share 
of the uses of the waters of an international watercourse.155 
2. To the extent that the use of the waters of an international watercourse within  the 
territory of one watercourse State affects the use of  the waters of the watercourse in 
the territory of another watercourse State, the watercourse States concerned shall 
share in the use of the waters of the watercourse in a reasonable and equitable manner 
in accordance with the articles of the present Convention and other agreements  and 
arrangements entered into with regard to the management, administration or uses of 
the international watercourse.156 
 
 Evensen introduces the term reasonable to the text of the draft articles but limits it in 
both paragraphs 1 and 2 to modifying the “share” of a watercourse that a state may use.  
 In Draft Article 7 Evensen157 incorporates reasonableness as a limitation on the domestic 
use of an international watercourse:   
Article 7.  Equitable sharing in the uses of the waters of an international watercourse. 
The waters of an international watercourse shall be developed, used and shared by 
watercourse States in a reasonable and equitable manner on the basis of good faith and 
good-neighbourly relations with a view to attaining optimum utilization thereof 
                                                
152 Id. at Par. 106, Art 7(vii). 
153 The Schwebel Draft Articles rely on many of the same factors as the Helsinki Rules to determine “equitable use” 
to determine “reasonable use.” However, the Schwebel Draft Articles are not as closely aligned with the concept of 
reasonableness from riparian law as are the Helsinki Rules. 
154 Jens Evensen, Second Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 1984, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/381.  
155 Compare Helsinki Rules Art. IV “Each basin State is entitled, within its territory, to a reasonable and equitable 
share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an international drainage basin.” 
156 Evensen Second Report supra note 149, at Par. 49. 
157 Jens Evensen, First Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 1984, U.N. 




consistent with adequate protection of the international watercourse and its 
components.158 
 
Evensen first introduces this form of “legal standard”159 directing how an international 
watercourse may be used within a state; it “shall be developed” and “used…in a reasonable and 
equitable manner…with a view to attaining optimum utilization.”160  This draft Article 
recognizes the interconnectedness of uses within each state, provides that each state may utilize 
its equitable and reasonable share and that each state’s share must be used in an equitable and 
reasonable manner.  Equitable and reasonable utilization are determined using a list of factors, 
many of which carry forward from the Helsinki Rules to the Schwebel draft articles.  The Draft 
Article 8 factors for the “determination of reasonable and equitable use”161 include “conservation 
by the watercourse state,”162 a comparison of efficiencies of use among watercourse states,163 
pollution “as a consequence of the particular use,”164 “other interference with or adverse effects, 
if any, of such use for the uses, rights or interests of other watercourse States,”165 and the 
“availability to the States concerned and to other watercourse States of alternative water 
resources.”166  Each of the factors mentioned here relates to use of water within the state and may 
be used to determine if such domestic use is reasonable.  There is some overlap in that some of 
the factors, such as the availability of other water resources may also be used to determine the 
equitable share for each state. 
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163 Id. at Art. VIII (f). 
164 Id. at Art. VIII (h). 
165 Id. at Art. VIII (i). 
166 Id. at Art. VIII (j).  This requirement is a further examination of water use within a state, requiring information on 




 Evensen may be credited with introducing the concept of reasonable use to the ILC draft 
articles regarding equitable use of an international watercourse and also for explicitly adding the 
important concept that uses within a watercourse state are to be reasonable. 
McCaffrey, ILC Draft Articles:  Special Rapporteur Stephen C. McCaffrey comments on the 
previous draft articles in his second report in 1986.167  McCaffrey chronicles the changes from 
“shared natural resource” articulated by the first Special Rapporteur Richard D. Kearny and 
developed by Schwebel to the language of the most recent drafts “sharing in the use of waters in 
a reasonable and equitable manner.”168  He reviewed the draft articles by Evensen in light of 
strong State objections to the concept that  an international watercourse is a “shared natural 
resource.”169 McCaffrey notes the work of Evensen to replace the language and concept of a 
watercourse as a shared natural resource with the principle that “States were entitled to a 
reasonable and equitable share of the benefits arising from an international watercourse.”170  
McCaffrey states that “[T]he expression ‘the watercourse system and its waters are…a shared 
natural resource’ had been changed to ‘the watercourse States concerned shall share in the use of 
the waters of the watercourse in a reasonable and equitable manner’”171 in order to address state 
objections. 
McCaffrey discusses two sides to equitable and reasonable utilization which he 
incorporates into a new draft Article 5.  The first is that each state is entitled to an equitable and 
reasonable share of an international watercourse; the second is that no state is entitled to more 
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168 Id. at Par. 38. 
169 Id. at Par. 23. 
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than its share or to a share that interferes with another states’ equitable and reasonable share.172  
McCaffrey includes an extensive survey and discussion of treaties, positions taken in diplomatic 
exchanges, state practice, judicial decisions, arbitral awards, other international instruments, the 
views of publicists and municipal court decisions.173  Based on this extensive survey McCaffrey 
concludes:  
It is clear…that there is overwhelming support for the doctrine of equitable utilization as 
a general, guiding principle of law for the determination of the rights of States in respect 
of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses.174   
 
The bedrock upon which the doctrine of equitable utilization is founded is the 
fundamental principle represented by the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.  As 
seen above, this maxim is a generally accepted principle of law governing the relations 
between States.  In the context of the use of a watercourse which separates or traverses 
two or more States, this means that one of those States may not use or permit the use of 
the watercourse in such a way as to cause injury to the other(s).  Thus the States are 
referred to as having “equal” or, perhaps more accurately, “correlative” rights in respect 
of use of the watercourse, a concept which finds expression in the doctrine of limited 
territorial sovereignty: a State has the sovereign right to make whatever use it wishes of 
waters within its territory, but that right is limited by the duty not to cause injury to other 
States.175 (citations omitted) 
 
 McCaffrey goes on to discuss the parameters of equitable use in this second report176 but 
does not discuss in this or later reports the addition of the requirement of reasonable use to the 
draft of what became Article 5 of the 1997 UN Convention. 
 What may appear as a subtle change in wording from the Evensen draft Article 6  to the 
McCaffrey draft Article 5 may in fact be a change in meaning with the new Article 5 reflecting 
more the concept of domestic water use contained in the Evensen Article 7 with the 
understanding that an equitable apportionment must take place in order for there to be an 
equitable and reasonable domestic utilization. 
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 The Draft articles as reported to the General Assembly and as adopted in the 1997 
Convention read as follows: 
Article 5.  Equitable and reasonable utilization and participation 
 
1.    Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an international 
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In particular, an international 
watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse States with a view to attaining 
optimal utilization thereof and benefits therefrom consistent with adequate protection of 
the watercourse.  
 2.    Watercourse States shall participate in the use, development and protection of an 
international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. Such participation 
includes both the right to utilize the watercourse and the duty to cooperate in the 
protection and development thereof, as provided in the present articles.177 
 
 It appears from the plain language of the first sentence of the first paragraph that the 
Convention sets a standard for the domestic use of water within a watercourse state vis-à-vis 
other states.  This incorporates the concepts from Evensen Article 7.  The principle contained in 
this first sentence of Article 5, does not receive consideration in the reports or commentary.178   
 As with drafts prepared by each of the previous special rapporteurs, McCaffrey includes a 
non-exclusive list of factors to determine equitable and reasonable utilization.  Four of the listed 
factors apply directly to domestic water use:  “the effects of the use or uses of the watercourse in 
one watercourse State on other watercourse States;”179 the “existing and potential uses of the 
watercourse;”180 the “conservation, protection, development and economy of use of the water 
                                                
177 Y.B. I.L.C. 1991, A/CN.4/SER.A/1991/Add.1 (Part 2), Part D.  The only change made prior to the adoption by 
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resources of the watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that effect;”181 and “the 
availability of alternatives, of corresponding value, to a particular planned or existing use.” 182 
 The ILC submitted its report to the General Assembly on the Law of the Non-
navigational Uses of International Watercourses in 1994.183  Each draft article recommended to 
the General Assembly is followed by extensive commentary indicating that each watercourse 
state may use an equitable portion of the watercourse but not elaborating on the “reasonable” 
aspects of the provision. The first sentence of Article 5 requiring that “[w]atercourse states shall 
in their respective territories utilize an international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable 
manner” is the same as developed in the McCaffrey Draft Articles.184 
Conclusion	  
 The forgoing discussion demonstrates that the 1997 UN Convention includes the 
obligation for states to use an international watercourse reasonably.  Equitable utilization and 
reasonable utilization are distinct concepts in domestic water law, the former is the standard for 
sharing or apportioning an international or interstate watercourse, the latter is the standard for 
use of that watercourse.  In order to determine a reasonable utilization it is necessary to have 
information about domestic uses within each watercourse state.  This may be a necessary 
intrusion on state sovereignty in order to attain “optimal and sustainable utilization”185 of the 
international watercourse.  The commentary to the 1997 UN Convention does not include a 
discussion of reasonable use.  However, this is a long standing measure of water use in riparian 
law.  The following chart demonstrates the similarities in the factors for determination of 
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184 Compare McCaffrey Draft Articles contained in 1994 ILC Report supra note 172 and Art. 5 of the 1997 UN 
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reasonable use in riparian law and the Article 7 factors from the 1997 UN Convention indicating 
that the history and development of reasonable use in domestic law as embodied in the 
Restatement First may inform determinations about what is reasonable use of an international 
watercourse. 
 Reasonable use is not a fixed standard or a quantified measure of water.  The domestic 
riparian law standard of reasonableness is utilized on watercourses in regions with plentiful 
water supply.  It is also a principle that may be used in circumstances when demand exceeds 
supply.  For example, is it reasonable to continue to divert water to grow rice if the supply 
downstream is diminished to a point that it is insufficient to supply the population with drinking 
water?  The principle of reasonable use may provide flexibility to require changes in use to meet 
changes in natural conditions and changes in use. 
 Following the chart, the next chapter discusses the comparative nature of water law based 






Comparison	  of	  Restatement	  and	  International	  Factors	  for	  Reasonable	  Use	  
Restatement of the Law of Torts Second 
§  850A. Reasonableness Of The Use Of Water 
 
The determination of the reasonableness of a use of 
water depends upon a consideration of the interests of the 
riparian proprietor making the use, of any riparian 
proprietor harmed by it and of society as a whole. Factors 
that affect the determination include the following: 
(a) The purpose of the use, 
 
(b) the suitability of the use to the watercourse 
or lake, 
 
(c) the economic value of the use, 
 
(d) the social value of the use, 
 
(e) the extent and amount of the harm it causes, 
 
(f) the practicality of avoiding the harm by 
adjusting the use or method of use of one proprietor 
or the other, 
 
(g) the practicality of adjusting the quantity of 
water used by each proprietor, 
 
(h) the protection of existing values of water 
uses, land, investments and enterprises and 
 
(i) the justice of requiring the user causing harm 
to bear the loss. 
 
 1997 UN Convention 
Article 6 
Factors relevant to equitable and reasonable utilization 
   
1.    Utilization of an international watercourse in an 
equitable and reasonable manner within the meaning of 
article 5 requires taking into account all relevant factors 
and circumstances, including:  
(a) Geographic, hydrographic, hydrological, 
climatic, ecological and other factors of a natural 
character;  
(b) The social and economic needs of the 
watercourse States concerned;  
(c) The population dependent on the watercourse 
in each watercourse State;  
(d) The effects of the use or uses of the 
watercourses in one watercourse State on other 
watercourse States;  
(e) Existing and potential uses of the 
watercourse;  
(f) Conservation, protection, development and 
economy of use of the water resources of the 
watercourse and the costs of measures taken to 
that effect;  
(g) The availability of alternatives, of comparable 
value, to a particular planned or existing use. 
2.    In the application of article 5 or paragraph 1 of this 
article, watercourse States concerned shall, when the need 
arises, enter into consultations in a spirit of cooperation.  
3.    The weight to be given to each factor is to be 
determined by its importance in comparison with that of 
other relevant factors. In determining what is a reasonable 
and equitable use, all relevant factors are to be considered 










Chapter	  3:	  The	  Vermejo	  River	  	  
 The Vermejo River litigation between the states of Colorado and New Mexico186 in the 
United States poses a fact situation conducive to analyzing equitable apportionment and the 
requirements of reasonable use.  It also demonstrates the vertical legal pluralism along a 
watercourse.   
The Vermejo River is a small stream that originates in the snowmelt of the Sangre de 
Cristo Mountains of southern Colorado.187  This tributary flows for a total distance of 55 miles, 
most of which is in New Mexico, before reaching the mainstream of the Canadian River.  The 
facts regarding use of the Vermejo River are simple enough to permit a transparent examination 
of the relationships among the state laws of prior appropriation, the interstate law of equitable 
apportionment, and the requirements of reasonable use.   
New Mexico and Colorado follow the law of prior appropriation, the first in time to use 
the water has a superior legal right.  The priority dates and the quantification of the rights are 
determined in an adjucation, a court proceeding that brings all water users on the same 
watercourse into court together.  The court enters a decree on which the priorities are listed 
chronologically along with a quantity of water which has been beneficially used.  In the event of 
a shortage on the watercourse, the parties at the bottom of the decree with the latest priority dates 
are shorted water. 
The New Mexico portion of the Vermejo River was adjudicated in New Mexico state 
courts and a water rights decree listing four water rights holders was entered in 1941.188  The 
largest and most junior holder of water rights is the Vermejo Conservancy District, a federally 
                                                
186 Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982) (Vermejo I); following remand to Special Master, Colorado v. 
New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310 (1984) (Vermejo II). 
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funded reclamation project that provides water through “an extensive system of canals and 
reservoirs”189 for stock watering190 and irrigated agriculture.191   The four users have fully 
appropriated the Vermejo River the result of which is that any new use, whether in New Mexico 
or Colorado, reduces the available supply to the most junior rights holder, the Vermejo 
Conservancy District.192 
 In 1975 the state of Colorado granted Colorado Fuel and Iron Steel Corporation, (C.F. & 
I.) a Colorado corporation, a conditional water right to divert water from the Vermejo River, 
transfer the water out of the Vermejo River basin and use it in the Purgortoire River basin for 
industrial development.193  The first litigation was filed by the four New Mexico water users 
against C.F. & I194 based on a theory of transboundary prior appropriation.195 Both New Mexico 
and Colorado follow the law of prior appropriation and this formed the basis of the district court 
order enjoining C.F. & I. from diverting any water that would violate the senior rights held by 
the four users downstream in New Mexico.  C.F. & I. appealed, which appeal was stayed 
pending resolution of the equitable apportionment action in the United States Supreme Court 
which had been subsequently filed by the state of Colorado against the state of New Mexico. 
 The state of Colorado invoked the original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme 
Court to request an equitable apportionment of the Vermejo River.196  The Court accepted 
jurisdiction and appointed Special Master Ewing T. Kerr to hear evidence and prepare a report 
which was submitted to the Court in 1982.  The parties, Colorado and New Mexico, then 
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appeared before the Court on exceptions to the Special Master’s Report.  The Court summarized 
the findings of the Special Master: 
 “The Special Master found that most of the water of the Vermejo River is 
consumed by the New Mexico users and that very little, if any, reaches the confluence 
with the Canadian River.  He thus recognized that strict application of the rule of priority 
would not permit Colorado any diversion since the entire available supply is needed to 
satisfy the demands of appropriators in New Mexico with senior rights.  Nevertheless, 
applying the principle of equitable apportionment established in our prior cases he 
recommended permitting Colorado a transmountain diversion of 4,000 acre-feet of water 
per year from the headwaters of the Vermejo River.  He states: 
‘It is the opinion of the Master that a transmountain diversion would not 
materially affect the appropriations granted by New Mexico for users 
downstream.  A thorough examination of the existing economies in New Mexico 
convinces the Master that the injury to New Mexico, if any, will be more than 
offset by the benefit to Colorado.’”197 
 
 To summarize further, the Special Master determined that Colorado has a right to an 
equitable share of the Vermejo River which the special Master determine to be 4,000 acre-feet 
per year.  The common law of equitable apportionment as determined by the Supreme Court 
provides that each state has an equal right to share in the use of an interstate stream, even when 
use in one state interferes with uses in another state.198  There must be a balancing of interests 
and benefits. 
 In the first case, Vermejo I,199 the Court remanded to the Special Master requesting that 
he provide findings of fact for the Court sufficient to support his determination that an equitable 
apportionment of the Vermejo River would permit Colorado to divert 4,000 acre-feet per year.    
Justice O’Connor wrote a separate opinion in Vermejo I concurring in the remand, but 
questioning the finding of the Special Master that water use within the Vermejo Conservancy 
District in New Mexico was unreasonable and wasteful.  Two years later, Justice O’Connor 
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wrote the majority opinion in Vermejo II200 holding that Colorado had not met its burden of proof 
to establish that it was entitled to an equitable apportionment of  the Vermejo River.   
 Taking these two cases together one discerns the following principles of equitable 
apportionment and of reasonable use that elaborate on the holding that “equitable apportionment 
will protect only those rights to water that are ‘reasonably acquired and applied.’”201 
Equitable	  Apportionment	  
 
 The Court recounted the law of equitable apportionment as determined in previous cases, 
including the salient principles set forth below: 
• “Equitable apportionment is the doctrine of federal common law that governs disputes 
between states concerning their rights to use the water of an interstate stream.”202 
• Equitable apportionment requires a “delicate adjustment of interests”203 considering all 
relevant factors including: 
o the physical and climatic conditions; 
o the consumptive use within the different sections of the river and the return flow; 
o the extent of established uses; 
o the availability of storage water; 
o the effect of wasteful uses; 
o damage to uses in one state compared to benefits in another if limitations are 
placed on the former; and 
o the efficiencies of different uses.204 
• When the states involved recognize the doctrine of prior appropriation, “priority becomes 
the ‘guiding principle’ in an allocation between competing states.’”205 
• “[T]he equities of supporting the protection of established, senior uses are substantial, it 
is also appropriate to consider…conservation measures available to both states and the 
balance of harm to benefit.”206 
 
• The “doctrine of equitable apportionment clearly extends to a state’s claim to divert water 
for future uses.”207 
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• “[E]quitable apportionment will protect only those rights to water that are ‘reasonably 
acquired and applied.’”208  It requires not only the “reasonably efficient use of water” but 
it also imposes “an affirmative duty to take reasonable steps to conserve and augment the 
water supply of an interstate stream.”209 
The final factor makes clear the relationship between equitable apportionment and reasonable 
use in that the Court states that only those uses that are reasonably acquired and applied will be 
protected.  This is an interesting concept in this context given that the New Mexico courts had 
previously adjudicated this stream requiring a determination that all uses are lawful.  Examining 
the range of principles articulated by the Court it is difficult to discern a standard by which an 
equitable apportionment may be made.   
Reasonable	  use	  
In Vermejo I the Court determined that existing uses in New Mexico could be reduced to 
accommodate new uses in Colorado, an equitable apportionment.  The Court used the standard of 
reasonableness to determine the available supply from which an apportionment may be made 
without causing legal harm.  In other words, the Court determined that a wasteful or 
unreasonable use is not protected under an interstate theory of priority of rights or a theory of 
equitable apportionment.   
The following are principles articulated by the Court regarding reasonable use or its 
corollary, unreasonable or wasteful use: 
• “The question here is not what one state should do for the other, but how each should 
exercise her relative rights in the waters of this interstates stream….  Both states 
recognize that conservation within practicable limits is essential in order that needless 
waste may be prevented and the largest feasible use may be secured.”210 
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• “[I]t is…appropriate to consider the extent to which reasonable conservation measures by 
[one state] might offset the proposed diversion [in another state] and thereby minimize 
any injury to …users.”211 
• “Especially in those Western states where water is scarce, ‘[t]here must be no waste … of 
the ‘treasure’ of a river….  Only diligence and good faith will keep the privilege alive.  
Thus, wasteful or inefficient uses will not be protected.”212 
• “In calculating the dependable supply we (the Court) placed on each state the duty to 
employ ‘financially and physically feasible’ measures ‘adapted to conserving and 
equalizing  the natural flow.’”213 (emphasis in original) 
• Each state has a “duty to exercise her right reasonably and in a manner calculated to 
conserve the common supply.”214 
• “What is reasonable…does not admit of ready definition, being dependent upon the 
particular facts and circumstances of each case.”215 
• New Mexico did not act reasonably to take the actions necessary to detect waste and 
administer the Vermejo River in a reasonable manner.  The following are listed as 
examples;  the river does not have a Water Master, water use is not measured, there is not 
monitoring of use, the State Engineer lacks the staff to detect unadjudicated and 
unauthorized uses,  the state had not installed gauges at the state line or assisted in the 
maintenance of gauges installed by Colorado nor did New Mexico administer the decreed 
rights under the Vermejo Decree.216 
• A finding that a use is unreasonable requires more than a showing that it is not efficient. 
• The Court will not permit unreasonable waste, but this must be established by clear and 
convincing evidence and may only be determined upon a comparison of uses in both 
states. 
 
 One commentator bemoans this last point indicating that the high standard of proof 
established in the Vermejo cases is the demise of equitable apportionment.217  However, a 
standard of clear and convincing evidence is necessary in these circumstances not only for the 
reasons set forth by the court but because of the inherent nature of the controversy.  Colorado 
asked the Special Master and the Court to manage the water resource from the top-down, to 
substituting itself as Water Master on the stream replacing the states. 
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 The discussion of a standard of reasonableness is difficult to apply.  This case took 
evidence on individual water uses, proposed water uses and then attempted to balance the 
relative importance of each.   The Court, at the behest of a neighboring state, imposed  standard 
of reasonableness on local water users in order to change a legal entitlement to water.  This is 
disruptive to the stability provided by local water law.   However, the law of equitable 
apportionment requires this to be done in some instances.  The higher standard of proof is the 
balance between intrusion into state sovereignty and local property rights and the equitable 
apportionment of interstate watercourses. 
 In Vermejo I and Vermejo II, the Court held that Colorado must prove the particular 
conservation measures that are reasonable for New Mexico to make to reduce demand for water.  
Colorado failed to do so.  The Court also required proof that the proposed uses in Colorado 
which meet the same standard of reasonableness.  Colorado failed to prove this as well.  For 
these reasons, the Court ruled in favor of New Mexico. 
Conclusion	  
 Determining equitable apportionment and reasonable use requires an examination of 
water use that many states will find intrusive. In Vermejo I and Vermejo II Colorado alleged 
unreasonable use by New Mexico and New Mexico countered that the proposed uses in Colorado 
must be reasonable as well.  A finding of unreasonable use would “free-up” water within an 
over-allocated stream making it available to new uses.  The determination whether a given use is 
reasonable or if the local laws and the administration of local water laws promotes reasonable 
use is difficult to determine and requires a fact intensive inquiry.  The Vermejo River cases 
demonstrate the potential to use a standard of reasonableness to provide flexibility in the 




As discussed in Chapter One, the laws for the allocation of water develop to address local 
resource conditions and policy objectives.  The evaluation of local uses with an interstate 
standard of reasonableness may result in a different determination of reasonableness than is 
made based on local law.218 
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  Chapter	  4	  Water	  Laws:	  Entitlements,	  Rights,	  Duties	  and	  Privileges	  
 
 Chapter One discussed selected examples of local water laws which developed from the 
bottom up to serve local needs.  Chapter Two examined the principles of international water law 
discerned from state practice and codified by the International Law Commission in what became 
the 1997 UN Convention; water law from the top-down.  The Vermejo River example, discussed 
in Chapter 3, lets us examine the relationships among local water laws, in this case prior 
appropriation and acequias, and the relationship between local water laws, principles of 
equitable apportionment among states of the United States and the principles of reasonable use.  
This Chapter examines the legal basis of water allocation and the different meanings of “water 
rights,” the entitlements, rights, duties and privileges that permit use of a watercourse.  The 
classic work Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral219 by 
Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed provides an economics and the law perspective of 
different water laws.  The classic articles, Some Fundamental Legal conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning220 and Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning221 
by Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, provide the basis for a tautological discussion of “rights” to 
water.  The reasoning from these articles is applied to local and international water laws to 
highlight conceptual differences. 
 An international watercourse flows through multiple communities, regions and states.  
Each user looks up the chain of vertical legal pluralism to determine the controlling water laws.  
These may include a local ditch users association, community rules, provincial or regional laws, 
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interstate apportionments and international agreements.  At each of these levels similar 
terminology of “water law,” “rights to water” and “water rights” is used but the underlying legal 
concepts are different.  At one level a “water right” is based on community participation with 
shared benefits and burdens as in an acequia.  At another level a “water right” is a commodity 
that is quantified, bought and sold as in a prior appropriation system or the spring allocations in 
Morocco.  Absent a watercourse agreement, a “water right” at the international level is a “right” 
to an equitable share of the watercourse that is indeterminate and, in some instances, 
undevelopable without agreement among all riparians.222 
 Negotiations for watercourse agreements involving multiple states include a wide range 
of state and local water laws. This Chapter uses of the work of Calabresi and Melamed and that 
of Hohfeld to illustrate that a “water right” does not mean the same thing to all. 
Entitlements:	  Calabresi	  and	  Melamed	  
The first issue which must be face by any legal system is one we call the problem of 
‘entitlement.’  Whenever a state is presented with the conflicting interests of two or more 
people, or two or more groups of people, it must decide which side to favor.  Absent such 
a decision, access to goods, services, and life itself will be decided on the basis of ‘might 
makes right’—whoever is stronger or shrewder will win.223 
 
This is the foundation of the law and economics analysis by Calabresi and Melamed.  It is 
the decision to enforce certain “rights,” to favor one side over another in a dispute, which 
protects an entitlement.224  Property rules, liability rules and principles of inalienability are used 
to enforce entitlements.  A brief examination of these rules in relation to water illustrates 
differences in water laws. 
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A government may fix entitlements based on economic efficiencies, distributional goals 
or what Calabresi and Melamed call “other justice reasons.”  The entitlement to pollute or the 
entitlement to be free from pollution is a policy decision of the society served by that 
government.  The government may conduct a similar analysis to decide whether to permit water 
to be diverted for an irrigation project. The decision will serve a policy of the government and 
the government is assured that the benefits will inure to the society because the legal system will 
support the continuation of the use that is favored by an entitlement, in this case irrigation. 
“Society can, for instance, give an entitlement away free and then, by paying the holders 
of the entitlement to limit their use of it, protect those who are injured by the free 
entitlement.  Conversely, it can allow people to do a given thing only if they buy the right 
from the government.”225 
 
The laws of prior appropriation protect water use with property rules.  The water is free 
to those who first construct the works and put it to beneficial use.  The water right is quantified 
and in most jurisdictions may be transferred and sold.  In the example above, the irrigator has a 
quantified water right which, given a limited supply, is protected by legal rules from interference 
by later appropriators.   
Water use under riparian laws is protected by liability rules.  The reasonable use of water 
on one parcel of riparian land is protected against unreasonable interference from other riparians.  
Reasonableness and liability for unreasonable use are determined using the Restatement factors 
which require comparing the disputed uses.226 
The principles of international water law do not fit these rule sets.  Each state riparian to 
an international watercourse has the right to share in the equitable and reasonable benefits 
derived from the resource.  This is based on the sovereign equality of states which is crystallized 
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as customary international law and is codified in the UN Charter.227  This principle is 
incorporated in international water law through the provisions of the 1997 UN Convention.  
Article 4 paragraph 1 provides that “[e]very watercourse State is entitled to participate in the 
negotiation of and to become a party to any watercourse agreement that applies to the entire 
international watercourse, as well as to participate in any relevant consultations.”228  The 1997 
UN Convention states explicitly that “[w]atercourse States shall cooperate on the basis of 
sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual benefit and good faith in order to attain optimal 
utilization and adequate protection of an international watercourse.”229  The determination of 
property rules or liability rules for an international watercourse is a matter for negotiation among 
watercourse states. 
Water use for vital human needs and a human right to water are gaining acceptance as 
entitlements which may be inalienable.  However, the international society of states has not 
developed enforcement mechanisms and an individual entitlement to water remains uncertain.230 
Article 7 of the 1997 UN Convention, the prevention of significant harm, is a rule of 
liability.  Article 7 is an obligation to prevent significant harm to other watercourse states.  
Article 7 includes a mechanism to enforce liability for significant harm.  It provides: 
1. Watercourse States shall, in utilizing an international watercourse in their territories, 
take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other 
watercourse States. 
 
2. Where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another watercourse State, the States 
whose use causes such harm shall, in the absence of agreement to such use, take all 
appropriate measures, having due regard for the provisions of articles 5 and 6, in 
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consultation with the affected State, to eliminate or mitigate such harm and, where 
appropriate, to discuss the question of compensation.231 
 
 It can be said that within international water law there is an entitlement to be free from 
significant harm caused by another state’s utilization of the watercourse.  This is based on the 
above provisions of Article 7 of the 1997 UN Convention and the customary international law 
principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.232  The ILC Commentary to Article 7 focuses on 
harm from pollution and contamination.  It is not clear if Article 7 applies to harm caused by 
depletion of water by other uses.  The ICJ was presented with this question in the Danube Case 
and used Article 5, equitable and reasonable utilization, as the basis of their decision.  The Court 
determined that temporarily diverting 80 to 90 percent of the flow “deprived Hungary of its right 
to an equitable and reasonable share of the natural resources of the Danube.”233 
 Is there a state entitlement to particular uses of water or quantified amounts of water that 
are enforceable within an international water law system of property rules and liability rules?  
“According to the doctrine of equitable utilization, each state has a legally protected interest in 
an equitable share of the uses and benefits of an international watercourse.”234   In the event of a 
conflict, the conflicting uses are compared using equitable factors.  While each state is “entitled” 
to use the watercourse, the following section examines whether the right to an equitable and 
reasonable share is an “entitlement” that is protected by legal rules. 
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 One state analyzes whether to utilize an international watercourse by determining the 
needs within its territory.  The determination of whether water and water works to meet those 
needs is an equitable and reasonable utilization may only be made by examining e the uses made 
by other riparian states.  This is a comparative analysis in which the factors for comparison are 
not within the control of the government wanting to initiate a new use.  Assuming the new use is 
equitable and reasonable at the time it is initiated, use does not necessarily mature into an 
entitlement enforceable with property rules, liability rules or principles of inalienability.  The use 
remains subject to diminishment by what may be determined to be more equitable or more 
reasonable uses in other states.  This creates risks for a state proposing a watercourse 
development that, absent a watercourse agreement, remain throughout the life of the project. 
 The equitable and reasonable utilization framework for the 1997 UN Convention is 
valuable in part because it is flexible enough to apply to all states and all watercourses 
throughout the world.235  It establishes that each state has the right to share in the watercourse 
and diminishes the influence of watercourse “might” based either on economic or military power 
or on the relative location of the state on the watercourse.  However, it is this flexibility that 
makes development based on the rule of equitable and reasonable utilization risky.  There are 
few, if any, watercourses within the world that contain sufficient water to accommodate all 
planned development.  If the watercourse accommodates new development today, in time it will 
no longer contain sufficient water for additional uses.  At any given time during planning, 
financing, construction or operation of watercourse works the equities along the watercourse 
may change and development in one state may be foreclosed by development within another 
                                                




state.  This hampers investment in development requiring a water supply that remains available, 
predictable and ascertainable throughout the life of the development.236 
 Water use in the eastern states of the United States is based on riparian law.  The 
quantification of a riparian use is governed by the rule of reasonableness which compares uses 
using similar factors to those used to determine equitable and reasonable utilization in 
international law.237  In the latter half of the 20th century consumptive water use increased and 
riparian law did not provide the security needed for new water dependant development.   The 
leading water scholar at that time described the problem as follows: 
“A major criticism of the system concerns the element of uncertainty associated with the 
reasonable use of water for nondomestic purposes.  Because the reasonableness of each 
use is determined by the needs of other riparians, unforeseen conditions may arise when 
others commence or enlarge uses despite long nonuse of their rights.  A further 
uncertainty exists in those states where a riparian neither making nor intending to make 
use of water can enjoin an existing use as unreasonable with regard to his right.”238 
 
 Reasonableness is measured “either by the lack of damage to others or by the relative 
insignificance of the damage compared to the value of the use.”239  Equitable utilization may 
only be ascertained by comparing a use in one state to uses in all other states on the watercourse.  
Both equitable and reasonable are post hoc determinations.  On a developed watercourse changes 
in watercourse conditions and new uses create new risks to the existing uses as each of them is 
measured against the new conditions.   
 The combination of legal and factual uncertainty240 impairs the security needed to invest 
in water intensive development.  This is particularly acute within a basin subject to natural 
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fluctuations in flow. “What might be a reasonable [or equitable] use in good water years may 
become highly unreasonable in times of drought, and some riparians may, thus, lose their right 
temporarily.”241  Physical uncertainties may be overcome to a limited extent by storage, but the 
construction of storage facilities requires cooperation among the watercourse states to avoid 
having the impoundment of flow become a violation of the equitable and reasonable standard.242  
 It may be impossible to make a comparative analysis.  Each state needs the data on 
natural conditions (flow, precipitation, climate, etc) and use within each other state to make the 
necessary comparisons.  Water security necessary for a state to serve its own domestic needs is 
not possible without this information.243  The security of a water entitlement while not provided 
by the principles of international water law alone may be acquired through agreements among 
co-riparians.  The principles of equitable and reasonable utilization are better applied as a 
standard for negotiation than a basis for establishing a water entitlement.  This is discussed 
further in Part II. 
	  Rights,	  Duties	  and	  Privileges:	  Hohfeld	  
Local water laws based in property describe water use in terms of water rights. This 
section explores the law of equitable and reasonable utilization as a right to water.  Professor 
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld studied and developed the legal language of rights.244  His 
scholarship and definitions of legal relationships, though published near the turn of the twentieth 
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century, remain a standard of jurisprudential thought today.245  This discussion focuses on the 
Hohfeld chart of jural correlatives: right/duty and privilege/no-right.246   
 Looking at international water law using the Hohfeldian system of rights and duties 
highlights the distinctions between a property based water law system such as prior 
appropriations and those based on an equitable share of the resource.  Water within an 
international watercourse is not owned by any one state along its course nor may one state assert 
control over the watercourse to the exclusion of other states.247  The watercourse is a resource 
shared by all watercourse states.248  Hohfeld defines the right to share in a common resource as a 
privilege.  The Hohfeldian distinction between a right and a privileges is described by Singer as 
follows: 
‘Rights’ are claims, enforceable by state power, that others act in a certain manner in 
relation to the right holder.  ‘Privileges’ are permissions to act in a certain manner 
without being liable for damages to others and without others being able to summon state 
power to prevent those acts.’249 
 
Singer describes the importance of the Hohfeld correlatives and opposites as follows:  
The major contribution of Hohfeld's opposites was to make it plain that to the extent 
others have legal liberties, one has no legal rights. Liberties are not by definition limited 
to the extent necessary to prevent damage to others, as the sic utere doctrine misleadingly 
implied. Legally protected interests are not granted absolute protection, as the concept of 
protected rights had misleadingly implied. The sic utere doctrine had the ideological 
purpose of reassuring people that the exercise of legal liberties did not threaten their 
security. Hohfeld's concept of opposites was ideologically designed to demonstrate that 
                                                
245 See Joseph William Singer PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES AND PRACTICES 4th ed. 2006, 198-202 a standard 
property law textbook in use today (quoting extensively from Arthur Corbin Jural Relations and their Classification 
30 YALE L. J. 226, 226-229 (1921))  and Curtis Nyquist Teaching Wesley Hohfeld’s Theory of Legal Relations 52 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 238 (2002) among others. 
246 Hohfeld 1916 supra note 239, 710. 
247 The theories of absolute territorial sovereignty and absolute territorial integrity have been repudiated by state 
practice and the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court.  See generally MCCAFFREY supra note 94, Chs. 
4-5. 
248 1997 UN Convention Art. 2(c) defines a watercourse state, Art. 4, “Every watercourse State is entitled to 
participate in the negotiation of and to become a party to any watercourse agreement, and Arts. 5-6 regarding 
equitable utilization.  
249 Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 




to the extent individuals have freedom of action, others have no security. The modern 
ideological message was thus completely the reverse of the classical message. 
 
It is not true that a legal right has been invaded merely because one has been injured by 
another.  It is not true that all legally protected interests are protected to the same extent. 
It is not true that legal liberties are always accompanied by duties on others not to act in 
ways that interfere with the permitted acts.250 
 
Building on an example used by Hohfeld “if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off 
the former’s land, the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay off 
the place.”251  Under a legal system of “rights” such as those under prior appropriation we can 
say that if a watercourse has 1000 acre feet of flow and X has a right to use 1000 acre feet of 
water from the river.  “[T]he correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X” to 
not use water from the river.  Depending on the extent of the watercourse, there may be hundreds 
or thousands of Xs.  Rights are allocated to Xs until the watercourse is fully appropriated at 
which time everyone else is a Y with a duty not to use water. 
Under riparian law and the international system of equitable and reasonable use, Y is 
NOT under a duty toward X to not use water from the river.  Each X and each Y hold the same 
right to an equitable share.  Hohfeld classifies the legal relationship between X and Y as mutual 
privileges without corresponding duties.  Neither X nor Y has a duty not to use the water and 
neither X nor Y has a claim against the other for interference unless the use is unreasonable or 
inequitable.252  Each state has the privilege to utilize the shared resource subject only to the 
privileges held by other states.   A privilege is described as a liberty or freedom and does not 
have a corresponding duty of non-interference.  One state does not have a superior claim to the 
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use of the watercourse over any other states.  Each riparian exercises the privilege so as not to 
violate the other privileges.  The example used by Hohfeld illustrates this concept. 
“Thus it is said that a man has a perfect right to fire off a gun, when all that was meant, 
apparently, was that a man has a freedom or liberty to fire off a gun, so long as he does 
not violate or infringe any one’s rights in doing so, which is a very different thing from a 
right, the violation or disturbance of which can be remedied or prevented by legal 
process.”253  
 
 Each state along an international watercourse has the freedom or liberty to utilize that 
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner “so long as [the state] does not violate or 
infringe any [other state’s] rights in doing so.”254  No use made by State A enjoys a right which 
if disturbed by utilization of the watercourse by State B gives rise to a legal remedy unless State 
B exceeds the equitable and reasonable limitations of its privilege.  The use by State A is not a 
right to water with the correlative duty imposed on State B to not interfere.  The correlative to a 
privilege is no-right.255   
For example, assume A irrigates 10 acres of hay which is sold as cattle feed.  If A has a 
water right in a jurisdiction with the law of prior appropriation that water right includes the right 
to have water delivered to A’s point of diversion at a scheduled time in a quantified amount.  A 
has the right to use the water for beneficial, non-wasteful, purposes on A’s land.  A has a claim 
against all others with junior priorities who might diminish his full water right.  A’s water right is 
“good” as against all others with a later priority date who have the correlative duty to not 
interfere with A’s use.   
Assume B has a water right with a later priority date for municipal supply for a remote 
community.  B has a right to divert water at a scheduled time in a quantified amount for basic 
human needs and B has a claim against all others with later priority dates who interfere with his 
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right.  If conditions are such that the watercourse has insufficient supply to satisfy A and B, B 
cannot share A’s water right.  B may not use B’s water right if it interferes with A’s water right 
no matter the purpose for the use or the location on the river. B has a duty to not interfere with 
A’s use.  B’s use for vital human needs does not give B a superior claim to a limited supply.256 
Equitable interests in water based on an apportionment or share or those based on 
reasonable use involve a different bundle of legal rights.  Water is a shared resource.  Using the 
example above, under riparian law if A and B meet the criteria for obtaining the right to use the 
water, i.e. riparian land ownership and reasonable use, each share the resource.  If conditions are 
such that there is insufficient supply to satisfy both the reasonable use of A for irrigation and of 
B for domestic supply, A does not have a claim against B to stop a reasonable use of water and B 
does not have a claim against A.  A third party examining the factors for reasonableness 
determines which use is the more reasonable or if both are equal, reduces both. 
 Assuming the legal relationships among water users may be used to inform relations 
among states, the legal principles of equitable and reasonable utilization of an international 
watercourse create in each riparian state an Hohfeldian privilege to share in the resource that is 
no less and no greater than the privilege of any other state, defensible against inequitable and 
unreasonable uses.  This is consistent with the international legal principle of equality of rights 
among states.257 
Prevention	  of	  significant	  harm	  
 The obligation to prevent significant harm is codified in Article 7 of the 1997 UN 
Convention.  As previously discussed, Article 7 is based on the customary international law 
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principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.258  This principle is important to completing the 
rights-duties analysis.   
When Article 7 is a factor in the determination of equitable and reasonable utilization259  
it is a limitation on the privilege to utilize the watercourse.  Returning to the nomenclature of 
Hohfeld, Article 7 creates a duty to not cause significant harm with a correlative right to be free 
from significant harm. This is apparent when examining the entirety of Article 7.  The negative 
duty is created in the first paragraph requiring states to take appropriate measures to prevent 
significant harm.  The legal consequences of failure to do so are in the second paragraph 
requiring the state to eliminate or mitigate the harm or to provide compensation.   
 State A has a duty to prevent significant harm which may result from its utilization of a 
watercourse.  The correlative right held by all other states is to be free from significant harm 
caused by utilization of the watercourse in State A.  The rules for enforcement of this right are 
contained in the second paragraph of Article 7 of the 1997 UN Convention include a requirement 
for State A to mitigate or eliminate the harm, and for State A to “discuss the question of 
compensation.”260  However, no state has the right to be completely free from all harm resulting 
from the utilization of the watercourse because each State has the privilege to utilize the 
watercourse and that utilization may result in some harm. 
Conclusion	  	  
 
 A vertical legal pluralism exists for the allocation and use of an international watercourse.  
Those people versed in international law or riparian law are familiar with the comparative 
concepts of equitable utilization and reasonable use.  Those more familiar with private property 
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allocations of water rights are not as familiar with the factors for determining equitable and 
reasonable and with the uncertainty of the water allocations under comparative water laws. 
 “Water rights” or “rights to water” are varied and complex.   Equitable utilization among 
basin states is based on the reasonable use within each state.  What is an equitable use and a 
reasonable use requires a comparison with all other uses in relation to the natural conditions of 
the resource.  This is complicated further by the different legal foundations for water law and the 
vertical plurality of such laws. 
The framework of entitlements as developed by Calabresi and Melamed and the 
terminology of “rights” discussed by Hohfeld help illuminate the differences in water laws.   
However, precision of language and a common understanding of legal relationships will foster 




Conclusion	  to	  Part	  I	  
 Part I began with a quote regarding the need for legal systems to establish entitlements, 
the mechanism whereby the law may resolve disputes by favoring one side over another.261  
Using Vermejo I and Vermejo II, let us take stock of that idea.   
 Local water laws develop from the bottom up to match water resources with the needs of 
the community.  Local laws often create entitlements, whether this is done on a priority system 
as is the law of Colorado and New Mexico or the springs in Morocco.  These entitlements 
impose a duty of non-interference on all others and are protected and enforced through local 
courts or other cultural norms.  The stability provided by entitlements fosters development. 
 An international or interstate watercourse is governed by laws that establish the rules for 
sharing the resource among multiple jurisdictions.  These water resources are equitably divided 
in a top-down system.  The Supreme Court of the United States developed the common law 
principle of equitable apportionment.  The international legal system developed the customary 
law of equitable utilization which is “born of the US Supreme Court’s decisions in interstate 
apportionment cases….”262  These principles provide each watercourse state the equal privilege 
to utilize the common resource.  As was discussed in relation to the Hohfeld paradigm of rights 
and duties, no state has the duty to refrain from utilizing the watercourse, each has the privilege 
which must be exercised within the parameters of reasonable use and the prevention of 
significant harm to other watercourse states.   
 Vermejo I and Vermejo II stand for the principle that an equitable apportionment of a 
watercourse includes limiting existing uses in one state for the benefit of another.  Water users 
with valid entitlements to water based on the local law in one jurisdiction may lose that 
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entitlement to users within another jurisdiction263 based on a comparison and balancing of the 
equitable factors and the comparative reasonableness of the uses. 
 The second part of the law of international and interstate watercourses is that of 
reasonable use.  This chapter demonstrated that reasonable use is a principle of international law 
contained in the 1997 UN Convention and part of the principle of equitable apportionment as 
that doctrine has developed by the United States Supreme Court and as applied in the Vermejo 
cases.  The standard of reasonable use may supersede local laws on an international or interstate 
watercourse.  In the Vermejo cases the Supreme Court examined local delivery canals, local 
management by the user, and the state management of the watercourse to determine if the uses 
within New Mexico were reasonable.  The Court also required a showing from Colorado that its 
planned future use would also be reasonable, and the case by Colorado for an equitable 
apportionment of the Vermejo River failed in part because of a lack of clear and convincing 
evidence regarding the reasonableness of the  planned future uses in Colorado. 
 The law of equitable apportionment and equitable utilization may defeat an entitlement to 
water based on local law, however, these principles alone do not create entitlements.  Use from a 
watercourse that is governed by the comparative standards of equity and reasonableness is not 
secure from claims from other states whether these occur over time or are reevaluated with each 
new demand on the watercourse.  State development utilizing an international or interstate 
watercourse is a balancing of risks.  The State may attempt to control those risks through 
assertion of “might” which may include political, economic or military intimidation or the 
assertion of discredited legal theories based on absolute territorial sovereignty or absolute 
territorial integrity which are discussed in Part II.  Or, a state may control its risks by negotiating 
                                                




watercourse agreements that take into consideration the needs of each state and the ecological 
and environmental preservation of the watercourse. 
 Societies depend on reliable and legally secure water supplies to serve the population and 
to foster and maintain economic development.  Part II begins with a discussion of asymmetrical 
power on a watercourse.  It then looks at two aspects of negotiating watercourse agreements, the 
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Negotiating Watercourse Entitlements 
 
 
[M]erely recognizing that states have equal rights usually does not, by itself, solve the 
problem of apportioning the uses and benefits of an interstate or international stream.  It 
is only the starting point.  But it is an essential starting point, because it means that no 
state has an inherently superior claim to the use of the watercourse.264 
 
 Prof. Trelease posits that water security consists of three aspects; physical certainty, legal 
certainty and tenure certainty.  Physical certainty relates to the availability of water which may 
be improved with infrastructure and river works.  Legal certainty provides predictability in the 
event of a conflict.  Tenure certainty is crucial for investment in watercourse development.  It is 
the “protection against the loss of the water right by the exercise of lawful acts by others.” 265  
Tenure certainty was lacking under the riparian laws of the United States and is a driving force 
for the negotiation of transboundary agreements.  All states have equal rights to share the 
benefits of and from a transbouncary watercourse.  As discussed in Chapter Two, the legal 
principles of equitable and reasonable utilization are comparative standards.  Each use is 
evaluated against other uses.  Therefore, tenure security requires all states to participate in 
watercourse negotiations.   
 Watercourse agreements may provide all three aspects of water security.  States, as 
sovereigns, may grant or obtain rights and assume duties vis-à-vis other states by agreement.  A 
use of an international watercourse that is recognized by the other watercourse states and that 
will remain secure during the life of a project may be established in a watercourse agreement.  
                                                
264 MCCAFFREY supra note ___2007 at 391. 
265 Trelease 1957 supra note 1at 307 citing S.V. Ciriacy-Wantrup, Concepts Used as Economic Criteria for a System 
of Water Rights, 32 Land Econ. 295 (1956). 
≈76≈ 
 
Watercourse agreements allocate water in any number of ways including volumetric 
quantification,266 percentage of flow,267 shared storage,268 and priorities by sector.269   
 An allocation secured by a watercourse agreement creates a legal entitlement enforceable 
according to the terms of the agreement and allows each watercourse state to respond to its own 
preferences for water use subject to the equitable uses in other watercourse states.   
 Part I concluded that watercourse agreements are necessary to obtain and preserve water 
security within the international law of equitable and reasonable utilization. Watercourse 
negotiations are as complex and varied as the natural conditions of watercourses.  This Part II 
explores two aspects of such negotiations; the role of law and a methodology that may be used 
by developing states to meaningfully participate in watercourse negotiations.  
 Chapter 5 begins the discussion of negotiations with a short explanation of three aspects 
of negotiations particular to watercourses; first, the subject matter of the negotiation is a natural 
system, second, existing intra-state allocations are controlled by national, regional and local laws 
and third, the relative location of states to each other and to the watercourse affect their power 
positions in negotiations.  
 Chapter 6 discusses using laws applicable to watercourse negotiations to define the 
bargaining zone.270  The 1997 UN Convention and the principles recognized by the International 
Court of Justice as customary international law establish the box within which negotiations may 
                                                
266 Colorado River Compact, signed November 24, 1922, Ariz, Cal., Colo. Nev., N.M., Ut., Wyo.  The 1922 
Compact was approved by Congress through the Boulder Canyon Project Act of 1928, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928) which 
provided that the 1922 Compact would enter into force upon the approval of 6 of the 7 basin states and by 
proclamation of the President.  This occurred with the proclamation of President Hoover on June 25, 1929.  The 
1922 Compact  is available at www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/pdfiles/crcompct.pdf . 
267 Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, 1948, Ariz., Colo., N.M., Ut., Wyo., 63 Stat. 31 (1949) available at 
www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/pdfiles/ucbsnact.pdf . 
268 Arkansas River Compact Dec. 14, 1948, 63 Stat. 145 (1949).   
269 Senegal River Water Charter 2002 available at http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/mul71173.pdf.  
270 See Omar M. Dajani, Shadow or Shade? The Roles of International Law in Palestinian-Israeli Peace Talks, 32 
YALE J. INT’L L. 61, 81 (2007). 
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occur.271  The principles of sovereignty over natural resources, water for human needs and 
sustainable development are discussed as soft laws influencing state positions in negotiations.  
Chapter 6 also discusses the influence of the World Bank operational principles on watercourse 
negotiations.  All of these legal mechanisms help to level the playing field and lessen the 
potential for domination by basin hegemons. 
 Chapter 7 discusses a negotiation methodology specific to watercourse negotiations based 
on the Winters doctrine of reserved rights from the United States.  Developed states have an 
inherent advantage in watercourse negotiations in that they know their current water use and may 
more easily project their future demand.  Developing states may not have a complete picture of 
present use or the more complicated calculations for projected future demand.  Yet an agreement 
for the sharing an international watercourse once entered, is not easily altered.272  Recognizing 
these circumstances Chapter 7 adapts the methodology used for presentation of water rights 
claims on behalf of Native American tribes in the courts of the United States to inform 
international negotiations.  
Chapter	  Five:	  Watercourse	  Negotiations	  Are	  Different	  
 Watercourse negotiations are different from other bilateral or multilateral negotiations in 
three significant ways.  An international watercourse is a natural system about which all parties 
require a common understanding.  It is a fluctuating system that changes seasonally and over 
time.  Using the Colorado River as an example, the states meeting in 1922 to negotiate an 
interstate Compact had stream flow data at Lees Ferry for approximately 20 years indicating a 
                                                
271 Id. 
272 Case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v.Slovakia) at par. 78-79, Sept. 25, 1997, 1997 
ICJ 7, hereinafter Danube Case. 
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mean flow of 16.1 acre feet per year.273  They entered a compact for the volumetric allocation of 
water totaling 15 million acre feet per year.274  Recent paleontological tree ring studies indicate 
that the historic precipitation patterns examined during the negotiations of the 1922 Compact 
were unusually high.  The historic average flow is in the range of 13 to 14.7 million acre feet.275  
This means that the average natural flow was not sufficient to meet the requirements for 
allocations to the states at the time they were made.  Total flow of blue water run-off is part of 
the basic data required to negotiate a watercourse agreement.  Information on groundwater 
storage and recharge, precipitation and rain fed water use are also crucial but may be 
unknowable given the technology and data collection at the time of negotiations.276  Therefore, 
flexibility in the allocation and management of the hydraulic system is key to reaching 
agreement. 
 Watercourse negotiations are limited by, but not controlled by the facts on the ground.  
River works may provide storage of floodwaters and run-off during rainy seasons for release 
during agreed upon times for multiple purposes. Rivers may be channelized for navigation and 
flood protection.  Multipurpose projects often provide flood control, irrigation water during dry 
seasons and hydropower production, increasing the benefits to all riparian states. 
In addition to involving complex natural systems and possible construction of 
multipurpose works, international watercourses are utilized according to multiple layers of laws, 
customs, traditions and religious practices.  The next section discusses legal pluralism in relation 
to watercourse negotiations.  
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ADJUSTING TO HYDROCLIMATIC VARIABILITY 80 (2007). 
 
274 Colorado River Compact 1922. 
275 NAS supra note 109 
276 Historic watercourse data is used when available.  However, hydrologists predict that even the best available 





 “Legal pluralism argues that understanding water rights needs to start from the local 
perspectives of those who use water, their daily experiences, the meanings through which 
they conceive of water and rights, and the options they have available for acquiring water 
and defending their access to this vital resource.”277   
 
 Chapter one discussed the development of water law from the bottom up, (laws to 
determine water use that develop at the user level) and the development of transboundary and 
international water law from the top down (agreements among states that determine the 
allocation of water within large political boundaries).  The local laws regulating use and the 
international agreements are the bookends, the bottom and top, of multiple layers of law that are 
the vertical legal pluralism of water law.   
 Legal pluralism is a term used by different theorists in different ways, all of which 
describe multiple laws governing a single situation or sector of law.  International legal theorists 
discuss a horizontal pluralism in which a single conflict or situation is governed by multiple, 
often inconsistent, legal regimes.278   Koskenniemi279 discusses legal pluralism and 
constitutionalism as outcomes from the increasing fragmentation of international law.  Absent an 
international legal hierarchy the increasing fragmentation of international law into subject matter 
sectors results in legal pluralism which is an acknowledgement of the situation and a tacit 
tolerance.280  Twining281 and Teubner282 describe legal pluralism as the current fragmentation of 
                                                
277 Ruth S. Meinzen-Dick & Bryan Randolph Bruns, Negotiating Water Rights: Introduction 25, in NEGOTIATING 
WATER RIGHTS (Bryan Randolph Bruns & Ruth S. Meinzen-Dick eds. 2000) 
278 See Koskenniemi, Twining, Teubner, intra note __. 
279 Marti Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics, 70 Modern Law 
Review 1 (2007), see also Marti Koskenniemi, Global Legal Pluralism: Multiple Regimes and Multiple Modes of 
Thought, address at Harvard March 5, 2005 available at http://www.helsinki.fi/eci/Publications/MKPluralism-
Harvard-05d%5B1%5D.pdf accessed April 19, 2007. 
280 Constitutionalism on the other hand seeks to establish a hierarchy.  One example of which is dispute resolution in 
which the ICJ serves as an international appellate body with all other mechanisms established by treaty subsidiary to 
the World Court. See Report of Stephen M. Schwebel, President of the International Court of Justice, U.N. GAOR, 




law into sector regimes.  These theorists are concerned with forum shopping for dispute 
resolution among the different dispute resolution mechanisms provided by different sectors of 
international law which may be applicable to a given dispute.  It is often the fact that the sector 
selected to resolve the dispute will determine the outcome.283  Legal pluralism acknowledges the 
existence of multiple regimes and unlike constitutionalism does not seek to impose a 
hierarchy.284   
The most cited example of horizontal pluralism is a dispute between Ireland and the 
United Kingdom over the Sellafield nuclear enrichment plant.  The dispute was presented under 
the Convention on the Law of the Sea to the UNCLOS tribunal.  It was also presented by Ireland 
against Britain before the European Court of Justice under the laws of the European Union.  In 
this dispute the President of the UN Law of the Sea Tribunal deferred to the European Court of 
Justice “in accord with the dictates of mutual respect and comity.”  Koskenniemi writes that this 
global “comity” or “regime-co-ordination” will need to develop to resemble the private law of 
conflicts.285  This is not likely to occur, even with the urging of Judge Stephen Schwebel, former 
president for the International Court of Justice who advocates for the ICJ to serve as an appellate 
body in such situations.286 
                                                                                                                                                       
281 William Twining, Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective, 1 J. Legal Pluralism & Unofficial L. 1 (2004), 
William Twining, Social Science and Diffusion of Law, 32 J.L. & Soc’Y 203 (2005), William Twining, Diffusion 
and Globalization Discourse, 47 Harv. Int’l L.J. 507 (2006). 
282 Andreas Fischer-Lescano & Gunther Teubner (Michelle Everson translator), Regime-Collissions: The Vain 
Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 Mich. J. Int’l L. 999 (2004).   
283 William W. Burke-White uses the term “legal pluralism” in a more general way.  He reconciles those that argue 
that the international legal system is becoming more fragmented with those that argue it is becoming more 
connected by saying that international lawyers should describe the emerging system as pluralist.  International Legal 
Pluralism in  Diversity or Cocophony?: New Sources of Norms in International Law Symposium, 25 Mich. J. Int’l L. 
963 (2004). 
284 See  Schwebel supra note 21. 
285 Koskenniemi 2007, supra note __, 15.  
286 See  Schwebel supra note 21. 
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 Koskenniemi287and Burke-White288observe the development of a pluralism of regimes 
that exist along a horizontal plane.  Any of the relevant regimes may be used to resolve an 
international dispute with equal authority.   
From this perspective, conflicts between, say, trade and human rights, economic 
development and the environment, scientific and political expertise can never really be 
settled because there is no meta-rationality that would allocate to each its respective place 
or hierarchical position.  Instead of co-ordination from some higher level, there will be a 
series of more or less violent adoption of jurisdiction by one expert institution where the 
matter had previously been dealt with by another.  No hierarchy is established, but the 
centre moves….Each rationality and expert system is involved in a hegemonic project: to 
make my rationality govern the whole—to make my preference, the structural bias of our 
institution, the general preference.  From the UN and elsewhere, the experience is 
familiar that once one knows which institution will deal with an issue, one already will 
know how it is disposed of.289  
 
Hydraulic systems are increasingly subject to horizontal legal pluralism with 
development of additional international environmental regimes and soft law statements from 
international conventions and declarations.290  The 1997 UN Convention covers a broad scope of 
watercourses defined as “a system of surface waters and groundwaters constituting by virtue of 
their physical relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a common terminus.”291  
The ILC recently adopted on second reading a set of draft articles on “The Law of 
Transboundary Aquifers” the scope of which includes groundwaters that are within the scope of 
the 1997 UN Convention.  This is significant given the addition of Article 3, Sovereignty of 
Aquifer States in the latter instrument.  All waters within the scope of the 1997 UN Convention 
are governed by the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization.  Draft Article 3 of the Law 
of Transboundary Aquifers provides that:  
                                                
287 Koskenniemi 2007, supra note __ 
288 William W. Burke-White, International Legal Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 963 (2004). 
289 Koskenniemi 2007, supra note __,15. 
290 See UN/ECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, 
March 17,1992 available at http://www.unece.org/env/water/. 
291 1997 UN Convention, Art. 2(a). 
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“Each aquifer State has sovereignty over the portion of a transboundary aquifer or 
aquifer system located within its territory. It shall exercise its sovereignty in accordance 
with international law and the present draft articles.”292 
 The interjection of principles of sovereignty in relation to transboundary waters creates 
the potential for two regimes to produce two different results regarding utilization of the same 
waters.293 
More importantly for the impact on current water negotiations is vertical legal pluralism 
which is a subject studied by social and anthropological legal theorists. Sally Engle Merry 
offers a general definition of legal pluralism as “a situation in which two or more legal systems 
coexist in the same social field.”294  “Classic” legal pluralism295 studied the interaction between 
European systems of law imposed within colonies and the indigenous law.  A “new legal 
pluralism”296 examines the intersection of laws of multiple origins within a society.297  The 
broader definition of law as normative forces in society associated with legal pluralism is 
criticized as re-defining “law” separate from the state or sovereign power.298  However, it is 
apparent from the discussion in this paper that water is controlled, regulated, monitored and 
                                                
292 Report of International Law Commission, ¶ 46-49, A/63/10 available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/2008/2008 report.htm. The Draft Articles that appear at paragraph 53 of this Report 
will be referred to hereinafter as the “2008 Draft Articles.” 
293 See Margaret J. Vick, International Water Law and Sovereignty:  A Discussion of The ILC Draft Articles on the 
Law of Transboundary Aquifers,, 21Pac. McGeorge Global Bus. & Dev. L. J., 191 (2008) for a detailed discussion. 
294 Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869 (1988). 
295 Id. at 872. 
296 Id. 
297 “[R]esearch on legal pluralism began in the study of colonial societies in which an imperialist nation, equipped 
with a centralized and codified legal system, imposed this system on societies with far different legal systems, often 
unwritten and lacking formal structures for judging and punishing.  This kind of legal pluralism is embedded in 
relations of unequal power.  The concept has been expanded in recent years to describe legal relations in advanced 
industrial countries, but here, discussions of legal pluralism are quite different.  The center on a rejection of the law-
centered-ness of traditional studies of legal phenomena, arguing that not all law takes place in the courts.  The 
concern is to document other forms of social regulation that draw on the symbols of the law, to a greater or lesser 
extent, but that operate in its shadows, its parking lots, and even down the street in mediation offices.  Thus, in 
contexts in which the dominance of a central legal system is unambiguous, this thread of argument worries about 
missing hwat else is going on; the extent to which other forms of regulation outside law constitute law.” Id. at 874. 
298 See id. at 875-879 and Franz von Benda-Backman, Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?, 47 J. LEGAL PLURALIMS & 
UNOFFICIAL LAW 37 (2002) for a general discussion of the debate over the concept of legal pluralism. 
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disputes are resolved at multiple levels which may or may not be within one state’s hierarchical 
system of law. 
Guillet applied the principles of legal pluralism to water rights in northwestern Spain, 
Meinzen-Dick and Nkonya applied the principles to water rights in Africa and Asia following the 
research in legal anthropology of H. L. Joep Spiertz in southeastern Asia.  The legal 
anthropologist examines the normative system governing use of water at the local level and then 
steps back to examine what other normative systems are at work to allocate the same 
watercourse. 
In addition to the multiplicity of laws and norms for a single watercourse the same law 
may be applied differently in different locations.  Each acequia within northern New Mexico 
developed its own social structure for water allocations and for sharing the costs and decision 
making within the community.  Spiertz documents that the subaks in Blahpane have the same 
normative institutions but their administration is different depending on the locale.  “In other 
words, plurality of law should not only be seen in terms of different normative systems 
pertaining to one domain of social life, but also in the way in which one legal rule or one 
institution can manifest itself differently in different levels and contexts.”299 
 These layers of the legal system are not necessarily consistent.  The domestic law of each 
state determines the hierarchy however within a hierarchical system legal pluralism calls for a 
closer examination of compliance and non-compliance and by whom.300  Local use may continue 
despite a transboundary agreement requiring curtailment in favor of delivery across a border.  
The local farmer may not know of the requirements in the transboundary agreement or may not 
                                                
299 H.L. Joep Spiertz, Water Rights and Legal Pluralism: Some Basics of a Legal Anthropological Apporach, 183 in 
NEGOTIATING WATER RIGHTS, Bryan Randolph Bruns & Ruth S. Meinzen-Dick eds. (2000). 
300 See, Hinderliter v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938) in which the courts of the 
United States determined that the allocation in an interstate compact limited the amount of water available to users 
based on local state law. 
≈84≈ 
 
consider it binding on her when she is using the water in the same manner under the same legal 
right as always.  Under these circumstances the question of compliance and non-compliance is 
not clear-cut.  The water use by the farmer is in compliance with local law but the state may be 
in breach of its obligations under a transboundary agreement.  The state must develop the 
capacity to control and curtail local use to meet its obligations under a transboundary agreement. 
 How does this affect transboundary negotiations?  Negotiations occur at a level most 
likely to meet the needs of the parties negotiating.301  A farmer negotiates for water with her 
neighbors or a local ditch authority; a large developer negotiates with the reservoir operators and 
regional government; a utility may negotiate with the state for construction of a hydroelectric 
power plant.  But negotiations rarely jump a level whereby local farmers negotiate with other 
states.  The farmers are more likely to pressure their representatives who negotiate with other 
states.  Each state brings to negotiations its own individual box built by domestic laws and 
interests that confine or limit the options available to that state in transboundary negotiations.302   
 The Rio Gallinas basin in northern New Mexico in the southwestern United States 
includes acequias which have supplied water to local farms for centuries.  When the supply of 
water in the basin did not meet all the new demands the state of New Mexico instituted an 
adjudication to determine the relative priorities of each user within the prior appropriation 
                                                
301 Bryan Randolph Bruns & Ruth S. Meinzen-Dick, Negotiating Water Rights, in NEGOTIATING WATER RIGHTS, 
Bryan Randolph Bruns & Ruth S. Meinzen-Dick eds. (2000).  
302 Eyal Benvisiti discusses establishing local agreements for transboundary resources. SHARING TRANSBOUNDARY 
RESOURCES, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OPTIMAL RESOURCE USE (2002) and essay, (Eyal Benvinisti, Domestic 
Politics and International Resources: What Role for International Law, 119, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, Michael Byer, ed. 
(2000).  He argues for negotiating resource agreements, including water, at a local level to avoid the difficulties of 
heterogeneous influences that complicate or preclude state-to-state negotiations.  His main example is a waste water 
treatment plant serving both Israeli and Palestinian communities.    This type of local agreement may be effective for 
waste disposal or pollution prevention however this author maintains that it should not be used for apportionment of 
an international watercourse. This type of local agreement may be perceived as creating rights that only frustrates 
basin wide agreements that can foster optimal utilization.  In fact, Benvenisti makes this very point that states “must 
abstain from assigning inalienable rights in shares of ICPR’s ….” Heterogeneity as described by Benvinisti is not 
unique to negotiations over resources and is not the same concept as legal pluralism. 
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system of state law in order to apply the first in time rule.  Each irrigator and water user within 
the acequia was served with notice to establish the date of first use and proof of continuous use 
in order to establish a priority date and the non-abandonment of the water right.  The acequia 
management through the mayordomo established that within the acequia the law of prior 
appropriation did not apply, that the water was shared equitably in times of shortage and the 
first-in-time rule did not apply.  The land owners within the acequia also argue that the laws 
regarding abandonment of appropriative rights for non-use do not apply.   The Rio Gallinas 
forms part of the headwaters and is tributary to the Pecos River.  The Pecos River is subject to an 
interstate compact between New Mexico and Texas303 one purpose of which is “to provide for 
the equitable division and apportionment of the use of the waters of the Pecos River.”304  The 
Pecos River is tributary to the Rio Grande.  The confluence is in the limitrophe section forming 
the border between the United States and Mexico and subject to bilateral treaties.305  All sections 
of these watercourses are fully appropriated. 
 The question becomes what law controls the use of water by the farmers in the Rio 
Gallinas basin?  Within the constitutional system of the United States a hierarchy of laws exist 
and the resolution may be determined in court. 
 Through out the world use of water is governed from the bottom-up by local and 
provincial laws.  Yet the use of an international watercourse vis-à-vis other states is determined 
at the top levels of government with the results implemented from the top down.  Recognizing 
legal pluralism in international negotiations may have positive and negative effects on the 
negotiations.  If the vertical pluralism of water law within a state is considered in international 
                                                
303 Pecos River Compact, NMSA §75-15-19 
304 Id.  Art. 1 
305 Convention between the United States and Mexico Equitable Distribution of the Waters of the Rio Grande, May 
21, 1906, Rectification of the Rio Grande, Feb. 1, 1933, Utilization of the Waters of the Colorado, Rio Grande and 
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negotiations those negotiations may be slowed considerably as local uses and constituent 
interests are assessed.  Local laws may permit uses which will no longer be viable after an 
international water sharing agreement is reached.  On the other hand, as will be discussed in 
Chapter 7, the assessment of local uses and the local laws that protect those uses are a valuable 
determination of equitable and reasonable utilization of the watercourse.  If local laws and local 
uses are not considered, the political constituencies will be impacted upon implementation and at 
worst the agreement loses the legitimacy necessary to make it effective.  Local water uses, if 
continued or expanded under local law will undermine the implementation of transboundary 
agreements. 
 As an example, the La Plata River in the states of Colorado and New Mexico is allocated 
by an interstate compact306 which authorizes the respective State Engineers to adjust deliveries in 
times of shortage.  When the Colorado state engineer cut off deliveries to farmers in Colorado 
they sued him for violating their water rights which were perfected and adjudicated through a 
state judicial proceeding.  The constitution of the United States provides that the allocation 
contained in the inter-state compact which is approved by Congress is superior to state law 
which regulates local uses.307  If this had not been the case, or if these facts were presented in an 
international setting involving states without clear hierarchies of law, the upstream farmers have 
the potential to defeat the purposes of the inter-state agreement. 
Asymmetrical	  Power	  on	  a	  Watercourse	  	  
 This section briefly discusses aspects of asymmetrical power unique to transboundary 
watercourses looking at some factors that contribute to hydro-hegemony. 
  
                                                
306 La Plata River Compact, November 27, 1922, http://www.ose.state.nm.us/isc_laPlata_river_compact.html . 
307 United States Constitution Art. VI clause 2. 
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 The land to which a state is entitled, its territory, is defined by political borders, many of 
which were established by military power and alliances. International law now prohibits the 
acquisition of territory by force308 and most territorial entitlements are secure.309  International 
watercourses310 are not limited by political borders.  Water flows, it moves from the snowmelt or 
rain at the headwaters through multiple jurisdictions, through multiple uses, often returning to 
the stream bed or aquifer many times before reaching an outlet.  The amount of water within a 
watercourse fluctuates with storm events, with seasonal changes and with climate changes.  The 
water quality changes as the water passes through different geological structures, as it is used, 
and as waste and pollutants are added.  Over time, even the location of the watercourse changes.   
 Power may be exerted in watercourse negotiations based on the relative location of one 
riparian state to another.  Upstream states may assert physical control over downstream flow.  
Upstream dams, diversions and the discharge of pollutants determine the amount of water that is 
available for use in a downstream state.  Downstream states fear depletion and contamination of 
the watercourse before it reaches their territory.  However, downstream states are often the first 
to develop using the flatter and more temperate lower reaches of a watercourse to create 
economic superiority within the basin.  The downstream state also may balance the upstream 
power with legal authority.   The customary international legal principle sic utere tuo ut alienum 
non laedas,311 on which the principle of prevention of significant harm codified in Article 7 of 
the 1997 UN Convention is based, allows the downstream state to limit use in an upstream state.  
                                                
308 U.N. CHARTER ART. 2 (4). 
309 See J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE CH IX (6th 
ed. 1963)at 413-432, IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, CH 33 (6th ed. 2003)at Chapter 3 
697-715 
310 An international watercourse is defined as “a system of surface waters and ground waters constituting by virtue 
of their physical relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a common terminus; … parts of which are 
situated in different States. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, UN Doc. A/RES/51/869, May 21, 1997, 36 ILM 700 (1997)at Art. 2(a) and (b). 
311 See, 1997 UN Convention at Art. 7. 
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The downstream state may also object to upstream uses as inequitable or unreasonable.  The 
Danube Case demonstrates that unilateral control by the upstream state of 80 - 90% of the flow 
for a short period of violated the principles of equitable and reasonable utilization in relation to 
the downstream state.312 
 The historic legal theories for the non-navigational utilization of an international 
watercourse reflect assertions of upstream and downstream power on a watercourse. 313  The 
theory of absolute territorial sovereignty, set forth in the opinion of United States Attorney 
General Judson Harmon during negotiations with Mexico over the Rio Grande,314 provides that a 
state may use all the water within its territory without obligation to deliver water to downstream 
states.  This legal theory was not followed by the United States.  However, the power of an 
upstream location is used by Turkey on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers to develop the GAP 
project without meaningful consultation or agreement with the downstream states. 315    
 The theory of absolute territorial integrity provides a position of “might” for a 
downstream state.  This theory provides that a state has a right to receive all of the water within a 
watercourse undiminished in quantity or quality by upstream use.316  This is an exaggerated 
extension of the principle of sic utere tuo.  
                                                
312 Danube Case supra note ___ at ___. 
313STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES (2007), Chapt. 5 at 111-170.. 
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The United States Supreme Court characterizes arguments based on both absolute 
territorial sovereignty and absolute territorial integrity as “extreme positions.”317  Neither theory 
is viable in international law based on state practice.318  The research by the ILC preparatory to 
the 1997 UN Convention and the ICJ decision in the Danube Case make clear that the law 
requires states to share the equitable and reasonable benefits of an international watercourse.   
The factors for determining equitable and reasonable utilization give consideration to a 
states relative location on a watercourse319 and to the different levels of development320 without 
giving advantage to one factor to the disadvantage of another.321  For example, in a typical 
watercourse downstream state B is more highly developed with a larger population, a larger 
economy and a larger military.  Upstream state A includes the headwaters for the watercourse, is 
a more remote and mountainous region and is less developed.  The interests of state B are in 
preserving the existing development and providing food and water for a growing population and 
economy.  A theory of absolute territorial integrity provides the most water security.  Absent this 
extreme position state A may focus negotiations on the following factors from the 1997 UN 
Convention: 
(c) The population dependent on the watercourse…. 
(d) The effects of the use or uses of the watercourses in one watercourse State 
[upstream state A] on other watercourse States [downstream state B] 
(e) Existing and potential uses of the watercourse.322 
 
The interests of upstream state A are in developing the potential of the watercourse for 
hydropower, irrigated agriculture and domestic supply for a growing population.  A theory of 
absolute territorial sovereignty would permit state A to construct a multipurpose dam.  However, 
                                                
317 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). 
318 MCCAFFREY 2007 supra note __, 112. 
319 1997 U.N. Convention supra note __, Art. 6 (1)(a). 
320 Id. at Art. 6 (1) (b). 
321 Id. at Art. 6 (3). 
322 1997 U.N. Convention supra note __, Art. 6 (1).  
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under the principles of international law as set forth in the 1997 UN Convention upstream state B 
may relay on Article 6(b) “[t]he social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned” 
and gain support from the Helsinki Rules Article V(2)(b) which provides that the hydrology of 
the basin, “including in particular the contribution of water by each basin State” is a relevant 
factor to determine equitable and reasonable utilization. 
The principles of equitable and reasonable utilization of an international watercourse and 
the obligation to prevent significant harm to other watercourse states deter the assertion of 
sovereign might over an international watercourse.  However, remnants of each theory of 
absolute sovereignty remain in political posturing and therefore each theory informs the 
discussion of negotiations.     
Conclusion	  
 This chapter discussed unique negotiating circumstances related to watercourses, the 
variability of the natural conditions of the watercourse, the layers of existing laws governing its 
utilization, and the power positions of the parties based on their relative location on the 
watercourse.  Within a state, the recognition of subsidiary laws governing utilization of the 
watercourse informs the negotiating positions as well as lays the foundation for implementation 
of a watercourse agreement.  The physical characteristics of the watercourse may cause a shift in 
the relative political power positions of the parties to the negotiations depending on the location 
as an upstream or downstream state.  
 Transboundary watercourse agreements are political instruments.  International 
agreements are negotiated by government officials and once concluded must be approved by 
legislative or parliamentary bodies to enter into force.  The negotiators balance the interests and 
benefits with the other parties during negotiations while maintaining the domestic political and 
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development agenda sufficiently intact to obtain ratification.  This complexity of interests is one 
reason current scholars are proposing “benefit sharing”323  By enlarging the basket of items open 
for negotiation the parties are more likely to be able to create a win-win situation for all 
constituents.324 
 Benefit sharing and broadening the negotiations do little to limit the power that can be 
exercised by a hydro-hegemon.  The next chapter discusses the role international law may play to 
support a process to better equalize the power positions in watercourse negotiations and provide 
legitimacy for local constituencies.  
 
                                                
323 Claudia W. Sadoff & David Grey, Beyond the River, The Benefits of Cooperation on International Rivers, 4 
WATER POLICY 389 (2002). 
324 Claudia W. Sadoff & David Grey, Cooperation on International Rivers: A Continuum for Securing and Sharing 
Benefits, 30 WATER INTERNATIONAL 420 (2005).  
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Chapter	  Six:	  The	  Role	  of	  Law	  
 
A person trained in another discipline, an engineer, has postulated that, in fact, 
water laws have a relatively unimportant effect on development, that entrepreneurs 
initiate projects and engineers build them without much regard for the fears here 
discussed the need to reform of water laws]. 
 Perhaps the truth lies somewhere between.  If poorly-designed laws do not 
impede all developments, how much do they impede?  If development proceeds outside 
the law, to what extent is present law a trap waiting to be sprung on those who have 
invested in projects?  How many projects are not built?  The biggest builder and 
financier of water use projects, the federal government, has refused to act in the face of 
uncertain water titles….325 
 
 Frank J. Trelease, the leading water law scholar of the 20th century poses these questions 
about the role of water law following his analysis of the prior appropriation and riparian systems 
in the United States in a time of maximum development.326  While the policy promoting 
maximum development has changed since 1957 to that of “optimal and sustainable 
utilization,”327 the questions posed by Prof. Trelease remain relevant.   
 As discussed in Part I, international water law does not in and of itself, apportion or 
allocate the waters of international watercourses, it does not determine which side to favor in a 
conflict.   
“Pacta sunt servanda, the cardinal rule of international law, prohibits the breaking of 
agreements.  But what role should international law play in the making of agreements?”328  A 
leading non-lawyer in transboundary water policy described international law as “poorly 
developed, contradictory, and unenforceable.”329  If we assume this to be an accurate statement, 
                                                
325 Frank J. Trelease, A Model State Water code for River Basin Development, 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 301, 
321 (1957). 
326 Id. at 307. 
327 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, UN Doc. 
A/Res/51/869, May 21, 1997 [hereinafter 1997 UN Convention] Article 5(1). 
328 Dajani supra note __at 62. 
329Aaron T. Wolf, “Water Wars and Other Tales of Hydromythology,” 112 in WHOSE WATER IS IT?: THE 
UNQUENCHABLE THIRST OF A WATER HUNGRY WORLD, Douglas Jehl & Bernadette McDonald, eds (2003)..  See 
also Aaron T. Wolf, Criteria for equitable allocations: The heart of international water conflict, Natural Resources 
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the law of international watercourses still plays a significant role in the negotiation of 
watercourse agreements.   
 Law seldom provides the solution to interstate or international water disputes.  Within the 
federal system of the United States the United States Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to 
decide disputes between states.330  Over the past 100 years the Court has decided numerous 
equitable apportionment cases.  “In only three equitable apportionment cases has the Court 
actually decreed a division of the waters of a river on an interstate basis.”331  In most other cases 
the Court admonishes the parties to negotiate an agreement to resolve their differences.332 
 In one of the few international case regarding the non-navigational use of an international 
watercourse the International Court of Justice reached a similar conclusion for the equitable 
utilization of the Danube by Slovakia and Hungary.333 
[T]he Parties (Slovakia and Hungary) … must find a satisfactory solution for the volume 
of water to be released into the old bed of the Danube and into the side-arms on both 
sides of the river.  It is not for the Court to determine what shall be the final result of 
these negotiations to be conducted by the Parties.  It is for the Parties themselves to find 
an agreed solution that takes account of the objectives of the Treaty, which must be 
pursued in a joint and integrated way, as well as the norms of international environmental 
law and the principles of the law of international watercourses.334 
 
 The restraint exercised by the United States Supreme Court and the International Court of 
Justice reflects the complexity of apportioning a transboundary watercourse among riparian 
sovereigns.  Judicial remedies for apportionment are not likely to be available.  The states must 
negotiate this for themselves in a manner that permits compliance by all parties.  Law maintains 
a significant role by establishing norms and standards for the negotiations. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Forum Vol 23, #1, Feb. 1999, pp. 3-30 “international water law is ambiguous and often contradictory, and no 
mechanism exists to enforce principles which are agreed-upon.” (before note 2). 
330 US Constitution, Art. 3,§2 
331 LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES, SAX et al, eds. (1986), 868. 
332 See Oklahoma v. New Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 241 (1991), and the cases cited therein. 
333 The Danube Case supra note __. 
334 Id at par 140-141. 
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 Henkin offers the following observations on international law: 
International norms will … determine choice among alternatives.  With more than one 
way of achieving a desired policy, nations will not readily choose the one that violates, or 
more clearly or deeply violates, an international norm or obligation.  They will tend to 
choose the lesser violation, sometimes at substantial sacrifice.335 
 
What matters is not whether the international system has legislative, judicial, or executive 
branches, corresponding to those we have become accustomed to seek in a domestic 
society; what matters is whether international law is reflected in the policies of nations 
and in relations between nations.  The question is not whether there is an effective 
legislature; it is whether there is law that responds and corresponds to the changing needs 
of a changing society.  The question is not whether there is an effective judiciary, but 
whether disputes are resolved in an orderly fashion in accordance with international law.  
Most importantly, the question is not whether law is enforceable or even effectively 
enforced; rather, whether law is observed, whether it governs or influences behavior, 
whether international behavior reflects stability and order.336 
 
 The law governing the non-navigational uses of international watercourses is still 
developing.  Brunee and Toope in their articles on environmental security337 maintain that law 
and binding legal obligations are only one aspect of utilization of freshwater resources.  Building 
on the concept of security articulated by Robert Ullman that threats are based on events that 
“degrade the quality of life” or limit policy choices338 they state that security of the resource 
must be security at the local and community level not just in state to state relations.  Internal 
conflict over a resource is as damaging to stability as state-to-state conflict over resources.  To 
provide better environmental security, they argue for an “ecosystem regime” guided by general 
principles which may or may not result in a binding agreement among those involved.    
                                                
335 LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE, 2d, 45 (1979). 
336 Id. at , 26. 
337 Jutta Brunnee & Stephen J. Toope, Environmental Security and Freshwater Resources: A Case for International 
Ecosystem Law, 5 Y.B. Int’l Envtl. L. 41 (1994), Jutta Brunee & Stephen J. Toope, Environmental Security and 
Freshwater Resources: Ecosystem Regime Building, 91 Am. J. Int’l L. 26 (1997).   
338338 Robert Ullman, Redefining Security, 8 Int’l Security 129, 133 (1983). 
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 Brunee and Toope state that environmental and freshwater security must be understood as 
having two dimensions.  The first is an expansive view of security in terms of the environment 
and maintaining ecological balance; is the resource secure?  The second is the more traditional 
concept of “prevention or management of conflict over scarce or degraded resources.”339  It is 
this approach based on ecosystem regimes that provides security both in state-to-state relations 
and internally.  Increased water security may be the goal of watercourse negotiations; both 
security for the resource and the ecosystem and for the population relying on the resource.  
Law	  Defines	  a	  Bargaining	  Zone340	  	  
 Using the analysis of Omar Dajani in his seminal article Shadow or Shade? The Roles of 
International Law in Palestinian-Israeli Peace Talks341 this section examines the role of the law 
of international watercourses in negotiating agreements.  According to Dajani, “[L]aw’s 
influence is not simply a function of the legal sanction that will follow if no deal is 
reached….[its] influence is also a consequence of the shade it offers….the attributes of legal 
rules that pull parties to reach an agreement in conformity with them even when enforcement is 
unlikely.”342 
 Watercourse negotiations, like negotiations for any type of agreement, are influenced by 
many factors, including “the economic costs and benefits of reaching agreement and of 
continuing to negotiate; interests in maintaining an ongoing relationship with the other party; 
social norms; cultural difference; power disparities; even spite or distrust.”343 
                                                
339 Brunee & Toope 1997 supra note __, 27. 
340 Omar M. Dajani, Shadow or Shade? The Roles of International Law in Palestinian – Israeli Peace Talks, 32 
YALE J. INT’L L. 61-67 (2007). 
341 Id.  
342 Id. at 71. 
343 Id. at 66. 
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 International water law is a relatively new discipline with limited development in 
international tribunals.  The International Law Commission conducted extensive examination of 
state practice and existing agreements to discern three principles that have crystallized into 
customary international law.  McCaffrey sets forth these laws as follows:  
Equitable and reasonable utilization: Shared water must be used in a manner that is 
equitable and reasonable vis-à-vis co-riparian state;…. 
 
Prevention of significant harm: Countries must do their best to prevent uses within their 
territories from causing significant harm to other states;…[and]  
 
Prior notification:  …[A]state must notify other states of planned activities that may 
adversely affect those other states.  Potentially affected states must be permitted to 
comment on and consult with the notifying state concerning the plans.344   
 
 Only the third principles, prior notification, may be implemented unilaterally.  The 
second principle, prevention of significant harm, requires knowledge of conditions in other 
riparian states.  The first principle, equitable and reasonable utilization, requires tat all riparian 
states reach agreement.  This point is emphasized by the decision in the Danube Case.  The ICJ 
held that diversions by Slovakia, even though similar to what was contemplated by a treaty 
between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, violated Hungary’s “basic right to an equitable and 
reasonable sharing of the resources of an international watercourse.”345  The ICJ went on to 
solidify the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization as international law by referencing 
the 1997 UN Convention and quoting the second paragraph of Article 5, “watercourse States 
shall participate in the use, development and protection of an international watercourse in an 
equitable and reasonable manner.”346  McCaffrey states that the Court quoted the second 
paragraph of Article 5 regarding participation instead of the first paragraph regarding use 
                                                
344 STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, AARON WOLF, SHARING WATERS, SHARING BENEFITS, forthcoming  2009.   Stephen C. 
McCaffrey served as special rapporteur  to the ILC> 
345 Danube Case supra note __ at par. 78. 
346 Id. at par. 147. 
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because the second paragraph more closely reflects the outcome of the case—a recitation of 
treaty breaches and inequitable uses and a strong recommendation for the parties to negotiate a 
solution “that takes account of the objectives of the Treaty (Hungary/Slovakia), which must be 
pursued in a joint and integrated way, as well as the norms of international environmental law 
and the principles of the law of international watercourses.” 347  The Court did not articulate what 
the negotiated solution should be. 
 The United States Supreme Court in deciding an equitable apportionment case between 
the states of Kansas and Colorado strongly recommended to the parties that they negotiate an 
apportionment of the Arkansas River.  The Court declined to take on this task stating:    
The reason for judicial caution in adjudicating the relative rights of states in such cases is 
that, while we have jurisdiction of such disputes, they involve the interests of quasi-
sovereigns, present complicated and delicate questions, and, due to the possibility of 
future change of conditions, necessitate expert administration rather than judicial 
imposition of a hard and fast rule.  Such controversies may appropriately be composed by 
negotiation and agreement, pursuant to the compact clause of the Federal constitution.  
We say of this case, as the court has said of interstate differences of like nature, that such 
mutual accommodation and agreement should, if possible, be the medium of settlement, 
instead of invocation of our adjudicatory power.348  
 
 The Court went on to examine the controversy within the legal parameters of equitable 
apportionment indicating that judicial intervention would occur only when one state breached its 
obligation to the other. 
“The lower state is not entitled to have the stream flow as it would in nature regardless of 
need or use. If, then, the upper state is devoting the water to a beneficial use, the question 
to be decided, in the light of existing conditions in both states, is whether, and to what 
extent, her action injures the lower state and her citizens by depriving them of a like, or 
an equally valuable, beneficial use.”349 
 
 The states of Kansas and Colorado negotiated a Compact with the assistance of federal 
authorities, the purpose of which is to equitably apportion the waters and administer the 
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operation of a new reservoir.  The parties and the federal government changed the watercourse 
facts by increasing the supply with new storage facilities and used the law of equitable 
apportionment to set the bounds of the negotiations.350 
 These two examples, the Danube Case and Colorado v. Kansas, indicate the need for 
negotiated agreements to establish entitlements to international and interstate watercourses.    
Within each state there are strong constituencies with rights to water based on local law who 
urge maximum allocation without concern for equitable apportionment with other riparian states.  
The court decisions confirm the legal obligations of each state and provide the political cover, 
the shade, needed to pull the parties to negotiate reasonable allocations. 
Soft	  Law	  Influences	  Positions	  
 There is a large and increasing body of “soft law” regarding the utilization of 
international watercourses.  Soft law furthers negotiations by serving as the default rules, the 
standards, concepts and principles around which a deal may be structured.    When a state-to-
state negotiation arises to which that non-binding concept applies a state that previously voiced 
support of the concept in the abstract may not be able to ignore it.   
 This section discusses three “soft law” concepts impacting watercourse negotiations.  The 
first two, water for vital human needs and sustainable development guide choices and help “to 
anticipate the contours of a legal remedy” to the situation under negotiation.351  The third soft 
law is sovereignty over natural resources.  It is discussed for its potentially negative influence on 
watercourse negotiations.  Though sovereignty over natural resources is a principle of 
international law, the assertion of sovereignty over an international watercourse is antithetical to 
sharing the resource through equitable apportionment.  World Bank policies also have a 
                                                
350 See, Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673(1995) for a discussion of the water supply added by constructing a 
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351 See Dajani supra note__. 
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significant impact on watercourse negotiations and are discussed below for the direct influence 
the World Bank exerts over watercourse projects and for the secondary influence on the 
development of international law. 
Water	  for	  vital	  human	  needs	  
 Foremost among the soft laws regarding utilization of international watercourses is water 
for basic human needs.  A human right to water is set forth in General Comment 15—The Right 
to Water prepared by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  Water for vital 
human needs is the only use given a priority in the 1997 UN Convention352 for utilization of an 
international watercourse. The relationship between these two documents is discussed below. 
 Peter Gleick discusses basic water requirements for human needs in terms of drinking 
water, sanitation, bathing, and food preparation.353  He is careful to point out the variability in 
basic requirements based on environmental factors including the local climate and distance to 
water sources.  Given these variables he estimates the basic water requirements for human life to 
be a minimum of 25 liters per person per day.354  “Adding water for bathing and cooking raises 
the total range to between 27 and 200 liters per capita per day, bracketing the level of 100 liters 
per capita per day … as typical household demand in water-scarce regions.”  Using this as the 
minimum for basic human needs Gleick indicates that based on the best available data “in 1990 
fifty-five countries with a population of nearly a billion people fell below the level 
recommended.”355  Based on UN and WHO data Gleick estimated that in 2000 more than 1 
billion people lacked access to safe drinking water.356  The World Health Organization estimates 
                                                
352 1997 U.N. Convention supra note __,Art. 10. 
353 Peter H. Gleick, Basic Water Requirements for Human Activities: Meeting Basic Needs, 21 WATER 
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354 Id. at 88. 
355 Id.  
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that in 2002 1.1 billion people are without access to an improved water supply.357  WHO also 
estimates that 1.5 million people die each year from diseases related to unsafe water supplies and 
inadequate sanitation and hygiene.358   
 McCaffrey was the first to address the legal issue of a human right to water in his seminal 
article in1992.359  He explores both the concept of using the basic human rights documents, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,360 the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights361 and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights362  as a basis for such a right and the 
potential obligations of watercourse states to each other to maintain adequate water to meet vital 
human needs based on Article 10 of the 1997 UN Convention.  He concludes that water is so 
vital to life that the basic human rights documents should be interpreted to require states to at 
least exercise due diligence in their efforts to provide water to their citizens.363   
 In 2002 the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights issued General 
Comment 15, “The Right to Water” based on Articles 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.364  This committee does not address the mandatory 
obligations contained in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which moves the right to 
water away from the right to life under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and away from 
a mandatory obligation as McCaffrey had advocated.   
                                                
357 WHO Facts & Figures updated November 2004.  An “improved water supply” is not the same as the “basic 
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 Salman indicates that General Comment 15 can be “characterized as a need or an 
entitlement embodied as a right.”365  The language of Paragraph 10 of the General Comment 
continues this less-than-clear characterization. 
The right to water contains both freedoms and entitlements.  The freedoms include the 
right to maintain access to existing water supplies necessary for the right to water, and the 
right to be free from interference, such as the right to be free from arbitrary 
disconnections or contamination of water supplies.  By contrast, the entitlements include 
the right to a system of water supply and management that provides equality of 
opportunity for people to enjoy the right to water.366 
 
 General Comment 15 strengthens the importance of water to meet human needs but is not 
clear that co-riparians have obligations to each other in regard to availability of water.  The core 
obligations are for infrastructure, financing for infrastructure, and for water supply. While 
couched in terms of “human rights” General Comment 15 addresses issues related to financing 
and the “core obligations” are somewhat removed from the objective of providing, delivering or 
obtaining water for people in need.367  General Comment 14, the right to the highest attainable 
standard of health, contains a clear statement of a core obligation for all states “to ensure access 
to…an adequate supply of safe and potable water.”368  General Comment 14 contains a more 
direct obligation for a state to provide water to maintain human rights than General Comment 15 
which directly addresses the Human Right to Water.  The state obligations to meet a human right 
to water cannot be answered at this time or in this paper.   
 The more fundamental question to the discussion of equitable utilization of an 
international watercourse is whether watercourse states have a legal obligation to consider or 
address the human needs that exist in other states utilizing the same watercourse.  Human rights 
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368 General Comment 14 par. 43.  This General Comment is based on Article 12 of the Covenant on Economic, 
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law protects individuals from actions by their own government but do international watercourses 
create a situation that requires an interstate obligation.  Is it necessary for State A to utilize an 
international watercourse in a way that protects or at least does not interfere with the basic 
human needs for water in State B?  The following examination of the 1997 UN Convention, Part 
II, General Principles addresses that question. 
 Article 5, Equitable and reasonable utilization and participation, and Article 7, Obligation 
not to cause significant harm, are the key substantive provisions of Part II containing the general 
principles of the 1997 UN Convention.  As discussed in Part I of this paper, each of these 
standards for use of an international watercourse requires comparison to other uses, more 
particularly comparison to uses in other states and an examination of the impacts in other states.  
The utilization of a watercourse in one state is never considered in isolation.  Therefore State A 
has a general obligation to consider the consequences of water utilization within its territory on 
all other watercourse states.369 
 Article 6 lists the factors relevant to equitable and reasonable utilization which include 
“the social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned” and “the population 
dependent on the watercourse in each watercourse State.”  Using these factors alone, an 
argument may be made that a use in State A that depletes or pollutes water needed in State B for 
basic human needs is inequitable and unreasonable. 
 The 1997 UN Convention, Article 10 of Part II titled Relationship between Different 
Kinds of Uses, provides additional support for this line of reasoning.  Article 10 references both 
Article 5, Equitable and Reasonable Utiltization and Article 7, Prevention of Significant Harm: 
Article 10 
Relationship between different kinds of uses 
 
                                                
369  1997 UN Convention Art. 5 
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1.  In the absence of agreement or custom to the contrary, no use of an international 
watercourse enjoys inherent priority over other uses. 
 
2.  In the event of a conflict between uses of an international watercourse, it shall be 
resolved with reference to articles 5 to 7, with special regard being given to the 
requirements of vital human needs. 
 
 Can this provision be used to protect “vital human needs” 370 in one state from 
interference by another state?  This author asserts the answer is yes.  What is equitable and 
reasonable utilization and participation required by Article 5 includes the factors of Article 6 
which take into account providing for the population in need of water.  Relying on the draft 
articles that would become the 1997 UN Convention, McCaffrey draws a similar conclusion.371  
 “In our hypothetical fact situation, a conflict has arisen between the hydroelectric and 
agricultural uses of state A, on the one hand, and the domestic (specifically, drinking 
water) uses of states B and C, on the other. Article 10 would require that in allocating 
their shared water resources, the co-riparian states pay "special attention" to the drinking 
water needs of the populations of B and C.  This, in effect, gives priority to the use of 
water for drinking over its use for power generation or agriculture, in the event that they 
come into conflict, as in our hypothetical case. The rationale for such a result would 
presumably be that human life (here, in states B and C) takes priority over economic 
development (here, in state A).  While this proposition may not be particularly 
controversial in the abstract, it could well be politically difficult for the government of 
state A to "sell" to its population.”372 
 
 As has been discussed herein, there is acceptance of the concept of equitable and 
reasonable utilization as a principle of customary international law binding on all states.  This 
principle has two aspects; one, utilization within State A must be equitable and reasonable and 
two, that utilization cannot interfere with the equitable and reasonable utilization in State B.  In 
the event of a conflict between State A and State B each is entitled to an equitable and reasonable 
share provided that each has sufficient water to provide for vital human needs.  Therefore any 
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utilization in State A, other than for vital human needs, that deprives State B of sufficient water 
to provide for the vital human needs of its population is not equitable and is a violation of 
customary international law.373  Using this reasoning, states must consider the human needs in 
other watercourse states to determine if their own use is equitable and reasonable. 
 The other substantive provision of Part II, Article 7, The Obligation Not to Cause 
Significant Harm, also requires consideration of impacts in other watercourse states by requiring 
that a state take “all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of significant harm to other 
watercourse States.”  The bridge for cross-boundary liability is built in paragraph 2 of Article 7; 
“where significant harm nevertheless is caused to another watercourse State, the States whose 
use causes such harm shall, in the absence of agreement to such use, take all appropriate 
measures, having due regard for the provisions of articles 5 and 6, in consultation with the 
affected State, to eliminate or mitigate such harm and, where appropriate, to discuss the question 
of compensation.” 
 The commentary to Article 7 indicates that the standard imposed on a state through 
Article 7 is one of due diligence.  McCaffrey examines the threshold of harm for legal injury that 
would result in a violation of this codified provision of international law.374  “To be sure, the 
causing of some forms of harm may be considered per se unreasonable, as for example, where 
the harm endangers human health.”375   
 McCaffrey goes on to point out that in order “for the ‘no-harm’ obligation to be breached, 
three conditions must be satisfied: significant harm must result in one state from activities in 
another state; the latter must not only have failed to prevent the harm by its conduct but must 
also have been capable of preventing it by different conduct; and the conduct or use resulting in 
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the harm must be unreasonable (inequitable) in the circumstances.”376  A project or use in State 
A that limits or contaminates the water in State B such that water is not available for vital human 
needs, for drinking water and for food production, meets these requirements for significant harm.  
It also may be characterized as inequitable and unreasonable—in both characterizations there is a 
violation of international law. 
 The Article 10 reference to Articles 5 to 7 of the 1997 Convention may appear to be a 
circuitous track; however, it ties water for “vital human needs” to principles of international law 
binding on all states and thereby creates a duty for all states in relation to all other states, and 
arguably all other humans, not to interfere with the human needs along a given watercourse. This 
does not mean that individuals within State B have a remedy against State A.  International law 
has not reached the point of providing such rights, however, in the relations between states, in 
the negotiations of a watercourse agreement, the state without adequate water to meet vital 
human needs should prevail against activities within any other watercourse state which interfere 
with the availability of sufficient water.377 
Sustainable	  development	  
 The concept of sustainable development is a policy for the interaction between resources 
and people for global development.  The need for this policy is articulated by the World 
Commission on Environment and Development, an independent commission called by the 
United Nations General Assembly. The Commission defined sustainable development as 
development that “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs.”378  Since the publication of the commission report, Our 
                                                
376 Id.  at 445 
377 Id. at 371. 
378 WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE, 8 (1987). 
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Common Future,379 in 1987 the concept of sustainable development has permeated the 
international declarations related to resource development including those governing 
international watercourses.380   
 The ILC draft of the 1997 UN Convention as referred to the General Assembly includes 
the concept of sustainable development in Article 24, Management, which suggests joint 
mechanisms for “planning the sustainable development of an international watercourse.”381 The 
ILC did not include sustainable development as a component of the general principles contained   
in Article 5.382 Article 5 did, however, include concepts that support sustainable development 
such as reasonable utilization,383  protection of the watercourse,384 consideration of the effects of 
planned development,385 and pollution prevention.386  It was not until the General Assembly 
added “sustainable” which reads as follows in the 1997 UN Convention:  
[A]n international watercourse shall be used and developed by watercourse States with a 
view of attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and benefits therefrom, 
taking into account the interests of the watercourse States concerned, consistent with 
adequate protection of the watercourse.387   
 
 In the Danube Case Vice President Weeramantry writing separately specifically 
addresses the “Concept of Sustainable Development.”  Justice Weeramantry explained the 
importance of this concept as follows: “The Court must hold the balance even between the 
environmental considerations (Hungary) and the development considerations (Slovakia) raised 
by the respective Parties.  The principle that enables the Court to do so is the principle of 
                                                
379 Id. 
380 See, Convention on Cooperation for the Protection and Sustainable Use of the Danube River 1994, Charte des 
Eaux du Fleuve Sénégal (OMVS 2002), Southern African Development Community Revised Protocol on Shared 
Watercourses 2001. 
381 Id., Art. 24. 
382 1994 ILC Report. 
383 1997 U.N. Convention, supra note --, Art. 5(1). 
384 Id. 
385 Id., Part III. 
386 Id., Part IV. 
387 Id. Art. 5 (1) clause 2. 
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sustainable development.”388  The Court in the majority opinion refers to sustainable 
development as a concept and Judge Weeramantry so titles his discussion, but the thrust of his 
argument is that it is a principle of international law with normative value essential to the 
resolution of the dispute between Hungary and Slovakia.389  He maintains that development and 
the right of each sovereign state to develop is a principle of international law and that protection 
of the environment is equally founded in international law. “While … all peoples have the right 
to initiate development projects and enjoy their benefits, there is likewise a duty to ensure that 
those projects do not significantly damage the environment.” 390  The way this is accomplished is 
through the requirements of sustainable development. 
The concept (of sustainable development) has a significant role to play in the resolution 
of environmentally related disputes.  The components of the principle come from well-
established areas of international law – human rights, State responsibility, environmental 
law, economic and industrial law, equity, territorial sovereignty, abuse of rights, good 
neighbourliness – to mention a few.  It has also been expressly incorporated into a 
number of binding and far-reaching international agreements, thus giving it binding force 
in the context of those agreements.  It offers an important principle for the resolution of 
tensions between two established rights.  It reaffirms in the arena of international law that 
there must be both development and environmental protection, and that neither of these 
rights can be neglected.391 
 
 According to Judge Weeramantry, watercourse agreements that contemplate development 
must be consistent with sustainable development which he characterizes as a principle of 
customary international law.  The majority of the ICJ characterize sustainable development as a 
concept, but its acceptance in international agreements and declarations392 is sufficiently 
pervasive that parties negotiating watercourse agreements should give due consideration that a 
watercourse is developed in a sustainable manner.   
                                                
388 Danube Case supra note --, separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry, A—page 1 
389 Id. 
390 Id. at 4. 
391 Id. at 6. 




 “Sovereignty” is a word with great power.  It is a political principle.  It  includes concepts 
of rights, territory and inviolability. In connection with watercourses it is used in two distinctly 
different ways.  First is the sovereign equality of states to share in the benefits of an international 
watercourse.  Second is the assertion of sovereignty over a watercourse.  The former is discussed 
in Part I as a foundational principle of equitable and reasonable utilization.  The latter is 
discussed below.393 
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration affirms that “[s]tates have, in accordance with 
the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to 
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies….”394  The same 
formulation has been reproduced in other binding and non-binding international instruments.  
Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration builds on this concept: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of 
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other 
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. 395 
 
 The right to development is set forth in a Declaration of the General Assembly which 
provides as follows in paragraph 2 of the first article:  
The human right to development also implies the full realization of the right of peoples to 
self-determination, which includes, subject to the relevant provisions of both 
International Covenants on Human Rights, the exercise of their inalienable right to full 
sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources.396 
 
                                                
393 See generally Margaret J. Vick, International Water Law and Sovereignty: A Discussion of the ILC Draft Articles 
on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers, 21 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 191 (2008); Stephen C. 
McCaffrey, The International Law Commission Adopts Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers, forthcoming 103 
AM. J. INTERN’L LAW  Part III.(2009). 
394 Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Principle 21, June 16, 
1972, 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972). 
395 Rio Declaration A/Conf.151/26, 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992). 
396 A/RES/41/128 adopted by the General Assembly 4 Dec. 1986.  See also the Danube Case, separate opinion of 
Judge Weeramantry at ___ 
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The General Assembly in resolution 1803 (XVII), Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural 
Resources, declares that: 
“The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and 
resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of the well-
being of the people of the State concerned.”397 
 
 The concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources gained recognition in the 
period of decolonization in the early 1960’s.   
The principle of ‘permanent sovereignty over natural resources’ as the right of peoples 
and nations to use and dispose of the natural resources in their territories in the interest of 
their national development and well-being was established by the General Assembly in 
its resolution 1803 (XVII) of December 1962….While the legal nature of the core 
principle of ‘permanent sovereignty over natural resources’, as a corollary to the principle 
of territorial sovereignty or the right of self-determination, is indisputably part of 
customary international law, its exact legal scope and implications are still debatable.398 
 
 Sovereignty over resources is a principle of customary international law,399 a “hard law,” 
and there is little dispute that states have permanent sovereignty over a resource such as a coal 
deposit.  However, the question remains as to its applicability to an international watercourse.  
Because the answer to that question is not certain, this principle is discussed as “soft law.”  
The legal theories related to transboundary watercourses of absolute territorial 
sovereignty and absolute territorial integrity are comparable to the policy of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources.  It is well documented that these two theories of sovereignty 
over a transboundary watercourse are discredited theories of international water law.400   The 
assertion of permanent sovereignty over an international watercourse may be considered as 
                                                
397 UN General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) Permanent sovereignty over natural resources, 14 Dec. 1962. 
398 Letter dated 29 January 2002 from the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, the Legal Counsel, addressed 
to the President of the Security Council, 12 February 2002, S/2002/161 (regarding contracts signed by Moroccan 
authorities with foreign companies for the exploration of mineral resources in Western Sahara). 
399 Letter dated 29 January 2002 from the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, the Legal Counsel, addressed 
to the President of the Security Council, S/2002/161, 12 Feb. 2002. 
400 McCaffrey 2007 supra note--, Ch. 5. 
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political posturing with a discredited legal theory or as an assertion of power during negotiations 
over an international watercourse. 
 However, sovereignty over transboundary water resources is a current topic of discussion 
by the UN Commission on Human Rights in relation to indigenous peoples and by the ILC in 
relation to transboundary aquifers.  These are discussed below for their potential pull on 
watercourse negotiations.401 
  Indigenous peoples’ permanent sovereignty over natural resources402 
 In 2001 the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights resolved 
to study indigenous peoples’ permanent sovereignty over natural resources through a request to 
the Commission on Human Rights to appoint Erica-Irene Daes as special Rapporteur to prepare a 
report to the sub-commission.403  This topic was suggested by the debates about indigenous 
peoples rights to self-determination and the detrimental impact to indigenous peoples from 
exploitation of natural resources.404  In response to questions regarding the nature of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources to be exercised by groups not recognized as sovereign states 
in most regions of the world, the Special Rapporteur defined the scope of her work as “legal, 
                                                
401 Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, 
and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources is the title of resolutions 
adopted by the General Assembly each session beginning with resolution 3175, 17 December 1973.  The natural 
resources covered by the resolutions include water (See A/res/56/204 (2002), A/res/59/251 (2005) as examples).  
Sharif S. Elmusa in his article Dividing the common Palestinian-Israeli Waters; An International Water Law 
Approach, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Spring, 1993), pp. 57-77, asserts that the Palestinian 
sovereignty over natural resources must be read in light of the principles of international law such that sovereignty 
over water resources means sovereignty over the Palestinian equitable share of the water resources. 
402 This discussion assumes that the water resources of indigenous peoples are transboundary, in that they are within 
the territory of the indigenous people, but most likely within and subsidiary to the territory of a state and thereby 
subject to the “governmental control and authority” of both or transboundary in that the water resource is within the 
territory of the state. 
403 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights Resolution 2001/10, 15 August 2001.  The Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights was replaced by the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee, see,  G.A. Res. 60/251, March 15, 
2006. 
404 Indigenous peoples’ permanent sovereignty over natural resources, Final report of Special Rapporteur, Erica-
Irene A. Daes, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/30, 13 July 2004 at par. 5. 
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governmental control and management authority over natural resources, particularly as an aspect 
of the exercise of the right of self-determination….In this context, it is apparent that the term 
‘sovereignty’ refers not to the abstract and absolute sense of the term, but rather to governmental 
control and authority over the resources in the exercise of self-determination.  Thus it does not 
mean the supreme authority of an independent State.” 405 
 Daes discusses Indian law from the United States as a concept of sovereignty held by 
indigenous peoples that is subordinate to the sovereignty of states.  Given this clarification of the 
difference between permanent sovereignty over the natural resources of states and that of 
indigenous peoples, it is more akin to local water laws.  Unlike state sovereignty which creates a 
tension over sharing a resource, the sovereignty of indigenous peoples over water resources is 
incorporated in the domestic legal system. 
Sovereignty and Shared Natural Resources 
 In 2000 the ILC took up the topic of shared natural resources starting transboundary 
aquifers.  Groundwater and surface water are defined as parts of a unitary system in the 1997 UN 
Convention.406  The ILC at the conclusion of its work on the law of the non-navigational uses of 
international watercourses adopted a resolution on Confined Transboundary Groundwater 
commending states to follow the principles in the 1997 UN Convention for those waters not 
included in the definition of watercourse.407  The ILC work on transboundary aquifers uses the  
resolution on Confined Transboundary Groundwater as a starting point.   
                                                
405 Indigenous peoples’ permanent sovereignty over natural resources, Final report of Special Rapporteur, Erica-
Irene A. Daes, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/30, 13 July 2004 at par. 18. 
406 1997 U.N. Convention Art. 2(a). 
407 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, vol. 2, pt.2, p. 135.  See also Chusei Yamada, Special Rapporteur, Shared natural 
resources: first report on outlines, A/CN.4/533 for a discussion of the scope of the 1997 UN Convention. 
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The draft articles adopted on second reading in 2008 contain a separate article titled 
“Sovereignty of Aquifer States”408 which is a different and new legal concept in relation to 
transboundary waters than any contained in the 1997 UN Convention.  
 This current work of the ILC on shared natural resources demonstrates the tension 
between the political principles of sovereignty and the development of transboundary resources.  
The United States Supreme Court determined that the states of the United States, as quasi-
sovereigns, have sovereign control over the water resources within the state; however that 
control only extends to each state’s equitable share of the resource.409   The ILC Draft Article 
Three emphasizes that the exercise of sovereignty over a transboundary aquifer shall be “in 
accordance with the present draft articles.”  The commentary, however, indicates that this 
sovereignty article is based on concepts of territorial boundaries, not equitable allocation.410 
  The ILC Special Rapporteur purported to base the draft articles for transboundary 
groundwaters on the 1997 UN Convention.  There is reported discussion that the 1997 UN 
Convention covered the topic of transboundary aquifers, however, the ILC proceeded to identify 
the differences between watercourses as defined in the Convention and aquifers within the scope 
of the draft articles.  In essence, the draft articles contain exceptions to the legal principles of 
equitable and reasonable utilization contained in the 1997 UN Convention.  Scientists are 
developing a better understanding of the interconnectedness of water throughout the hydrologic 
cycle411 and an understanding of the nature and extent of what the ILC called confined aquifers.  
                                                
408 ILC Draft Articles Transboundary Aquifers, Art. 3, Report of the Sixtieth session (2008), A/63/10, Ch. IV which 
reads “Each aquifer State has sovereignty over the portion of a transboundary aquifer located within its territory.  It 
shall exercise its sovereignty in accordance with international law and the present draft articles.” 
409 See Hinderliter v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 102 (1938). 
410 Report of the International Law Commission (2006), A/61/10 at pp. 202-203. 
411 See e.g. MALIN FALKENMARK & JOHAN ROCKSTRÖM, BALANCING WATER FOR HUMANS AND NATURE, THE NEW 
APPROACH IN ECOHYDROLOGY (2004). 
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However, the legal separation of “watercourses”412 from “aquifers”413 creates the potential for 
conflicting legal standards for water use. Separation of the law for groundwater withdrawal from 
the law for surface water may lead to situations where neither is sustainable.414 
 Special Rapporteur Chusei Yamada indicates in his reports that members of the 
Commission requested a specific reference to General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 
December 1962, entitled “Permanent sovereignty over natural resources.”  He recommended that 
such a reference be in the Preambular language which would not be drafted until the articles 
were final.  The Drafting Committee returned draft articles including the above quoted Article 3 
on Sovereignty.415    The Commentary for Draft Article 3 in the Report of the International Law 
Commission reflects the lack of consensus on the topic. 
The need to have an explicit reference in the form of draft article on the sovereignty of 
States over the natural resources within their territories was advocated by many States, 
particularly by those aquifer States that are of the opinion that water resources belong to 
the States in which they are located and are subject to the exclusive sovereignty of those 
States.  They also pointed out that groundwaters must be regarded as belonging to the 
States where they are located, along the lines of oil and gas.  Reference was made, in that 
regard, to General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, entitled 
‘Permanent sovereignty over natural resources’.  Some thought that it would be enough to 
have a reference to it in the preamble while others considered that such reference would 
be undesirable for the proper management of aquifers.416 
 
 This focus on sovereignty over the resources is not part of the 1997 UN Convention and 
the legal theories based on sovereignty over international watercourses were discredited by the 
work of the ILC in the preparation of the draft articles on which the 1997 UN Convention is 
                                                
412 1997 UN Convention Art. 2 
413 ILC Draft Articles supra note--, Art. 2 
414 See Robert Glennon, The Disconnect between Water Law and Hydrology, in ARIZONA WATER POLICY, 
MANAGEMENT INNOVATIONS IN AN URBANIZING, ARID REGION, BONNIE G. COLBY & KATHARINE L. JACOBS, EDS. 
(2007) for a discussion of the water management difficulties in the state of Arizona which has separate groundwater 
and surface water legal regimes. 
415 Shared Natural Resources, Titles and texts of the draft articles adopted by the Drafting Committee on first 




based.  The topic of shared natural resources and the manner in which the ILC chose to approach 
the topic invite the application of the concept of sovereignty to transboundary water resources.  
 In 2000 the ILC listed the topic of “shared natural resources of States” as an appropriate 
topic for its long-term program of work.  The Special Rapporteur proposed first to take up the 
topic of confined groundwaters and then oil and natural gas.  This sandwiched transboundary 
groundwaters between the law of international watercourses codified in the 1997 UN Convention 
and the law of mineral development including oil and gas which is reflected in General 
Assembly resolution 1803.  The Special Rapporteur proposed draft articles for discussion based 
on the 1997 UN Convention noting the physical differences between confined groundwaters and 
renewable surface supplies.  He noted that the first discussions within the Commission and the 
Sixth Committee included concern with the term “shared”417 and with use of equitable and 
reasonable utilization as the legal standard.418  This concern resulted in sovereignty being the 
lead principle in the Draft Articles. 
 Development of different legal principles for “transboundary aquifers” makes the 
negotiated definition of the waters covered by an agreement key to the optimal and sustainable 
development of the resource.  The introduction of sovereignty over water based on the territorial 
limits of a state may pull negotiations in a different direction from the law of equitable and 
reasonable utilization.  It would be unfortunate if the work of the ILC on shared natural resources 
legitimizes sovereign as opposed to equitable claims to international watercourses.  The relative 
importance of these concepts must be resolved through negotiations. 
                                                
417 Second Report on shared natural resources: transboundary groundwaters, Chusei Yamada, Special Rapporteur, 9 
March 2004, A/CN.4/539 at pars. 3-4. 
418 Id. at par. 7. 
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World	  Bank	  Policies	  
 World Bank policies for the development of international watercourses are not in the 
same classification as the “soft law” discussed above.  Yet, they have a significant influence over 
watercourse agreements and over the implementation of both “soft” and “hard” law. 
[T]he policies, procedures, codes of conduct, and guidelines of multilateral financial 
institutions, such as the World Bank Group and of other United Nations specialized 
agencies…are not binding in the traditional sense, (but) they have considerable practical 
impact, especially throughout the developing world.  In part, this impact occurs because 
the financial leverage of institutions such as the World Bank enables them to impose 
environment-related instruments such as “green’ loan conditions and environment-related 
policies as part of their financing activities.  Further, the application of these instruments 
by multilateral financial institutions helps support traditional treaty law because many of 
these instruments explicitly or implicitly further the aims of international environmental 
agreements.  Thus, in a world where the efficacy of a legal instrument is based upon its 
capacity to generate compliance, the policies of the World Bank and similar institutions 
may be highly effective in promoting international environmental treaties, in some cases 
more effective than many of the traditional sources of international environmental law.419 
 
 McCaffrey argues that the operational policies of the World Bank, which, for the most 
part, are set by developed countries and accepted as conditions of funding by developing 
countries, contribute to the development of customary international water law.420   
 The World Bank is instrumental in instigating watercourse negotiations.  It is Bank policy 
to require notification and receive a “non-objection” from all watercourse states before funding a 
watercourse project.421 These policies have been in place since 1956 with the objective of 
ensuring “that riparians did not undertake projects with Bank financing to the detriment of other 
riparians, especially in the absence of adequate notice and opportunity for consultation.  Thus, 
                                                
419 Charles E. DiLeva, International Environmental Law and Development, 10 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 501 
(1998) emphasis added. At the time this article was published the author was Senior counsel, Legal Department, 
World Bank. (emphasis added) 
420 Stephen C. McCaffrey,  Some Developments in the Law of International Watercourses, in Some Developments in 
the Law of International Watercourses , Chapter 44, in PROMOTING JUSTICE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW, LIBER AMICORUM LUCIUS CAFLISCH, 781, 790 MARCELO G. KOHEN 
ed. (2007).   While the overall result may be to view wide spread acceptance of World Bank policies this author 
submits that domestic compliance by developed countries and the voluntariness of developing country compliance 
should be examined before asserting customary international law status for loan conditions. 
421 DeLeva supra note__at 519-520, World Bank Operational Manual, Operational Policies (OP) 7.50(6) (2004). 
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Bank policy was largely consistent with current international treaties many years before their 
development.”422   
The current Operational Manuals require more than notification.  The Bank makes a 
determination that a project does not cause appreciable harm viewed from both downstream and 
upstream perspectives.423  Though McCaffrey asserts that the Bank “is in a position analogous to 
that of a third-party dispute-resolution mechanism, in that it interprets and applies international 
standards in concrete cases”424 the Bank attempts to limit this role by basing its evaluation on a 
determination of “appreciable harm” not by determining an equitable and reasonable utilization.   
 By using the ‘appreciable harm’ and ‘adverse effect’ formulation, the Bank is not 
rejecting the ‘equitable utilization’ formulation.  In fact, it has been noted that the 
‘equitable use’ formulation is considered the ‘cornerstone’ of the law in this field.  In the 
Bank’s view, however, the equitable use analysis could require the Bank to act more in 
the nature of a tribunal, adjudicating issues of equity and distribution between the parties; 
whereas the ‘appreciable harm’ or ‘adverse effect’ formulation is more of a purely 
scientific determination, akin to the environmental assessment/economic analysis 
required of Bank investments.425 
 
 The leverage of World Bank financing strongly influences a state to comply with the 
notification provisions of Part III of the 1997 UN Convention for planned measures.  In many 
instances it is through the influence of World Bank policies and the state compliance with 
lending agreements that customary international law, treaty obligations and “soft law” principles 
are implemented.426 
Conclusion	  	  
“As a growing body of international law and international relations literature suggests, 
the influence of legal rules does not turn solely on the possibility of third party 
                                                
422 DiLeva at 520, World Bank Operational Manual, Operational Policies (OP) 7.50, Bank Procedures (BP) 7.50 and 
Good Practices (GP) 7.50 (2004) available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,menuPK:6470163
7~pagePK:51628525~piPK:64857279~theSitePK:502184,00.html . 
423 DiLeva supra note __at 530, McCaffrey 2007 supra note__ at 785-786. 
424 McCaffrey supra note __  at 790. 
425 DiLeva supra note __at 531 citations omitted. 
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enforcement; international law’s influence also derives from the normative force of the 
ideas it embodies and its capacity to legitimize negotiated outcomes in the eyes of other 
international actors and domestic constituencies.”427 
 
 Legitimacy is key to watercourse agreements.  Negotiating within the box of widely 
accepted legal principles adds legitimacy.  International law influences negotiations because “the 
attributes of legal rules… pull parties to align a negotiated outcome with them, even when their 
ultimate enforcement is unlikely.”428 
 The division of a finite supply of water among increasing demands is a difficult task.  
Conflicts among states over water are politically charged in part because of the multiple 
domestic constituencies with a stake in the outcome which may require economic, political and 
individual life changes. Sovereign states may divide the water and the benefits of an international 
watercourse as they agree among themselves.  The role of the law is to facilitate the negotiation 
of an equitable and reasonable solution that is obtainable and sustainable.  It is the role of law to 
lessen the influence of power in negotiations through application of normative principles applied 
equally to all states. 
                                                
427 Dajani supra note __at 64-65. 




Chapter	  Seven:	  Using	  a	  Winters	  Methodology	  
 The comparison of uses among all states along a watercourse to determine equitable and 
reasonable utilization is not an easy task.  This paper has established that watercourse 
agreements help to protect economic development and investment in water infrastructure.  
Flexibility for the variability of the watercourse and the needs of the watercourse states should be 
built into the agreement because hanges in circumstances and natural conditions are not likely to 
alter the obligations in the agreement.429  
 Watercourse negotiations are part law, part hydrology, part engineering and part political 
strategy.  Negotiations require a common data base of watercourse information that is as accurate 
and complete as the parties are able to acquire.  Watercourse negotiations are unique in that the 
parties may change the facts of the watercourse any number of imaginative ways from adding 
dams and storage reservoirs to conservation requirements to inter-basin transfers of water, to 
virtual water trade agreements.   
 This section describes the methodology used in the United States to establish entitlements 
to water for indigenous Indian tribes who have not developed in the same way or to the same 
degree as the non-Indian surrounding communities. This methodology is primarily one of water 
use planning.  This is supported by Article 24 of the 1997 UN Convention which calls for 
“planning the sustainable development of an international watercourse and providing for the 
implementation of any plans adopted; and otherwise promoting the rational and optimal 
utilization, protection and control of the watercourse.”430  The Winters methodology described 
herein may be used for water use planning and as the basis for negotiations.  It develops the 
                                                
429 See The Danube Case. 
430 1997 UN Convention Art. 24 (2)(a) and (b). 
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factual basis for presentation of tribal water rights’ claims and may be used as the factual 
foundation for negotiations over international watercourses. 
History	  
 In general, the states within the western United States allocate water among individual 
users based on a system of prior appropriation and beneficial use of water. The first to do so on a 
river system obtains a superior right over all those who appropriate at a later date.  This system 
of prior appropriation is summarized by the statement that the first in time is the first in right.431   
 During the 19th century indigenous tribes within the western United States were forced 
from all or large portions of their aboriginal lands by non-Indian settlement.  The surviving tribes 
relocated to or remained on smaller enclaves that were reserved for them by treaty or executive 
order.  This territory, the tribe’s reservation, is governed by the tribe and subject to federal 
jurisdiction but is outside the jurisdiction of the state(s) in which it is located.  The state law of 
prior appropriation does not apply within tribal territory and tribes are not bound by the rules of 
state water law.432 
 In 1908 the United States Supreme Court decided Winters v. United States433 establishing 
the legal basis for an entitlement to water for an Indian tribe.  The Court held that the tribe was 
entitled to an amount of water necessary to fulfill the purposes for which the reservation was 
established.  Since 1908 a methodology for determining the quantity of water necessary to fulfill 
the purposes of the reservation has developed through extensive litigation. 
                                                
431 See generally, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, 2005 ED.,NELL JESSUP NEWTON et all eds., JOHN 
SHURTS, INDIAN RESERVED WATER RIGHTS, THE WINTERS DOCTRINE IN ITS SOCIAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT, 1880S-
1930S, (2000), DANIEL MCCOOL, NATIVE WATERS, CONTEMPORARY INDIAN WATER SETTLEMENTS AND THE 
SECOND TREATY ERA (2002), LLOYD BURTON, AMERICAN INDIAN WATER RIGHTS AND THE LIMITS OF LAW (1991).   
432 An additional legal basis for this distinction is that the title to tribal reservations is held in trust by the United 
States for the benefit of the tribes. 
433 207 U.S. 564 (1908). 
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 This chapter discusses the legal principles of the Winters doctrine of reserved rights with 
an emphasis on water rights claims based on this theory.  This is followed by a section discussing 
the similarities between equitable theories of water use and a Winters claim comparing the 
Winters factors to Article 6 of the 1997 UN Convention.  This chapter concludes with a general 
discussion of ways in which the Winters methodology may inform international negotiations. 
 The prior appropriation doctrine facilitated the rapid development of the arid western 
states of the western United States.  Prior appropriation rights are quantified at the time of first 
use and continue until abandoned at which time they revert to the watercourse for the benefit of 
junior appropriators.  The doctrine also encouraged a “race to the river,” and over-appropriation 
of the watercourse using inefficient diversion works.  It furthered the philosophy that a drop of 
water reaching the ocean was a drop of water wasted giving little consideration to the ecology or 
“natural” resources associated with the watercourse.   
 It is into this system of “first in time, first in right” that the courts were challenged to 
incorporate water rights for Indian tribes.434  The tribes were the first to occupy the lands riparian 
to the watercourses yet few tribes developed the large river works for irrigated agriculture.  The 
United States government spent billions on major reclamation projects to irrigate non-Indian 
lands giving non-Indian settlers a priority to water often in violation of treaties or trust 
obligations to tribes. 
 It is in this context at the end of the 19th century that the Supreme Court decided the case 
of Winters v. United States.435 
                                                
434 Shurts in his thorough historical analysis of the Winters doctrine dispels the role of the law of prior appropriation 
played in the actual decision of Winters. 
435 207 U.S. 564 (1908). 
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Winters	  Doctrine	  of	  Reserved	  Rights	  
 The Gros Ventre and the Assiniboine Indians reside on the Fort Belknap Reservation in 
the state of Montana.  The northern border of the reservation is the Milk River.  In the early 
1900’s there was not sufficient water in the Milk River to irrigate the lands on the reservation 
because of upstream non-Indian diversions.  This led to litigation by the United States on behalf 
of the tribes against the non-Indian irrigators in the case of Winters v. United States.436 
 Montana follows the law of prior appropriation and though the tribe and the United States 
used water for irrigation prior to any use by non-Indians off the reservation they did not perfect 
the water use on the reservation under state law by filing the necessary documents.437  When the 
conflict in uses arose the parties argued different theories of law.  The non-Indians argued for 
upholding state law requirements for perfecting prior appropriation rights.  The United States 
argued that water for Indian tribes should have the same legal status as their land.  When the 
tribes ceded vast tracts of land to the United States by treaty, they reserved unto themselves a 
smaller territory, their reservation.  The United States argued that the reservation of land 
included a reservation of water sufficient to make the land habitable.  In essence, the tribe did not 
relinquish the land that supported their nomadic life and also relinquish the water necessary to 
support farming on the smaller reserved lands.   
The facts of Winters were particularly suited to this theory of law.  The reservation 
boundary was set by the Treaty of 1888 between the United States and the tribes as the “middle 
of the main channel of the Milk River.”438  The Treaty provides that the United States will 
                                                
436 Id. 
437 Shurts supra note __ citing Montana Laws 1905, chap. 44, sec. 1. 
438 An act to ratify and confirm an agreement with the Gros Ventre, Piegan Blood, Blackfeet, and River Crow 
Indians in Montana, and for other purposes, Act of May 1, 1888, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., chap. 213, 25 Stat. 113-133, 
reprinted in KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS, ch. 1, 216 available at 
http://digital.library.okstate.edu/Kappler/Vol1/HTML_files/SES0261.html#p263.  
For a discussion of the signing of the 1888 Treaty see Shurts supra note __at Ch. 1 note 2. 
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provide assistance for irrigation of the reservation and that the United States promises to promote 
the arts of civilization for the tribe.  In addition, the reservation was irrigated prior to the time 
when the diversions by the non-Indian irrigators depleted the flow of the Milk River.  
 The Court determined that the dispute between the United States on behalf of the tribes 
and the non-Indian upstream irrigators would be resolved according to the terms of the Treaty of 
1888.  The Court held that the Treaty of 1888 reserved for the tribe sufficient water to fulfill the 
purposes for which the reservation was established.  To hold otherwise and deprive the tribe of 
water would make the Treaty meaningless and illusory.439 
 The courts of the United States elaborated on the reserved water rights doctrine of 
Winters throughout the decades in numerous water rights cases.  This history is well documented 
by legal scholars440 and is not discussed here. This discussion leapfrogs to two cases which 
applied the Winters doctrine and developed standards to quantify tribal reserved water rights. 
The first is a 1963 United States Supreme Court case, Arizona v. California,441 which quantified 
the tribal reserved water rights along the Colorado River developing the standard of “practicably 
irrigable acreage.”  The second is the 2001 decision by the Supreme Court of Arizona, In re the 
General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System and Source (Gila V)442 
in which the state court takes a realistic view of water use and water needs on reservations in 
Arizona. 
                                                
439 Winters, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908). 
440 See e.g. COHEN supra note __, ch. 19,  
441 373 U.S. 546 (1963). 
442 In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System and Source, 201 Ariz. 307, 35 
P. 3d 68 (2001) hereafter Gila V. 
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Arizona	  v.	  California443	  
 In the late 1950’s the state of Arizona sued the state of California444 challenging the 
Congressional apportionment of the Colorado River in the Boulder Canyon Project Act.445  The 
other states in the Lower Basin and the United States joined the action which adjudicated the 
rights to water within this section and the United States presented claims on behalf of riparian 
tribes.  This case was one of original jurisdiction before the United States Supreme Court446  who 
appointed a Special Master to hear evidence and submit findings.  The Special Master 
established a  standard of practicably irrigable acreage to measure the amount of water needed to 
satisfy the purposes of the Indian reservations.  In doing so he rejected a standard for tribal 
reserved rights based on future needs as being too speculative.  He rejected a standard based on 
population as not sufficient to meet the future needs of the reservation and as too speculative.  He 
also rejected an equitable apportionment of the water between the tribes and the states because 
the tribes are not states for purposes of this doctrine.  He determined that the quantity of water 
reserved was commensurate with the land reserved for the tribe.   
What the United States did, in withdrawing public lands for these Indian Reservations, 
was to establish areas that could be used in the indefinite future to satisfy the needs of 
Indian tribes in the United States as those needs might develop.  It follows from this that 
the United States intended to reserve enough water to make the lands productive, in other 
words, enough to irrigate all of the practicably irrigable acreage.447 
 
 The Special Master proceeded to hear evidence to determine the amount of irrigable 
acreage, the practicability of producing crops on this acreage and the appropriate amount of 
water for each crop, the water duty.  He recommended an amount of water for each tribe to be 
entered into a decree.  For example, the Special Master’s report indicates that the Chemehuevi 
                                                
443 Arizona v. California 376 U.S. 340 (1964). 
444 Id. at 551. 
445 43 U.S.C. §§617-617t. 
446 U.S. Constitution Art. 3 §2 
447 Report of Special Master Simon H. Rivfind, Dec. 5, 1960, 262-266. 
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reservation contains 1900 acres of irrigable land within the state of California with a maximum 
annual diversion requirement of 11,340 acre-feet or up to the quantity necessary to “supply the 
consumptive use required for irrigation of 1,900 acres and for the satisfaction of related uses, 
whichever is less, with a priority of February 2, 1907.”448  The priority date is the date the 
reservation was established.  This amount of water for the Chemehuevi reservation is confirmed 
by the Supreme Court in the water decree.449 
 Water rights were decreed for six reservations along the lower reaches of the Colorado 
River.  All of the reservations are comprised of arid lands riparian to the mainstream with tribal 
histories of irrigation and reservation histories indicating that the lands were reserved for 
irrigation purposes.   
 The cases following Arizona v. California dealt with more complex reservation purposes, 
more complex land use issues and often adamant opposition from water users and state 
governments to the establishment of tribal water rights.  Numerous courts used the standard of 
sufficient water to irrigate the practicably irrigable acreage (PIA) within a reservation.450   The 
Montana Supreme Court in the Big Horn River adjudication clarified the PIA standard as “those 
acres susceptible to sustained irrigation at reasonable costs.”451   
By the year 2000 irrigated agriculture was not the same economic base for the rural and 
arid western United States that it was in 1963 when the Supreme Court established the 
quantification standard of practicably irrigable acreage.  The Supreme Court of Arizona faced 
                                                
448 Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340, 344 (1964).  The 1964 decision in Arizona v. California is the decree setting 
forth the rights determined in 1963.  
449 Id. 
450 See, COHEN supra note __, ch. 19. 




with the question of quantification for tribes in Arizona established a more expansive standard to 
measure the water necessary to fulfill the purposes of Indian reservations. 
Gila	  V	  
 The Gila River is tributary to the Colorado River arising in the mountains of far western 
New Mexico and eastern Arizona.  Except for a small section of the headwaters, the Gila River 
flows within the state of Arizona crossing the state from east to southwest having its confluence 
with the Colorado River near the border with Mexico at Yuma, Arizona.  The tributaries draining 
the high country of central Arizona include the Salt River, the Verde River and the Agua Fria 
River.  The mountains in the southern part of Arizona within the Gila River basin are drained by 
the San Pedro.  The parties to the adjudication include most of the population with the state of 
Arizona, the major irrigation interests, the State of Arizona, Indian tribes, and the federal 
government. 
The Gila River adjudication to determine the relative rights of water users within the Gila 
River System is a massive litigation that began in 1974.  Approximately 849,000 people or 
entities were served, 24,000 became parties filing 78,000 claims to water in the Gila River 
system.452  Because of the enormity of this litigation and the complexity of the interrelationship 
of the claims based on state law, federal law and reserved rights, the Arizona Supreme Court 
adopted special rules for interlocutory appeal of questions of law that affect the course of the 
adjudication.453  Gila V is an opinion from one such appeal addressing the single issue: 454 “What 
is the appropriate standard to be applied in determining the amount of water reserved for federal 
lands?”   
                                                
452 Joseph M. Feller, The Adjudication that Ate Arizona Water Law, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 405406-407 (2007). 
453 In re the General Adjudication of all Rights to Use Water in the Gila River System and Source, WC-1, WC-2, 
WC-3, and WC-4 (consolidated), Special Procedural Order Providing for Interlocutory Appeals and Certifications, 
Sep. 26, 1989 (Ariz.). 
454 Id. at A. 
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 This unique procedural posture permits the court to discuss the Winters doctrine in 
general terms not bound to a particular reservation or a particular set of facts.  Gila V is in the 
nature of an “advisory opinion” so that the parties, the Arizona Department of Water Resources 
who serve as the technical advisors to the trial court, and the Special Master may proceed to take 
evidence using established law for the case.   
 The Court reviewed the history of reserved rights cases since Winters455 including the 
case of  Arizona v California,456 and held that the United States established reservations for the 
tribes in Arizona in order “to provide Native American people with a ‘permanent home and 
abiding place’ that is a ‘livable’ environment.”457  The court did not accept arguments to examine 
the official documentary history of each of the reservations stating that the official record often 
did not reflect the reality of the reservation establishment.  Giving a realpolitik explanation the 
Court stated that “[d]espite what may be set forth in official documents, the fact is that Indians 
were forced onto reservations so that white settlement of the West could occur unimpeded.”  
Once the reservations were established and the Native Americans isolated thereon the United 
States government was “less than diligent in its efforts to secure sufficient water supplies for the 
[Indian] community to develop its arable lands and achieve meaningful economic self-
sufficiency and self-determination.”458   
 The Court held that the PIA standard articulated in Arizona v. California  and developed 
in the Big Horn Adjudication is not the exclusive measure459 of a reserved right to water.  
Irrigation may be considered, but “must be both practically and economically feasible.”460  The 
                                                
455 Winters v. U.S., 207 U.S. 564 (1908). 
456 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 599 (1963). 
457 Gila V at 74. 
458 Id. at 75, quoting Arizona congressman Morris K. Udall at 134 Cong. Rc. E562-02 (Mar. 8, 1988). 
459 Id. at 79. 
460 Id. at 80. 
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Court went on to negatively comment on water rights for irrigation indicating that in Arizona, “It 
has been observed that ‘irrigation is one of the most inefficient and ecologically damaging ways 
to use water…’”461 
 The Court held that a homeland is many things and determining the water requirements 
for a permanent homeland requires a multi-faceted approach.  Each tribe is to identify its own 
needs that may be based on master land use plans462 and which may include claims to water 
based on the following:  
• The tribal history including traditional practices and rituals that have used water or are 
related to water;463  
• The tribal culture464 and religion; 
• The geography, topography and natural resources, including groundwater availability on 
tribal lands;465  
• The present and projected future population; 466 and  
• The tribe’s economic base including development plans. 
Each of these are examined by the adverse parties and the court “to determine that they are, in 
fact, appropriate to a particular homeland.”467  
 These factors are used by tribes to develop water rights claims and are the standard for 
quantification in Arizona.  They are similar to the factors set forth in Article 6 of the 1997 UN 
Convention used to determine equitable and reasonable utilization.468 
                                                
461 Id. quoting Walter Rusinek, Note, A Preview of coming Attractions?  Wyoming v. United States and the Reserved 
Rights Doctrine, 17 ECOLOGY L. Q. 355, 410 (1990). 
462 Gila V supra note __ at 79. 
463 Id at 79. 
464 Id. 
465 Id. at 80. 
466 Id. at 80. 
467 Id. at 80 
468 See Table 1 infra. 
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Winters	  Methodology	  and	  International	  Watercourses	  
 This section explores the ways the process for developing a tribal reserved right claim 
may be used in negotiations over international watercourses. It begins with a discussion of the 
differences between these principles of domestic law of the United States and international water 
law.   
The first and most obvious difference between reserved rights and utilization based on 
international law is the protection afforded a prior appropriator.  The “first-in-time” to use water 
is protected in times of shortage and inadequate supply.  This principle usually protects a tribal 
reserved right since reserved rights are inserted into a priority system with the date the 
reservation was created, not the first date of beneficial use.  Most reservations in the western 
United States were established in the late 19th century within lands that were occupied by a tribe 
from “time immemorial.”  This priority date is prior to construction of major works for the 
benefit of non-Indian development   Therefore, within a priority ranking tribes are usually first in 
time.  
 International law does not emphasize priority of use.  "[T]he lodestar [of equitable and 
reasonable utilization] is not simply who got to the river first, or who is upstream and who 
downstream, but what is equitable and reasonable in the circumstances.  No state has an 
inherently superior claim.  The doctrine is 'flexible' in this sense and also in a temporal sense:  
what is an 'equitable apportionment' may change over time." 469 Water rights based on prior 
appropriation, including those based on the Winters doctrine, are not apportioned and do not 
change over time.  In the event of a shortage of water necessary to supply all rights  those “who 
                                                
469 McCaffrey 2007 supra note __, 388. 
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got to the river first” receive water to satisfy their full rights while others with later priority dates 
may receive none.470  Prior appropriation rights are fixed in time and quantity.   
 Another significant difference is the legal concept of “reserving” water for future use.  
International law does not recognize this concept.  It is contrary to an equitable apportionment 
among watercourse states.  The Helsinki Rules specifically provide that “A basin State may not 
be denied the present reasonable use of the waters of an international drainage basin to reserve 
for a co-basin State a future use of such waters.”471  Each state has an equal right to share the 
resource provided that a given use does not cause significant harm to another state.  This is a 
dynamic process the balance of which changes as each new use of the watercourse is added and 
as the natural conditions change.  
  The rigidity of the law of prior appropriation when presented with the facts of Winters472 
created circumstances whereby a legal right to water is “reserved” for future use.  The 
reservation of a legal claim that may ripen into a water right does not prevent others from 
utilizing the watercourse in the meantime.  Those rights with later priority dates are at risk of not 
having water available when a reserved right is converted to “wet water” by a tribe. 
 Given these basic differences in legal doctrine, the process used to develop tribal reserved 
rights offers a useful methodology for multilateral negotiations.  Tribes are sovereign 
governments subject to federal authority but not subject to the jurisdiction of the surrounding 
states.  The level of economic development between the on and off reservation territory is often 
disparate with many tribal reservations remaining under-developed with high levels of poverty 
                                                
470 This example rarely occurs as water is bought and sold, groundwater is used and other mechanisms are used to 
“wheel” water among users. 
471 Helsinki Rules Art. VII, Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIFTY-SECOND CONFERENCE, HELSINKI, 1966, 484; Berlin Rules Art. VII, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, WATER RESOURCES LAW COMMITTEE: REVISION OF THE HELSINKI RULES AND 
OTHER INTERNATIONA LAW ASSOCIATION RULES ON WATER RESOURCES, 4TH REPORT, BERLIN 2004,71 ILA, 337, 
385 available at http://www.ila-hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/32 . 
472 Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). 
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and a lack of basic water infrastructure. The adjudication of tribal claims and the negotiation of 
tribal rights involve multiple states each with its own water laws. 
 Acknowledging the differences and the similarities of these systems the next section 
discusses the use of the “Winters methodology” for national water planning, responding to 
notification of planned measures, and negotiating an international watercourse agreement.   
National	  water	  planning	  
 The increasing global demand for freshwater makes it critical for the utilization of an 
international watercourse to be planned and measured.  The International Law Commission 
discussed the importance of national water planning citing the Mar del Plata Action Plan adopted 
by the United Nations Water Conference in 1977.473  This Action Plan calls for the development 
of national and basin-wide water planning for integrated management of land and water 
resources.474 
The Arizona Supreme Court in Gila V commended tribes for developing master land use 
plans which incorporate the water requirements for each land use.  These plans form the basis of 
tribal claims and increase the credibility of claims to reserved water for future use. 
 The first step in development of a water rights claim or water planning is to identify 
existing uses.  For water planning this includes quantifying those uses.  Municipal, industrial and 
agricultural uses are measurable, but cultural and religious uses may defy simple quantification 
techniques.  What is the amount of water necessary to protect a sacred spring or to permit a 
                                                
473 Sephen McCaffrey, Third Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 1987 
Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N, vol. 2, pt. 1 at 15, ¶10. See generally id. at ¶¶8 -28. 
474 United Nations Water Conference, Mar del Plata, Arg. 1977, Water Development and Management, Proceedings, 
Mar del Plata Action Plan 1977, U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 70/29. 
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baptism?  Tribes have based these uses on minimum spring flows and minimum requirements for 
habitat preservation.475 
 Reserved rights for agriculture based on the legal standard of practicably irrigable 
acreage have been developed and quantified for more than 50 years.  The process includes 
analysis of soils, water availability, climate, agriculture markets, transportation, and all other 
aspects of crop production.  The sampling criteria are well established.  With this analysis the 
tribe has a credible water claim and knows the realistic potential for food or other crop 
production and may evaluate the best uses for its lands. 
 Population projections are an important component of water claims for tribal lands.  In 
Gila V the Arizona Supreme Court stated that “to act (to quantify a right) without regard to 
population would ignore the fact that water will always be used, most importantly, for human 
needs.  Therefore, the number of humans is a necessary element in quantifying water 
rights….Population forecasts are common in today’s society and are recognized and relied upon 
by the legal system.”476  Tribes use actuarial information including migration patterns to estimate 
future population and the potential future demand.  The distribution of the projected population 
within different water basins is determined using tribal land use planning.477  Other economic 
development plans and the water requirements for each are included in the calculations. 
 This level of detailed information for water planning is invaluable for the economic 
development of a state and, as will be discussed in the next part, provides a basis to evaluate the 
impact of upstream or downstream development on the equities among the watercourse states. 
                                                
475 Zuni Indian Tribe Water rights Settlement Act of 2003,  P.L. 108-34, 117 Stat. 782 (2003), BONNIE G. COLBY ET 
AL., NEGOTIATING TRIBAL WATER RIGHTS, FULFILLING PROMISES IN THE ARID WEST, 138-138 (2005). 
476 Gila V supra note __ 80. 




Responding	  to	  notification	  of	  planned	  measures	  
 Notification to all states on a watercourse, upstream and downstream, of planned 
measures is recognized as a requirement of customary international law. 478  It is required by the 
Helsinki Rules as a means to avoid disputes.  
A State, regardless of its location in a drainage basin, should in particular furnish to any 
other basin State, the interests of which may be substantially affected, notice of any 
proposed construction or installation which would alter the regime of the basin in a way 
which might give rise to a dispute as defined in article XXVI. The notice should include 
such essential facts as will permit the recipient to make an assessment of the probable 
effect of the proposed alteration.479 
 
 Notification of planned measures and the opportunity to respond build on a foundation of 
cooperation among watercourse states.  Article 12 of the 1997 UN Convention contains specific 
requirements for notification. 
Before a watercourse State implements or permits the implementation of planned 
measures which may have a significant adverse effect upon other watercourse States, it 
shall provide those States with timely notification thereof. Such notification shall be 
accompanied by available technical data and information, including the results of any 
environmental impact assessment, in order to enable the notified States to evaluate the 
possible effects of the planned measures.480   
 
 The 1997 UN Convention formalizes the process for notification and the time periods for 
reply.481  However, developing a meaningful reply regarding the significant impacts of planned 
measures may be difficult if a state is less developed than its co-riparians. A downstream state 
may be able to evaluate the impact on the flow of water reaching its borders after installation of a 
planned measure upstream but an upstream state may find it difficult to evaluate the impact of 
planned measures downstream.  Both situations require not only an evaluation of the physical 
impacts to water supply but an evaluation of the change in equitable apportionment of the 
benefits from the watercourse that may occur as a result of implementing the planned measure. 
                                                
478 STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY AND AARON WOLF, SHARING WATERS, SHARING BENEFITS World Bank publication. 
479 Helsinki Rules supra note __ ,Art XXIX (2). 
480 1997 UN Convention, Art. 12 
481 Id. Arts. 11 – 19. 
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 A state that has prepared a water plan using the “Winters methodology” is better able to 
evaluate the impacts of planned measures.  The internal water plan for a state will include the 
amount of water required for specific uses which may then be used to evaluate the 
reasonableness of the planned measure in response to plans in another state.  A state may ask the 
question: Given the physical characteristics of the land and the watercourse is the planned 
measure equitable in terms of its impact on our existing and planned future uses and is the 
amount of water to be used from the watercourse reasonable when compared to our own water 
plan?  The state may then formulate objections to the planned measure in terms of significant 
impacts and communicate these objections to other states within the relatively short time period 
of six months that is provided in Article 13 of the 1997 UN Convention.  
Negotiating	  a	  watercourse	  agreement	  
 
 A more developed state on a watercourse has the advantage of knowing what it has 
because its water use is established and measurable.  Existing uses are quantifiable and the 
equities of continuing those uses are observable.  The equities and reasonableness of any new 
development is measured against the pre-existing uses.  This process finds the developing state at 
a disadvantage. 
 For most tribes in the western United States, the presentation of water claims legally 
based on the Winters doctrine and factually supported with credible water use planning result in 
negotiated water rights settlements.482  These negotiated agreements establish a fixed quantity of 
water for the tribe which is approved by the non-Indian water users, the courts and by the United 
States Congress.   
                                                
482 Colby supra note __. 
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The factors to establish a Winters claim to water are universal factors used when there are 
multiple sovereign jurisdictions along a transboundary watercourse which must be shared. 
	   Conclusion	  	  
 Agreements are negotiated based on the information available at the time, both a common 
knowledge of the watercourse and the specific knowledge of the needs for one’s own future.  
The “Winters methodology” demonstrates that a legal principle may be given concrete meaning 
when applied to planning and development.   In 1908 the United States Supreme Court 
established the legal principle that the establishment of a tribal reservation includes sufficient 
water to fulfill the purposes for which the reservation is established.  In the 1960’s this principle 
was further defined for farming tribes and measured by sufficient water to irrigate the practicably 
irrigable acreage of the reservation.  The Arizona Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
quantifying reserved rights to water in 2001 when the suitability and sustainability of water for 
irrigation in the arid lands of the state of Arizona was viewed as less practicable.  The Court 
adopted a broader measure of water for homeland purposes.  This standard provides the 
parameters to quantify a tribal water claim using scientific studies.  The claim is then settled 
through negotiation or litigation. 
 The international legal standard is more fully articulated.  It is worded in comparative 
terms but may be used by a watercourse state to guide the preparation of a national water plan for 
the “optimal and sustainable utilization”483 of the watercourse “consistent with adequate 
protection of the watercourse.”484  As this chapter demonstrates, the factors to be examined to 
determine equitable and reasonable utilization and the factors to determine water utilization for a 
                                                




tribal homeland are sufficiently similar to demonstrate that the principles of international law 
may be developed into a water plan. 
 A watercourse state within an international basin that is less developed may be stymied in 
the international basin development processes unable to consent to uses by other states without 
knowing or understanding the potential impact on its own future development.    A 
comprehensive water plan developed using the “Winters methodology” permits the incorporation 
of local water uses, multi-sector utilization and provides a measure for response to potential 
impacts.  It is one way to level the playing field among the states within a basin. 
 
Conclusion	  to	  Part	  II	  
The Beginning point in any negotiation is the knowledge of what you have and what your 
opponent has.  Without that knowledge, any negotiation is a charade.485 
 
 Agreements are key to the equitable and reasonable utilization of an international 
watercourse.  Negotiating these agreements is a complex process requiring integration of the 
human and environmental use of a natural system into a legal document.  Water is being used by 
everyone within the watercourse basin prior to the negotiation of an agreement and those uses 
must be considered and where appropriate protected.  This includes the recognition of the 
plurality of water law and the effect of a watercourse agreement on other water laws. 
Each state has an equal right to equitably utilize a watercourse.486   This principle alone 
calls for cooperation and negotiation of water agreements.  Each use of water impacts other uses 
whether they are existing or a possibility for the future.  The equitable, reasonable, sustainable 
and optimal utilization of a watercourse requires the political will to share information, develop 
                                                
485 McCool supra note    ,34 quoting Person Zah, former chairman of the Navajo Nation in Water: Key to Tribal 
Economic Development,  in INDIAN WATER 1985: COLLECTED ESSAYS, ED. CHRISTINE MIDLAS & STEVEN SHUPE 
(Oakland: AILTP/American Indian Resources Institute)  1986 at 77-78. 
486 UN Charter Art. 2(1), 1997 UN Convention Art. 8(1). 
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common principles and implement them through cooperative institutions.  Legitimacy of a basin 
agreement is gained from recognition of all aspects of negotiations discussed above: 
understanding the natural conditions, agreeing to alter the natural conditions for the benefit of all, 
recognizing the legally pluralistic nature of water law, tempering the relative power of a hydro-
hegemon, and establishing the role of law in the negotiations.  International water law provides a 
common terminology, factors for consideration and the boundaries for negotiations. 
The next and final Part examines agreements from two watercourses, the Colorado River 
in the United States and the Senegal in western Africa along with the Utton Transboundary 
Model Agreement for the methods used to apportion water and the institutional and other 
management regimes.  Part III also looks at three basins without basin-wide agreements for what 
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Watercourse agreements set forth the principles for utilization of the resource.  The 
agreements substantiate the legal principles and the uses agreed upon during the negotiations.  
Agreements provide a level of water security to the parties.  Agreements are most commonly 
administered by multi-party institutions established in the agreement.487   
This Part examines three watercourse agreements  looking at how water is allocated or 
apportioned among the states and the institutions created to manage the watercourse.   Two 
watercourses with established allocations and basin institutions are discussed: the Colorado 
River in the Western United States and Mexico, the Senegal River in West Africa.  The legal 
regime for the Colorado River may be the most complex in the world and it is the author’s home 
basin, therefore it receives more extensive discussion.  The Senegal Basin has had numerous 
agreements since 1963, each modifying or rescinding the previous agreement, establishing 
principles for utilization of the watercourse and changing the basin institutions.  The discussion 
of the Senegal Basin traces the basin agreements in chronological order. 
A Model Interstate Water Compact was drafted by a group of experts under the auspices of 
the Utton Transboundary Resource Center at the University of New Mexico. The Model was 
prepared for use by states of the eastern United States however, the principles are applicable to 
all transboundary negotiations. 
This Part also includes a discussion of three basins without basin wide watercourse 
agreements, the Nile, Amu Darya/Syr Darya and the Euphrates/Tigris basins.  These three basins 
are examined using four criteria considered preparatory to entering an agreement: basin wide 
                                                
487 The exception to this is in a federal system when the federal, or higher, level of government administers an 
agreement among lower levels of government.  Such an example is discussed in relation to the Bureau of 
Reclamation administration of the Lower Colorado River. 
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Chapter Eight: Colorado River, United States and Mexico	  
 The Colorado River rises in the snow pack of the Rocky Mountains of the western United 
States.  It flows in a southerly direction through the states of Colorado, Wyoming and Utah to the 
Grand Canyon region where the upper basin is demarcated from the lower basin at a point known 
as Lee Ferry.488  The Colorado then flows west through Grand Canyon National Park after which 
it turns south at the southern tip of the state of Nevada forming the border between Nevada, 
Arizona and California.  Farther south it forms the border between the United States and Mexico 
before entering Mexico between the Mexican states of Sonora and Baja California.  It empties 
what may be left of its flow into the Gulf of California. 489  The Colorado River is approximately 
1450 miles long emptying a basin of approximately 240,000 square miles490 including the most 
arid regions of the United States.491  It provides drinking water for an estimated 27 million 
people in the United States and irrigation for over 3.5 million acres of farmland.492 
 The flow of the Colorado fluctuates considerably from year to year.  The massive works 
on the main stream store approximately four times the average annual flow or 60 million acre 
feet.493  The legal allocation scheme for the basin is based on an average annual flow of 16.5 
                                                
488 Lee Ferry is a point on the Colorado River where John D. Lee, a notorious figure in Arizona history operated a 
ferry to cross the river. See MARSHALL TRIMBLE, ROADSIDE HISTORY OF ARIZONA 295 (1986).  This point on the 
river is sometimes referred to as Lees Ferry or Lee’s Ferry.  
489 See generally, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER 
MANAGEMENT, EVALUATING AND ADJUSTING TO HYDROCLIMATIC VARIABILITY (2007) hereinafter NRC 2007. 
490 NRC 2007 supra note at 1. 
491 NRC 2007 supra note at 13. 
492 Bureau of Reclamation, Lower Colorado Region, Record of Decisions, Colorado River Interim Guidelines for 
Lower Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for lakes Powell and Mead, Final Environmental Impact 
Statement, Dec. 2007, at 1, available at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/RecordofDecision.pdf 
last visited 20 Aug. 2008. 
493 NRC 2007 supra note at 14. 
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million acre feet.494  Allocations are made according to a complex system of laws which include 
a treaty between the United States and Mexico, interstate compacts, federal statutes and United 
States Supreme Court decisions, together referred to as “The Law of the River.”495  
 This discussion focuses on the allocation schemes between the United States and Mexico 
and among the basin states within the United States.  The transboundary allocations build upon 
the first interstate agreement, the 1922 Colorado River Compact496 which divided the basin into 
the upper basin and lower basin at the point between Marble Canyon and the Grand Canyon 
known as Lee Ferry.497 
The second part of this chapter discusses three major water management institutions 
within the basin, the International Boundary and Water Commission, the Bureau of Reclamation 
and the Upper Basin Commission.   
 
Allocations	  
 John Wesley Powell, the first representative of the United States government to explore, 
study and write about the Colorado Basin recommended to the Congress of the United States that 
the political lines delineating state boundaries within the western territory be drawn along the 
basin boundaries.   He recognized the importance of the major river systems to development of 
this arid region, the interconnectedness of different ecological systems and the necessity of 
maintaining the ecology within different climatic zones to preserve the availability of water in 
the rivers. He was concerned that separating the mountainous regions from the farm lands by 
                                                
494 The 1922 Compact allocates 7.5 maf for the lower Basin, and assumes a balance of 7.5 maf for the Upper Basin.  
The 1944 Treaty between the United Stated and Mexico requires delivery of 1.5 maf. 
495 See Bureau of Reclamation, Lower Colorado Region at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/pao/lawofrvr.html last 
visited  Aug.20, 2008. 
496 1922 Compact 
497 MARSHALL TRIMBLE, ROADSIDE HISTORY OF ARIZONA 295 (1986). 
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political boundaries would separate development from the natural systems that supported it.  
Powell wrote in 1878498 that the waters of western rivers must be divided among the states and 
nations within the basin because when users began to squabble over water, so too would states 
and nations.499 
 At the turn of the 20th Century, irrigated agriculture expanded in the downstream state of 
California with the construction of diversion works to central valleys.  Negotiations for an 
interstate agreement began out of fear that California would obtain rights superior to the used in 
other states based on a theory of interstate prior appropriation,500   If so, this would curtail 
development in the other basin states.   
This section discusses allocations within the basin beginning with the 1922 Colorado 
River Compact.  This section also discusses the allocations among the lower basin states 
contained in the 1928 Boulder Canyon Project Act, the allocations among the upper basin states 
contained in the 1948 Upper Basin Compact and the sub-compacts contained therein, concluding 
with a discussion of the allocation between the United States and Mexico contained in the 1944 
Treaty. 
1922 Colorado River Compact	  
 The 1922 Colorado River Compact is a political compromise among the 7 basin states 
brokered by representatives of the United States.  The upper basin states contribute most of the 
flow to the river from snow melt.  The upstream state of Colorado was known at this time for its 
position of absolute territorial sovereignty501 maintaining that it had an exclusive right to use all 
the water within the state. The downstream state of California contributes negligible water to the 
                                                
498 1962 
499 Powell & DeBuys 304-305 
500 See Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922). 
501 Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902), Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) and Wyoming v. Colorado 
259 U.S. 419 (1922). 
≈143≈ 
 
river but at the time of the negotiations was the fastest developing state in the basin.  It diverted 
water long distances to supply irrigation to the out-of-basin area known as Imperial Valley and 
had plans for large diversions to supply the out-of-basin growing population of the coastal city of 
Los Angeles.  California would benefit from application of a theory of interstate priorities so that 
the first to develop would acquire rights to the most water.  Arizona was the least developed but 
most “riparian” state with the mainstream flowing through the northern canyons of the state and 
forming the border with California.  Arizona also contributes water from numerous tributaries 
including the Little Colorado and Gila Rivers.  Arizona wanted rights to water preserved for 
future development.  The three states of Colorado, California, and Arizona advocated different 
allocation schemes for waters of the Colorado.502 
 At the time of these negotiations the law of equitable apportionment of interstate 
watercourses was developing in Supreme Court jurisprudence.503  In a dispute over use of the 
Laramie River the upstream state of Colorado argued a theory of absolute territorial sovereignty 
while the more developed downstream state of Wyoming argued for an apportionment based on 
the law of prior appropriation.504  The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Wyoming reasoning that 
it was equitable to apportion the Laramie River between these two states based on interstate prior 
appropriation, because of their similar state water laws and their similar development histories.505  
                                                
502 See Charles J. Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1966) and Jack L. August, Jr. & Grady 
Gammage, Jr., Shaped by Water: An Arizona Historical Perspective, in ARIZONA WATER POLICY, MANAGEMENT 
INNOVATIONS IN AN URBANIZING, ARID REGION 10 (Bonnie G. Colby & Katharine L. Jacobs eds. 2007). 
503 See Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902), Missouri v. Illinois & the Sanitation District of Chicago, 200 U.S. 
496 (1906), Kansas v. Colorado,  206 U.S. 46 (1907), New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921), and Wyoming 
v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922) (for the development of the principle of equitable apportionment of interstate 
watercourses). 
504 See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (Arkansas River) and Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922) 
(argued beginning in 1916) in which Colorado unsuccessfully asserted “the right of Colorado as a state to dispose, as 
she may choose, of …all of the waters flowing in the portion of the [Laramie] river within her borders.” Id. at 457. 
505 Wyoming v.Colorado, 259 U.S. at 465. 
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Using an interstate system of priorities the Court permitted the first in time to be the first in right 
within the basin without regard to the state in which the water is used. 
 The states in the negotiations over the Colorado River feared that if this reasoning were 
applied to the Colorado River, California would acquire rights to a large portion of the river.506  
The negotiations stalled in attempts to allocate the waters among all the basin states and a 
compromise was brokered which split the basin into two parts, an upper basin including 
Colorado, Utah, Wyoming and New Mexico and a lower basin of Arizona, Nevada and 
California.   
The upper basin states agreed to deliver to the lower basin at the point known as Lee 
Ferry 75 million acre feet of water on average every 10 years, or approximately 7.5 million acre 
feet per year.  This allocation is based on the assumption that the basin generated on average in 
excess of 15 maf/year providing approximately7.5 maf/year for use in each of the lower and 
upper basins. With this division, the upper basin states are protected from the voracious 
development in California leaving Nevada and Arizona to negotiate a division of the lower basin 
share.507     
The legislature of the state of Arizona refused to ratify the 1922 Colorado River Compact 
preventing the unanimous agreement required for it to enter into force.508  However, this did not 
stop the powerful interests in California from continuing to pursue federal assistance for major 
                                                
506 See Meyers 1966 supra note ___ .  
507 Arizona did not ratify the 1922 Compact until 1944 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 645-1311 (2006) and Utah withdrew 
its initial ratification. (Meyers 1966 supra note 10-12.  However, Utah reinstated its ratification and the 1922 
Compact entered into force after Congress passed the 1928 Boulder Canyon Project Act (45 Stat. 1057, P.L. 70-642 
(1928)) permitting entry into force upon ratification of six of the seven basin states providing that California limited 
its right to 4.4 maf. 
508 1922 Compact supra note__, Art. XI. Arizona remained concerned about “sharing” the river with California, 
about use of tributaries and about the federal control of river management (See Meyers 1966 supra note__). 
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works on the river for flood control and irrigation.509  In 1928 the United States Congress passed 
the Boulder Canyon Project Act510 appropriating funds for a major dam at Boulder Canyon (later 
named Hoover Dam) where the river forms the border between California and Arizona.  
Considering the holdout of Arizona, Congress further provided that the 1922 Compact would 
enter into force upon ratification by six of the seven basin states including California, if 
California agreed to limit its share of the 7.5 maf/year to 4.4maf/year.511  With the enactment of 
the Boulder Canyon Project Act, the Congress of the United States allocated the waters of the 
Lower Basin.   
Lower Basin Allocations	  
In addition to limiting California to 4.4 maf, the Boulder Canyon Project Act further 
allocated the remaining lower basin share of 7.5 maf,  2.8 maf to Arizona and 300,000 af to the 
state of Nevada.  All allocations include existing uses and all uses of mainstream water within a 
state are counted against that state’s total allocation.  California maintained the right to use any 
unused allocations and only in the 21st century started reductions to limit uses to 4.4 maf.512 
 The Boulder Canyon Project Act established the federal government as the management 
entity for the river.  The United States Secretary of the Interior was authorized “to construct, 
operate, and maintain a dam and incidental works in the main stream of the Colorado River” and 
such diversion dams and canals as necessary to supply the major irrigation projects within 
                                                
509 California also sought protection for its population and diversion works from flooding which occurred in the 
1890’s, 1905, 1916 and 1920.  The 1905 flood filled the irrigation diversions to the Imperial Valley and helped form 
the Salton Sea.  Norris Hundley, Jr., The West Against itself: The ColoradoRiver-An Institutional History in NEW 
COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER, MAJOR ISSUES FOR THE NEXT CENTURY, 12 GARY D. WEATHERFORD & F. LEE 
BROWN eds (1986). 
510 45 Stat. 1057, P.L.70-642 (1928). 
511 Meyers 1966 supra note at 38-41. 
512 NRC Report supra note ___ at Box 2.2. 
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California.513  The Secretary of Interior carries out management responsibilities through the 
Bureau of Reclamation (the Bureau). 
 The legislature of Arizona ratified the 1922 Compact in 1944514 and proceeded to 
challenge the allocations contained in the Boulder Canyon Project Act in court.  The United 
States Supreme Court confirmed the lower basin allocations in 1963 in the case of Arizona v. 
California.515  Arizona then pursued federal funding for construction of works to deliver water to 
the major cities of Phoenix and Tucson, and in 1968 Congress passed the Colorado River Basin 
Project Act516 authorizing the Central Arizona Project and appropriating funds for its 
construction.  This 1968 legislation also authorized construction of major works in the upper 
basin the allocation scheme for which is discussed next. 
Upper Basin Allocations	  
 The states of Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, New Mexico and Arizona entered a compact in 
1948 apportioning the upper basin allocation from the 1922 Compact. 517  
Twenty six years after the division of the Colorado River into the upper and lower basins, 
the Upper Basin states needed to build major river works for in-state storage and carry-over 
storage to meet the 1922 Compact obligations to the Lower Basin.  In order to access federal 
money for the large reclamation projects the political realities required the states to agree on 
apportionment.  Meyers, in his 1966 seminal article on the Law of the River, described the 
                                                
513 Id. 
514 A.R.S. §45-1311 (2006). 
515 373 U.S. 546 (1963).  This is the same case that established PIA as the standard to quantify tribal reserved water 
rights. 
516 43 U.S.C.A. §§1501-1556 (2000), 82 Stat. 885, P.L. 90-537. 




political situation this way:  “All [states of the Upper Basin] were under-developed, none had the 
resources to go it alone.  It was a classic case of hanging together – or hanging separately.”518 
 The state of Arizona is allocated 50,000 af/year for use in that portion of the state in the 
watershed above Lee Ferry.519  All other allocations are measured as a percentage of annual 
available supply. Colorado has the beneficial use 51.75%; New Mexico, 11.25%; Utah, 23%; and 
Wyoming, 14%. The Upper Basin Compact was negotiated at a time of limited development in 
relation to supply such that each state’s percentage allocation is sufficient to includ all existing 
uses.  
In addition to the allocations to each state, the Upper Basin Compact includes four “sub-
compacts” apportioning the use of tributaries.  The sub-compacts were negotiated separately 
between the affected states, but within the framework and restrictions of the Upper Basin 
Compact which is within the limitations of the 1922 Compact.  The sub-compacts designate 
tributary sources of supply from which states may take their percentage shares.  Incorporation of 
sub-compacts within the “master” compact provides basin (granted only the upper basin) and 
sub-basin management under one umbrella agreement. 
Article XI of the 1948 Upper Basin Compact is the sub-compact for the Little Snake 
River and its tributaries apportioning its waters between the states of Colorado and Wyoming.  
The states agree to administer this tributary using a system of interstate priorities without regard 
to the state of use, except in times of curtailment which results from a shortage of supply within 
the basin.  In the event of shortage such that upper basin curtailment is required it is agreed that, 
to the extent possible, water use from the Little Snake River will be curtailed on an equal basis 
                                                
518 Meyers 1966 supra note at 27. 
519 Upper Basin Compact supra note Art. III(a)(1). 
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between the states.  The parties agree that the Little Snake River is administered by each state 
according to its water laws. 
 Article XII of the Upper Basin Compact is a sub-compact between the states of Utah and 
Wyoming apportioning the use of waters from the Green River and its tributaries.  Existing uses 
at the time of the Compact are apportioned by priority date without regard to state boundaries.  
Uses initiated after the effective date of the Compact are apportioned 50% to each state.  This 
sub-compact is administered by a Special Water Commissioner who is jointly appointed by the 
State Engineers of each state. 
 Article XIII of the Upper Basin Compact is a sub-compact between the states of Colorado 
and Utah for apportionment of the Yampa River, a tributary to the Green River.  The upstream 
state of Colorado agrees not to deplete the flow of the Yampa River below “an aggregate of 
5,000,000 acre-feet for any period of ten consecutive years” as measured at a designated gaging 
station.  No additional administrative institution is created. 
 The San Juan River is apportioned between the states of Colorado and New Mexico in 
Article XIV of the Upper Basin Compact.  The state of New Mexico is not riparian to the 
mainstream of the Colorado River but does supply water to the San Juan River tributary which 
runs through the northwest portion of the state.  This sub-compact provides that the upstream 
state of Colorado “agrees to deliver to the State of New Mexico from the San Juan River and its 
tributaries which rise in the State of Colorado a quantity of water which shall be sufficient, 
together with water originating in the San Jan Basin in the State of New Mexico, to enable the 
State of New Mexico to make full use of the water apportioned to the State of New Mexico by 
Article III of the [Upper Basin] Compact,”520 its 11.25% share.  All uses as of the effective date 
of the Compact are recognized with a prior right as are “uses of water contemplated by projects 
                                                
520 Upper Basin Compact supra note . Art XIV. 
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authorized.”  The technical determinations required to make this allocation are made by the 
Upper Basin Commission.  It is reported that New Mexico would not approve the Upper Basin 
Compact without protection for use of its full 11.25% share from the San Juan River.521 
 Article X confirms and incorporates the 1922 La Plata River Compact522 between the 
states of Colorado and New Mexico apportioning this tributary.  In the 1922 La Plata River 
Compact, the State of Colorado agrees to establish and maintain two gaging stations on the La 
Plata River, one upstream near the community of Hesparus and one downstream near the border 
with New Mexico.   The Compact allocates to New Mexico one half the mean flow as measured 
at the Hesparus gaging station.  However, when the “flow of the river is so low that… the 
greatest beneficial use of its waters may be secured by distributing all of its waters successively 
to the lands in each state in alternating periods…the use of the waters may be so rotated between 
the two states….”523 This scheme attempts to preserve uses within the downstream state when 
half the flow is not sufficient to convey the water and provide for its beneficial use.  This 
Compact is administered by the Colorado and New Mexico State Engineers. 
   The sub-compact format permits negotiation of an agreement closer to the user level and 
by only those states affected while keeping the negotiations within the framework of the 
equitable apportionment among the states contained in the Upper Basin Compact and the 1922 
Compact.  The sub-compact negotiations also took place bilaterally yet under the scrutiny of the 
other states who share in the 1922 Compact obligations.  The sub-compacts apportion the 
tributaries to meet local conditions, provide protection for existing local uses and permit the 
states to take water from local resources.  Including the sub-compacts within the 1948 Upper 
                                                
521 See Meyers 1966 supra note at 35. 
522 La Plata River Compact, November 27, 1922, http://www.ose.state.nm.us/isc_laPlata_river_compact.html . 
523 Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, supra note Art. II Consented to by Congress Jan. 29, 1925, 43 STAT. 796 
available at (3). 
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Basin Compact assures all parties that use of the tributaries will not deplete mainstream supply 
and thereby defeat the upper basin commitment to deliver 7.5maf to the lower basin. 
 The sub-compacts may be viewed as examples of the principle of subsidiarity “which is a 
general organizing principle of governance, express[ing] a libertarian value in favor of making 
decisions and implementing them at the lowest effective level of government....”524  For natural 
systems such as watercourses, the tributary sub-basin may be the lowest effective level of 
governance.  Local conditions within the tributary sub-basins impact, if not determine, the 
allocation schemes at the interstate and international level. This is illustrated by examining the 
sub-compact allocations negotiated by the upstream state of Colorado. 
Colorado is a party to the 1922 Compact, the 1922 La Plata River Compact, the 1948 
Upper Basin Compact, and the Little Snake, the Yampa and the San Juan sub-compacts.  The 
1948 Upper Basin Compacts apportions 51.75% of the available beneficial use of the upper basin 
supply to Colorado.  The Yampa and San Juan sub-compacts require Colorado to deliver 
designated quantities of water at fixed measuring points for use in the downstream states of Utah 
and New Mexico respectively.  This is a “negative allocation” whereby Colorado bears the risk 
of lower than “average” flows but benefits from above “average” flows by using all water in 
excess of the quantity required to be delivered downstream. 
The state of Colorado agreed in the Little Snake sub-compact to disregard the state 
boundary with Wyoming and to allocate the tributary based on the law of prior appropriation.  
The Upper Basin Commission, with representatives from the four upper division states prepared 
a schedule of priorities as of the date of signing the sub-compact.  Uses initiated in either state 
after the effective date “shall permit the full use within the Basin in the most feasible manner … 
without regard to the state line; and, so far as is practicable, shall result in an equal division 
                                                
524 ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 3rd ed. (2004) at 800-801. 
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between the States of the use of water not used under rights existing prior to the signing of this 
[Upper Basin] Compact.”525  All uses are charged to the respective state’s allocation and are 
administered and managed by each state within its jurisdiction. 
The1922 La Plata River Compact apportions the annual supply equally between the two 
states riparian to the tributary.  Flow is measured at designated gaging stations and allocated to 
diversion structures in each state. 
The mountains in the state of Colorado form the head waters for the Colorado River. In 
spite of the states early assertions of sovereignty over waters within its borders,526 by 1948 the 
state agreed to multiple and varied allocations to satisfy its negotiated share. 
 Moving from the interstate allocations of the Colorado River to international allocations, 
the final agreement examined in this section is the 1944 Treaty between the United States and 
Mexico. 
1944 Treaty with Mexico	  
 In 1944 the United States and Mexico entered a treaty for the utilization of waters of the 
Tijuana River, the Rio Grande below Fort Quitman, Texas and the Colorado River.527  At the 
time, the Colorado basin within the United States was divided into the Upper and Lower Basins 
with volumetric allocations based on an assumed annual flow of 15maf and the lower basin was 
further allocated with specific volumetric measures.  Mexico is the farthest downstream with less 
than 1% of the basin land area.   
At this time, the agricultural lands in Mexico were underdeveloped compared to the 
United States which was delivering water to farmers from massive federal reclamation projects.  
                                                
525 Upper Basin Compact supra note , Art. XI(b)(2)(f). 
526 See note- supra 
527 Treaty between the United States and Mexico relating to the Utilization of the Waters of the Colorado and 
Tijuana Rivers, and of the Rio Grande (Rio Bravo) from Fort Quitman, Texas to the Gulf of Mexico (1944) 59 Stat. 
1219, T.S. 94.  Available  at http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/g1000/pdfiles/mextrety.pdf . 
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Mexico attempted to negotiate an equitable apportionment of the benefits from the river that 
would adjust as development of irrigated agriculture increased within Mexico.  The United 
States, having approved the specific allocations to the states in the 1922 Compact and the 1928 
Boulder Canyon Project Act, did not have the domestic political support to upset the volumetric 
allocation scheme among the states even though Article III(C) of the 1922 Compact anticipates a 
future agreement with Mexico.   
The apportionment of the Colorado River between Mexico and the United States is a 
volumetric allocation.  The United States is obligated to deliver no less than 1.5maf/year to 
Mexico at designated points on the river, reminiscent of the volumetric allocations contained in 
the 1922 Compact and the 1928 Boulder Canyon Project Act.  Mexico may receive more water 
in any given year but cannot acquire rights to additional water.  The parties further agree to 
install works on the river for carry-over storage to meet this obligation. 
The 1944 Treaty, like the interstate compacts, does not allocate water for ecological 
preservation, does not contain provisions for conservation, pollution prevention or other factors 
for an equitable and reasonable utilization of an international watercourse.528  Nor does it address 
an obligation not to cause significant harm or provide remedies in the event of such harm.529  
However, as is discussed in the next section, the institution created by the 1944 Treaty, the 
International Boundary and Water Commission, does have limited authority to address these 
issues. 
Institutions	  	  
 Given that the allocations of the Colorado River are determined by a development 
strategy from the 19th century whereby a drop of water reaching the ocean is a drop of water 
                                                
528 See 1997 UN Convention supra note ___ Art. 6. 
529 See, 1997 Id. Arts. 5, 6 and 7. 
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wasted, the fixed allocation schemes within the lower basin and with Mexico are rigid and 
archaic.  However, the three different management institutions within the basin are worthy of 
emulation.  This section briefly discusses the International Boundary Commission established by 
the 1889 Treaty with Mexico whose duties were expanded by the 1944 Treaty to include 
international waters, the Bureau of Reclamation, which is the federal agency that manages the 
Lower Basin, and the Upper Basin Commission established by the 1948 Upper Basin Compact. 
International Boundary and Water Commission	  
 The 1889 Convention between the United States of America and the United States of 
Mexico established the International Boundary Commission “to facilitate the carrying out of the 
principles contained in the treaty of November 12, 1884, and to avoid the difficulties occasioned 
by reason of the changes which take place in the beds of the Rio Grande and Colorado Rivers in 
those parts which serve as a boundary between the two Republics.”530  The Commission has 
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve any such disputes.531  In this regard the IBC is charged with 
delimiting the boundary between the United States and Mexico, which function it continues to 
serve today.532  The 1944 Treaty expanded the duties of the IBC to include water management 
and the planning and construction of river works thereby changing the IBC to the International 
Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC).533   
                                                
530 Convention between the United States and Mexico, Water Boundary, Extending the Duration of the Convention 
of March 1, 1889, ___Stat. ___, T.S. 241 available at http://www.ibwc.state.gov/Files/TREATY_OF_1889.pdf . 
, Preamble. 
531 Id. Art. I. 
532 See i.e., IBWC Minute 305, Demarcation and Monumentation of the International Boundary on the Bridges over 
the Rio Grande at Eagle Pass, Texas-Piedras Negras, Coahuila II; Laredo, Texas-Colombia, Nuevo leon; Laredo, 
Texas IV-Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas III; Pharr, Texas-Reynosa, Tamaulipas; Los Indios, Texas-Lucio Blanco, 
Tamaulipas; and Beterans, Brownsville, Texas-Matamoros, Tamaulipas III, December 4, 2000, Cd. Juárez, Chih. 
533 1944 Treaty, supra note ___  Arts. 24 (a) and (b). 
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 The extraordinary aspect of the IBWC is the vesting of authority to make decisions on 
topics not covered in the 1944 Treaty, in essence amending the Treaty.  The decisions of the 
IBWC are recorded in Minutes.  Article 25 sets forth the import of the Minutes: 
Decisions of the Commission shall be recorded in the form of Minutes….Except where 
the specific approval of the two Governments is required by any provision of this Treaty, 
if one of the Governments fails to communicate to the Commission its approval or 
disapproval of a decision of the Commission within thirty days…the Minute in question 
and the decisions which it contains shall be considered to be approved by that 
Government.  The Commissioners, within the limits of their respective jurisdictions, shall 
execute the decisions of the Commission that are approved by both Governments. 
(emphasis added) 
 
If either Government disapproves a decision of the Commission the two Governments 
shall take cognizance of the matter, and if an agreement regarding such matter is reached 
between the two Governments, the agreement shall be communicated to the 
Commissioners, who shall take such further proceedings as may be necessary to carry out 
such agreement.534 
 
 To date the IBWC has entered 313 Minutes on a wide range of topics.  Recent Minutes 
have focused on water and sanitation projects within border communities (authorizing 
transboundary construction and allocating costs) and on ecological improvements particularly in 
the limotroph section of the River.535   
The most often cited series of Minutes address salinity levels of the water from the 
Colorado River as it reaches Mexico.  Water quality is not addressed in the Treaty and Mexico, 
located at the end of the River, suffers the effects of deteriorating water quality.  At the March 
22, 1965 meeting of the IBWC the commissioners complied with the “instructions” from their 
respective governments contained in Presidential Communiqués dated March 16, 1962, June 30, 
1962 and February 22, 1964 “to reach a permanent and effective solution” to the problems of 
                                                
534 1944 Treaty, supra note___ Art. 25. 
535 See Minutes 311 (Recommendations for secondary treatment in Mexico of the sewage emanating from the 
Tijuana River area in Baja California, Mexico, Feb. 20, 2004), 310 (Emergency delivery of Colorado River Water 
for use in Tijuana, Baja California, July 28, 2003), 306 (Conceptual Framework for U.S.-Mx studies for future 
recommendations concerning the riparian and estuarine ecology of the limitrophe section of the Colorado River and 
its associated delta, Dec. 12, 2000), and 304 (Joint grant contribution program for drinking water and wastewater 
infrastructure projects for communities in the United States – Mexico Border Area, Oct. 26, 2000). 
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salinity of the Colorado River at the northern border of Mexico.  In Minute 218, 
Recommendations on the Colorado River Salinity Problem, the Commissioners set forth a 5 year 
plan for construction of drains for saline waters, established a system of accounting to comply 
with the 1944 Treaty allocations and set forth the responsibilities for construction and payment 
of new works.   
 In 1972 the Commission again took up the matter of salinity “in accordance with the 
instructions which the two Governments issued to their respective commissioners pursuant to the 
understanding between President Richard Nixon and President Luis Echeverria A., expressed in 
their Joint Communique.”  In this communiqué, reproduced in Minute 241, the Mexican 
government states that the water quality at the northern border of Mexico should be the same 
quality as the water delivered to California from the diversion works upstream at Imperial Dam.  
The President of the United States expressed his concern that this was a “highly complex 
problem” and expressed his desire to find a “definitive, equitable and just solution” but did not 
agree with the President of Mexico that the water quality at the Mexican border should be the 
same as delivered to Imperial Valley, California. Based on these instructions the Commission 
developed maximum levels of salinity and a means to manage highly saline waste water drainage 
within the United States to reach these levels.  This includes water accounting procedures and 
cost accounting for construction of new works.536  Again, this Minute had a limited duration of 
five years. 
 Borrowing from the language of the Presidential Communiqués reproduced in Minutes 
218 and 241 the Commission issued Minute 242 on August 30, 1973 entitled “Permanent and 
definitive solution to the international problem of the salinity of the Colorado River.”  Minute 
                                                
536 Minute 241, Recommendations to improve immediately the quality of Colorado river waters going to Mexico, 
July 14, 1972. 
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242 calls for construction of permanent works and sets the maximum level for salinity so that 
“the approximately 1,360,000 acre-feet (1,677,545,000 cubic meters) delivered to Mexico 
upstream of Morelos Dam, have an annual average salinity of no more than 115 p.p.m. +/- 30 
p.p.m. U.S. count (121 p.p.m. +/- 30 p.p.m. Mexican count) over the annual average salinity of 
Colorado River waters which arrive at Imperial Dam….”  Minute 242 describes the measures to 
be taken to meet this water quality standard.  In addition, the Minute documents that the United 
States will provide assistance to Mexico in order to rehabilitate the irrigated lands within the 
Mexicali Valley which were inundated with the saline waters.537  At the time each state 
acknowledged this problem the IBWC used its authority to expeditiously address the salinity 
problems. 
  While the 1944 Treaty vests independent authority in the Commission, the Commission 
does not always exercise that authority independently.  For example, Minutes 218 and 241 
dealing with salinity state respectively that the Minutes must be “specifically” and “expressly” 
approved by both Governments.538  Minute 242, “the permanent and definitive solution of the 
salinity problem” provides that it “is subject to the express approval of both Governments by 
exchange of Notes.”539  However, absent language in the Minute requiring express approval, the 
Minutes take effect 30 days from issuance absent disapproval of one of the governments.  The 
IBWC has the authority to act on a wide range of border issues.  It is, however, dependant on its 
commissioners to take action.  Scholars from both states have called for more active leadership 
from the IBWC on water management issues.540 
                                                
537 Two additional Minutes, 248, dated June 10, 1975, and 284, dated January 18, 1991, address issues of 
implementation, operation and maintenance of the works authorized by Minute 242. 
538 Minute 241, Resolution pars. 8 and 10. 
539 Minute 242, Par. 8. 
540 See Stephen P. Mumme, Developing Treaty Compatible Watershed Management Reformsfor the U.S. Mexico 
Border: The Case for Strengthening the International Boundary and Water Commission, 30 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. 
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 In contrast to this quasi-independent international institution, the next section discusses 
management of the lower basin within the United States by the federal government through the 
Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation. 
Lower Basin: United States Bureau of Reclamation	  
 The 1928 Boulder Canyon Project Act (BCPA)541 authorized the Secretary of Interior to 
manage the delivery of water and power from Colorado River works constructed with federal 
funds.  Rights to utilize the waters of the Colorado River acquired after passage of the Boulder 
Canyon Project Act require a contract with the Bureau of Reclamation, the agency designated by 
the Secretary of Interior.  The Bureau collects data and establishes operating procedures in 
accord with the 1922 Compact, the BCPA, the Supreme Court decisions in Arizona v. 
California542 and other federal laws.  In addition, the Bureau is charged with operation of river 
works in order to deliver water.  
 The 1968 Colorado River Basin Project Act543 authorized and funded construction of 
additional river works and charged the Secretary to develop criteria for coordinated long-range 
operation of the Colorado River reservoirs through Annual Operating Plans.  The Annual 
Operating Plans provide for delivery of water for use within each lower basin state as permitted 
within the allocations established in the 1922 Compact and the Boulder Canyon Project Act.   
In 2001 the Secretary approved Colorado River Interim Surplus Guidelines setting forth 
the process for allocating system water that is “surplus” to the compact and Treaty 
requirements.544  In 2007 the Secretary approved “Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and 
                                                                                                                                                       
REG. 929 (2005) and Alberto Szekely, How to Accommodate an Uncertain Future into Institutional Responsiveness 
and Planning: The Case of Mexico and the United States, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 397 (1993). 
541 P.L. 70- 642 (1928). 
542 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), decree entered Arizona v. California, 376 U.S. 340 (1964), 
consolidated decree entered Arizona v. California, 126 S. Ct. 1543 (2006). 
543 P.L. 90-537 (1968). 
544 66 Fed. Reg. 7772, Jan. 25, 2001 (Vol. 66, No. 17, pg. 772-7782). 
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Coordinated Operations for Lakes Powell and Mead” which set forth management criteria for 
years when the supply is not sufficient to deliver the full volumetric allocations to the states and 
to Mexico.545  The Surplus and Shortage Guidelines also include criteria for coordinated releases 
from the major reservoirs.  The record of decision adopting the shortage guidelines was issued by 
the Secretary in December 2007 after an extensive environmental assessment including 
stakeholder and public participation.  The Secretary recognized the need to manage the system to 
account for the current multi-year drought and to adapt to longer range climate change conditions 
in a manner acceptable to the states party to the Colorado River Compact. 
 This process is effective in part because of the authority of the federal government and 
the availability of recourse by aggrieved parties to the United States federal courts.  However, 
the difficulty of negotiating an agreement to determine the distribution of a shrinking supply in 
conditions of increasing demand should not be underestimated.  The technical evaluation by the 
Bureau along with submission of its own proposals moved the process from a politicized conflict 
to an agreed upon technical resolution. 
 However, absent new federal legislation, the Secretary does not have the authority to alter 
the basin allocations among perfected rights holders or among the states.546 Nor may the 
Secretary alter the requirements of beneficial use or the preference given to agriculture and 
domestic uses in the 1922 Compact.547  However, each of the state governments has the authority 
to regulate how its share of water is utilized.548  As the resource becomes more scarce 
                                                
545 Colorado River Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and 
Lake Mead, Record of Decision, 73 Fed. Reg. 19873, April 11, 2008 (Vol 73, No. 71, pg. 19873-19892). 
546 Charles Ashby, McCain: Renegotiate 1922 Western Water Compact, The Pueblo Chieftain, Aug. 15, 2008, 
available at www.chieftain.com/articles/2008/08/15/news/local/doc48a548fed1e6f772542859.prt.  
547 1922 Compact supra note ___Art. IV (b). 
548 1922 Compact supra note __, Art II (c) 
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mechanisms are being developed for market transfers and other means for re-allocation among 
users.549 
Upper Basin Commission	  
 The 1948 Upper Basin Compact established the Upper Basin Commission.550  The 
Commission is composed of one representative from each upper division state, Colorado, New 
Mexico, Utah and Wyoming, and a representative appointed by the President of the United States 
who serves as the presiding officer.  The Commission is the administrative body for the upper 
basin with powers to establish gaging stations, forecast water availability, and make findings for 
water deliveries and storage losses.  The Commission quantifies the volume of water allocated to 
each state’s percentage share of beneficial use.  The Commission also determines if curtailment 
is necessary to meet the Upper Basin obligation under the 1922 Compact to deliver water at Lee 
Ferry for use in the Lower Basin.  In the past decade, drought conditions affecting supply and 
increased development within the upper basin have brought these accounting measures to 
prominence in the basin management. 
Conclusion	  	  
 Multiple institutions manage the Colorado River basin loosely coordinated through the 
federal projects administered by the Secretary of Interior through the Bureau of Reclamation.  In 
addition to the three major institutions discussed above, the tributaries with separate compacts or 
sub-compacts have their own institutions and management structures.  The Law of the River, the 
complex combination of agreements, legislation and judicial opinions, provides the framework 
within which the institutions function.  The United States Supreme Court offers an ultimate 
                                                
549 See generally NEW COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER, MAJOR ISSUES FOR THE NEXT CENTURY, GARY D. 
WEATHERFORD & F. LEE BROWN, eds. (1986) and Robert Glennon & Michael J. Pearce, Transferring Mainstem 
Colorado River Rights: The Arizona Experience, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 235 (2007).  




forum for interstate dispute resolution.  However, increased drought, climate change affecting 
snow pack evaporation rates and agriculture requirements are stressing the resource.  In addition 
the basin includes the regions and cities within the United States with some of the fastest 
growing populations.551 
Scholars and practitioners have called for a basin-wide international and interstate 
commission, a lower basin commission and for more federal oversight of water use.552  These 
have not garnered sufficient political support to move forward.  However, as this basin continues 
to experience explosive growth, increasing pollution, and new demands for water, the existing 
institutions will continue to be challenged by the limits of their jurisdiction and the need for 
basin-wide management solutions. 
                                                
551 NRC Report supra note__, 51-55 
552 See, NRC Report supra note__, NEW COURCES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER, supra note__, SKELEKY supra note 
__, and (Patrick Schiffer, et al., From a Colorado Compact Challenge to a New Era of Cooperation Among the 




Chapter	  Nine:	  Senegal	  River	  
 
The legal instruments establishing L’Organsation Pour la Mise en Valeur de Fleuve 
Senegal553 were lauded for establishing the most progressive and cooperative river management 
regime of its time.554 Yet development which proceeded as planned under this legal regime 
resulted in one of West Africa’s largest ecological disasters. 555  The lack of attention to local 
uses was a primary cause of the problems. 
 The Senegal River originates in the Fouta Djallon Mountains of Guinea and is formed 
when the Bafing and the Bakoye (Semefé) Rivers meet near Bafoulabé, Mali.  The third major 
tributary, the Falémé, also originates in the Fouta Djallon Mountains of Guinea and joins the 
Senegal near Bakel, Senegal.  The Falémé forms the border between Mali and Senegal before 
joining the mainstem.  Another tributary, the Karakoa River forms the border between Mali and 
Mauritania.  The Senegal River forms the border between Senegal and Mauritania from upstream 
of Bakel to the mouth at the Atlantic. 
 The Senegal flows from the mountain ranges, through steep gorges and over falls until it 
reaches Kayes where it becomes a semi-arid meandering river.  It is a major asset to the basin 
providing navigation to land locked Mauritania, hydropower, irrigation and fisheries.  The 
damming of the river in the 1980’s downstream at Diama to prevent salt water intrusion in the 
                                                
553 Convention Relative au Statut du Fleuve Senegal [Convention on the Statute of the River Senegal], March 11, 
1972, signed at Nouakchott, Sen-Mali-Mauritania, LEX-FAOC016004, available at http://faolex.fao.org, 
hereinafter 1972 Statute. 
554  Theodore Parnall & Albert E. Utton, The Senegal Valley Authority: A Unique Experiment in International River 
Basin Planning, 51 IND. L. J. 235 (1976), Third Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/406 and Add.1 and 2, reprinted in Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n, Vol. 2, Part 1, p 21, para 
28 (1987), (Stephen C. McCaffrey, Special Rapporteur) hereinafter  ILC Third Report. 
555 See STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES, 272-275 (2nd ed. 2007), Margaret J. 
Vick, The Senegal River Basin: A Retrospective and Prospective Look at the Legal Régime, 46 NATURAL RES. J. 211 
(2006), BONAYA ADHI GODANA, AFRICA’S SHARED WATER RESOURCES, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF 
THE NILE, NIGER AND SENEGAL RIVER SYSTEMS (1985) 
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dry season and upstream at Manantali for storage and hydropower provided mixed benefits and 
problems for the basin and its riparian population.556 
 The four riparian states in western Africa, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal, formed 
the first Senegal River basin institution in 1963, soon after independence.  Since then the 
structure, name and purpose of the institution has changed, however, the existence of this initial 
institution provided a forum for the leaders of each basin state to meet and to make changes to 
the framework of their agreements.  
Agreements 1963-1978 
 The four basin states entered a Convention for the development of the Senegal River on 
July 26, 1963 at Bamako, Mali.557  The states declared the Senegal an international river and 
formed an Inter-State Committee whose purpose was to promote and coordinate research and the 
development of works relating to the river.   
 The 1963 Bamako Convention was amended in 1964 with the addition of requirements 
for river and riparian development.558  Article 1 provides:  “The Parties express their desire to 
develop close co-operation in order to promote the rational utilization of the resources of the 
Senegal River basin and to ensure freedom of navigation and equality of treatment of its 
                                                
556 Joshua T. Newton, Case Study of Transboundary dispute Resolution: Organization for the Development of the 
Senegal River (OMVS) available at 
www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/Documents/senegal.pdf .  Newton also published the 
Sengal River case study in AARON T. WOLF AND JOSHUA T. NEWTON, CASE STUDIES OF TRANSBOUNDARY DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION (2008); and  JERRY DELLI PRISCOLI AND AARON T. WOLF, MANAGING AND TRANSFORMING WATER 
CONFLICTS, appendix C.16 (2009). 
557 Convention Relative `a l”Amenagement Général du Bassin du Fleuve Senegal [Convention Relating to the 
General Development of the Senegal River Basin], July 26, 1963 signed at Bamako, Sen.-Guinea-Mali-Mauritania, 
excerpts contained in U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/274 (Vol.1) at 79-80, hereinafter 1963 Bamako Convention. 
558 Convention Relative au Statut au Fleuve Senegal [Convention Relating to the Status of the Senegal River], Feb. 
7, 1964, signed at Dakar, Sen.-Guinea-Mali-Mauritania, excerpts and summary contained in U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/274 
(Vol.1) at 81-82 hereinafter 1964 Dakar Convention.  The 1963 and 1964 Conventions are discussed together.  The 
author found discussions and excerpts of both the 1963 and 1964 Conventions but was not able to locate a complete 
text of either Convention. 
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users.”559  Article 11 includes provisions for the construction of works, navigation, agricultural 
and industrial uses, monitoring the condition of the flora and fauna and protection of the water 
quality.560 
 Programs or works proposed by one state are required to be approved by the Committee 
whose decisions were binding on all states.  Through the 1964 Convention the Committee took 
on added functions and responsibilities to be administered through Sectoral Commissions, 
including:  
• developing rules for application of the principles contained in the Convention;  
• assembling basic data on the river basin;  
• disseminating the data to all basin states; 
• examining projects submitted by one state and “studying and executing” projects 
requested by a state; 
• promoting harmonious relations among the states;  
• regulating transportation along the river including roads and railways; and 
• seeking financial assistance. 
 
 A Secretariat was established to be an organ of investigation and liaison with the 
Committee.561   The Presidency of the Committee rotates among the states.562  Financing for the 
Committee is from the member states and foreign aid.563 
 In 1965 the Conference of the Heads of the Senegal Riparian States passed a resolution 
for organization of a new institution.564  This resolution resulted in the 1968 Statute of the 
Organization of the Senegal Riparian States (OERS).565  The OERS has an expanded purpose 
beyond river management to “establishment of the West African Regional Group of States, with 
                                                
559 Id. 
560 Id. at Article 11. 
561 Id. article unknown. 
562 Id. 
563 Id. 
564 Statut de Organisation des Etats Riverains du Senegal [Statute of the Organization of the Senegal Riparian 
States—OERS], March 24, 1968, signed at Labé, Sen.-Guinea-Mali-Mauritania, United Nations Treaty Series, 1969, 
No. 9577 Preambular par. 9. 
565 Statut de Organisation des Etats Riverains du Senegal [Statute of the Organization of the Senegal Riparian 
States—OERS], March 24, 1968, signed at Labé, Sen.-Guinea-Mali-Mauritania, United Nations Treaty Series, 1969, 
No. 9577 hereinafter 1968 OERS Statute. 
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a view to implementing African unity.”566  With this purpose the OERS harmonizes development 
plans and coordinates development in the following areas: 
• “agriculture and animal husbandry, 
• education, training and information,  
• public health, 
• industrial development, 
• transport and telecommunications, 
• trade, and 
• judicial co-operation and harmonization of civil and commercial legislation.”567 
 
The institutional structure is expanded to include a Conference of Heads of State and 
Government, a Council of Ministers and an Inter-Parliamentary Commission.  In addition, a 
Secretariat was created under the Council of Ministers to include an Executive Secretariat and 
three General Secretariats for Development of the Senegal River Basin, for Planning and 
Development and for Educational, Cultural and Social Affairs.  All decisions of the Conference 
of Heads of State and Government are binding on the member states. 
Parnall and Utton report that the OERS was not effective because its purpose was too 
broad, it was unable to obtain financing and Guinea, the upper-most state in the basin withdrew 
from membership.568 
In 1972 the OERS was formally dissolved with the formation of the Organization for the 
Development of the River Senegal (l’Organisation pour la mise en valeur du fleuve Sénégal 
(OMVS)) by the three basin states of Mali, Mauritania and Senegal.  Guinea remained an 
observer to the OMVS.  Two Conventions were entered on March 11, 1972 the Statute of the 
River Senegal569 which sets forth the principles of cooperation and policies for development and 
                                                
566 Id. at Art. 1 (4). 
567 1968 OERS Statute supra note __at Art. 1 (2). 
568 Parnall & Utton supra note ___. 
569 Convention Relative au Statut du Fleuve Senegal [Convention on the Statute of the River Senegal], March 11, 
1972, signed at Nouakchott, Sen-Mali-Mauritania, LEX-FAOC016004, available at http://faolex.fao.org, 
hereinafter 1972 Statute. 
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the Convention Creating the Organization for the Development of the River Senegal570 which 
establishes the organs and sets forth the authority and responsibilities of each organ of the 
OMVS.  
Anticipating construction of river works, the three Member States entered the Convention 
Relating to the Legal Status of Common Works on December 21, 1978.571  This Convention 
grants common ownership of river works to each Member State. Included in the Convention are 
restrictions on state taxation and regulation and provisions for open access.  Soon after the 
Works Convention entered into force construction of two dams began. The Manantali Dam is 
upstream on the Bafing and the Diama Dam is downstream near Saint Louis, Senegal.  The 
OMVS goals for these two dams were very specific; hydropower of 800 gigawatt-hours per year 
for nine out of ten years with 1,500 km of transport line to the three member states, increased 
irrigation in Mauritania and Senegal to 375,000 hectares with two rice crops per year, and a year-
round river transportation corridor to Mali.572  The downstream Diama Dam was developed to 
prevent salt water intrusion and to create a permanent water body within the River. 
Each of the institutions formed throughout the years is founded on the sovereign equality 
of states.  The states within this basin have a synergy of interests that permits development to 
proceed with a high level of cooperation.  The upstream state of Mali is landlocked and needs a 
transportation corridor to the sea.  Mauritania and the other basin states need power and Senegal 
                                                
570 Convention Portant Creation de L’Organsation Pour la Mise en Valeur de Fleuve Senegal [Convention Creating 
the Organization for the Development of the River Senegal—OMVS], March 11, 1972, signed at Nouakchott 
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and Mauritania are interested in increased irrigation.  All states were motivated by the desperate 
food shortages resulting from the drought during the 1970s.  The level of cooperation and river 
basin institutions are lauded as exemplary by international legal scholars.573 
Problems	  Associated	  with	  Basin	  	  
 Manantali Dam became operational in 1986 and Diama Dam was completed in 1988.574  
Soon thereafter the riverine population within the lower basin faced devastating consequences.  
The increase in water borne disease and the influx of invasive species may not have been able to 
be anticipated however, the impact on the existing local uses of the river were given inadequate 
consideration during the planning for river development and little consideration in the operation 
of the dams.575  
 The local riverine population in Senegal and Mauritania practiced recession agriculture 
for centuries.  During the rainy season the lands within the flood plain were inundated.  As the 
water receded cereal crops were planted in the moist and nutrient rich soil.  The people moved to 
higher ground where the acacia trees provided wood for shelter and charcoal and the livestock 
browsed on native vegetation.  They returned to the river for fishing and to harvest the crops.  
The livestock then fed on the plant stubble.   This annual cycle was disrupted by dam 
construction and clearing to expand irrigated agriculture.576 
 Reports indicate that the operational plans for the dams included an annual release to 
simulate the rainy season floods however, this did not occur.577  Some years there was not a 
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574 Newton supra note ___. 
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release and at other times releases occurred at times that destroyed seedling crops.578  In addition 
the acacia forests were cleared for expanded rice planting.  Most of the livestock died without the 
feed provided by the stubble from the cereal crops or became weakened and unable to withstand 
the parasites. Native fish populations were destroyed without access to the sea for spawning.  
The people suffered a devastating increase in water boarne diseases.  Nearly all aspects of local 
water use within the flood plain were destroyed.579 
 In response to these negative consequences the OMVS established environmental 
monitoring through the Programme d’Atténuation et de Suivi des Impacts sur l’Environnement 
(PASIE).  The results from PASIE and from independent studies led OMVS to the adoption of a 
Water Charter in 2002. 
2002 Water Charter 
 The 2002 Water Charter 580 incorporates the latest concepts of international water law in 
a manner consistent with the history institutional development of the basin.  The Preamble 
recites the historic documents relevant to the Member States and the regulation of the river 
beginning with the Charter of the United Nations and the Constitutive Act of the African Union 
and including the basin Conventions and management agreements.  The Preamble states that the 
Member States are conscious of customary international law regarding utilization of an 
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579 U.N. World Water Assessment Programme for Development, WATER FOR PEOPLE, WATER FOR LIFE,  Senegal 
River Basin, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Chapter 20 (2003) available at www.unesco.org/water/wwap. 
580 Adopted as Resolution No. 005 by the Conference of Heads of State and Government of OMVS and ratified by 
each OMVS state according to their Constitutions.  Guinea joined OMVS by Treaty of Accession March 2006.  
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international watercourse and the principles of the 1997 UN Convention and the 1992 Rio 
Declaration.581 
 Building on the OMVS management of the river, the 2002 Water Charter allocates water 
among sectors, not among states.  The cooperation of the basin states was established in 1963 
and the river works relinquished to common ownership in 1978 making allocations to states 
incongruous with the basin history.  The principle of equitable utilization is incorporated in the 
2002 Water Charter but in the context of utilization by sectors.  Article 8 provides that the water 
resource will be used in an equitable manner to satisfy not the needs of the respective states but 
the potable water needs of the population, the needs of agriculture, energy production, industry 
and navigation.   
Article 3 provides the following general principles for distributing water: 
• “the obligation to guarantee a balanced management of the water resource; 
• the equitable and reasonable use of the River’s water; 
• the obligation to preserve the environment; 
• the obligation to negotiate in case of conflict; 
• the obligation of each riparian State to inform other riparian States before engaging in 
any activity or project likely to have an impact on water availability and/or the possibility 
to implement future projects.”582 
 
The objectives go on to state that the guiding principles will “guarantee to the 
populations…the full pleasure of the resource, with respect to the safety of the people and the 
works, as well as the basic human right to clean water, in the perspective of sustainable 
development.”583 
 Article 5 establishes principles for the allocation of water among the sectors relying upon 
the river.  These principles include broad concepts of cooperation, security, prevention of flight 
                                                
581 Declaration on Environment and Development, June 13, 1992, Rio de Janeiro, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26; 31 
I.L.M.874 (1992) hereinafter 1992 Rio Declaration. 




from rural areas, food security, and strengthening economies against climatic variations.  The 
principles of integrated water resource management are also incorporated in Article 5.  The 
specifics of water allocation among the sectors are contained in Annexes to the Water Charter 
which may be revised at a technical level to meet changing conditions.584 
 Part 4 beginning with Article 16 provides for the protection and preservation of the 
River’s ecosystems.  The contracting States commit to protect the resources through national 
legislation and jointly through the OMVS.  In addition “[T]hey will take measures to prevent, 
reduce or control events or conditions resulting from natural disasters or human activities likely 
to harm other States, the environment of the river and human health or safety.”585  
 The protection of the population and establishing the priority of water for vital human 
needs586 are significant contributions of the Water Charter.  However, the opportunity for public 
participation remains limited.  Article 23 provides that the status of “observer” may be accorded 
to representatives of users, local communities, non-governmental organizations and 
decentralized management committees.  The process of obtaining “observer” status requires a 
recommendation from the High Commission and action by the Council of Ministers.  The 
“observer” may then attend meetings of the Permanent Water Commission. 
Conclusion 
 The institutions of the Senegal River Basin are remarkable for their cooperation and 
advancement of international water law.  They are top down institutions negotiated at the highest 
levels of government with goals to serve the state governments.  There were devastating and 
irreversible consequences at the local level.  The 2002 Water Charter takes significant steps to 
incorporate the needs of the local populations dependent on the Senegal River within the 
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operational principles and management goals yet lacks a regularized system for local stakeholder 
participation in basin decision making. 
 The cooperation established in the first institution in 1963 formed the basis for continuing 
communication, exchange of data and cooperation through multiple agreements leading to the 
2002 Water charter.  The basin institutions provide a forum for broad discussions about 
development within the basin.  With the accession of Guinea to the OMVS and the agreements in 
the 2002 Water Charter all basin states are once again bound together by the legal instruments 




Chapter	  Ten:	  Utton	  Center	  Model	  Interstate	  Water	  Compact	  
 The Utton Transboundary Resources Center587 published a Model Interstate Water 
Compact588 in October, 2006 following three years of collaboration among the leading 
academics and practitioners of transboundary water law.589   The model compact was developed 
to “be used as the basis for forging agreements between states regarding their shared water 
resources and for dealing with issues not considered in current compacts.”590  These issues 
include coordination of water quality for the watercourse among all the basin states, alternatives 
to litigation for dispute resolution, and an apportionment of water for ecological and 
environmental purposes. 
The principal purpose of the Model Compact is to respond to the Supreme Court’s 
repeated admonition to contesting states that the negotiation of their respective ‘equitable 
shares’ of interstate regional water resources and resolution of other disputes regarding 
such resources is a far better approach than a judicially imposed ‘equitable 
apportionment’ or other judicial decree.591 (citations omitted). 
 
 To accomplish this purpose the Model Compact recognizes in the Preamble the realities 
of interstate waters within the United States. The concepts, however, are equally applicable to 
international watercourses.   
• The water resources “are or may become valuable for a variety of beneficial 
purposes;” 
• The “optimum use and protection of the Basin’s water related values” are best 
realized by a basin wide approach; 
• The “equitable sharing and sustainable management of the Basin’s water 
resources can best be accomplished and equitably adjusted when necessary by the 
Basin states jointly by agreement;” 
                                                
587 University of New Mexico School of Law 
588 Jerome C. Muys, et al, Utton Transboundary Resources Center Model Interstate Water Compact 47 Nat. 
Resources J. 17 (2007). , also available at http://uttoncenter.unm.edu/pdfs/Model_Compact.pdf,  last visited June, 
2009, hereinafter Model Compact. 
589 For information about this process and the list of advisers, committees and review see, 
http://uttoncenter.unm.edu/model_compacts.html, last visited Oct. 21, 2006. 
590 Id. 
591 Model Compact supra note __, Art. I cmt., 47 Nat. Resources J. at 27.  
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• The “need for integrated, adaptive water resource management, specifically the 
need for management decisions affecting the watershed to be made at the 
watershed level” is critical “to the sustainable management of the water resources 
of the …Basin;” and  
•  Development projects and water management programs “should be consistent 
with regional water resource management programs.”592 
 
Given these goals and purposes the Model Compact apportions water among uses, among 
users, and among states.  The apportionment scheme is discussed below. 
Apportionment	  
 The “first cut” of water is for ecosystem protection and preservation.593  The parties agree 
to set forth in an annex the amounts of water required for the different reaches of the watercourse 
during different seasons to “maintain a healthy and productive Basinwide ecosystem.”594  For 
watercourses within the United States this water is primarily to satisfy the habitat protection 
requirements of the Endangered Species Act.595   
 The next allocation of water is to “satisfy the use requirements of all perfected water 
rights derived from federal, state or tribal law.”596  The Model Compact does not allocate water 
to particular users, but apportions the water among the states in sufficient amounts to satisfy the 
“perfected water rights” within each state.  A “perfected water right” is one which is “acquired in 
accordance with state law which has been exercised by the actual diversion and/or beneficial use 
of a specific quantity of water in accordance with state law….”597  These rights together with 
water for ecosystem preservation determine the base apportionment to each state.  The amount is 
                                                
592 Id.,  Compact Preamble, 47 Nat. Resources J at 24. 
593 Id, Art. V cmt. 47 Nat. Resources J at 64.. 
594 Id., Art. V(A), 47 Nat. Resources J at 59. 
595 16 USC §§1531-1544. 
596 Model Compact supra note Art. V(A), 47 Nat. Resources J at 59. 
597 Id., Art. III(I), 47 Nat. Resources J at 37.  This definition also considers reserved rights under federal common 
law that are not acquired in accordance with state law. 
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then converted to percentages of flow volumes.598  Percentages were selected for the ease in 
measurement and monitoring and the ease with which reductions may be made during times of 
shortages of supply.   
 The volume necessary to satisfy the base apportionment may exceed the available supply 
of the watercourse, a condition of “over appropriation.”  The Commentary addresses this issue 
by stating that the method developed to apportion the waters during years of shortage should be 
looked to as guidance for the negotiators of a compact under these conditions.599  In these 
conditions the water is apportioned by a commission using the percentages determined by the 
ratio of ecosystem and perfected rights for each state.  The apportionment to each state is 
reduced if the “safe annual yield” is less than average.  Intrastate allocation of each state’s share 
is determined by the state, i.e. state law is used to allocate water among each of the holders of 
perfected rights.  This seems straight forward, however, during shortage conditions, it is likely 
that a market will develop for intra- and inter-state transfers.   
 The volume necessary to satisfy base apportionments may be less than the supply of the 
basin.  In this circumstance the commentary suggests several alternative allocation methods that 
the negotiators may decide upon.  These include dividing the water according to the percentage 
shares for base apportionments, giving each state the same volumetric amount, or authorizing the 
Commission established by the Compact to allocate the water using criteria agreed upon.600 
 The final allocation is of “supplemental” waters.  The Model Compact includes a 
calculation of estimated safe annual yield, which is defined as “the amount of water that can be 
withdrawn annually from a surface or sub-surface water resource without serious water quality, 
                                                
598 Id., Art. V cmt 47 Nat. Resources J at 65., 
599 Id., Art. V cmt, 47 Nat. Resources J at 67. 
600 Id.,  Art. V cmt, 47 Nat. Resources J at 65. 
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net storage, environmental or social consequences.”601  This is calculated using an analysis of the 
average annual and seasonal flows on record, the wettest 10 year period and the driest 10 year 
period.  The Commission determines the amount of water “reasonably likely to be available” for 
a five year period and determines the amount above the base apportionment, ecosystem 
preservation and perfected water rights, and makes supplemental apportionments.  The 
supplemental apportionments are made on a five year term and are subject to renewal. 
 The measure for all uses within the basin is “reasonable beneficial use.”  Few states 
within the United States have enforced a standard for water use that limits quantity for right’s 
holders, however, as demand continues to increase this standard will play an increasing role in 
water management.  It is a flexible and adaptive standard incorporating both the amount of water 
in the term “reasonable” and the use of that water within the term “beneficial.”  “The authors [of 
the Model Compact] are convinced that the principal long-term source of ‘new’ water for 
expanding populations and environmental values will come from increased conservation efforts.  
A major component of this effort must necessarily be more aggressive enforcement of a clearly 
defined reasonable beneficial use standard.”602 
 The group of scholars and practitioners who developed the Model Compact determined 
that multiple methods of apportionment were needed to meet the varied utilization of an 
interstate stream.  Ecosystem preservation and existing uses are protected with base 
apportionments that are quantified and then converted to percentages of the estimated safe 
annual yield.  Supplemental apportionments are based on hydrological data and subject to 
conditions imposed by the Commission which may include conservation requirements and 
payment of a market value for the water.  All uses within the states in the basin are limited to 
                                                
601 Id., Art. III(K), 47 Nat. Resources J at 38. 
602 Id., Art. V(G)cmt, 47 Nat. Resources J at 73. 
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reasonable beneficial use with a mechanism to enforce rules against waste, unreasonable, or 
unbeneficial uses.  The Model Agreement also permits marketing the apportionments among the 
basin states as a means of achieving flexibility to meet changing circumstances.603 
Institutions 
 The Model Compact calls for the formation of a Commission to implement, supervise 
and enforce the provisions of the Compact among the states.604  The Commission members are 
the highest elected officials of each basin state or their representatives.  The authority of the 
Commission is very broad.  The Commentary explains that all possible functions are included 
with the intent that particular basins will tailor the authorities to meet the particular basin needs.  
The Commission duties are to “exercise final authority and responsibility for (a) the equitable, 
efficient, and sustainable 
use of the water apportionments; (b) the management of the water quality programs under this 
Compact; and (c) the management of the water resources programs under this Compact.”   
The Commission is supported by a Council of two high ranking water management and 
water quality officials from each state, two tribal representatives and two federal representatives.  
The Council has the primary responsibility for approving water allocations and water quality 
programs at the state level. 
The Commission and the Council are supported by a Division of Scientific Analysis.  The 
Division is composed of an equal number of representatives from each state with technical 
expertise in water management, water quality, economics, fish and wildlife and other matters of 
importance to the management of the Basin.605 
                                                
603 Model Compact Art. V cmt, 47 Nat. Resources J at 64-75. at 44-58.  The Model Compact also includes 
provisions for maintaining the water quality of the basin. See, Id., Art. VI, 47 Nat. Resources J at 76. 
604 Model Compact Art. IV (A), 47 Nat. Resources J at 41. 
605 Model Compact supra note __ Art. IV (D), 47 Nat. Resources J at 53. 
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This structure is explained in the Commentary as vesting decision making authority with 
the elected officials of the basin governments.  The Council consists of the agency heads from 
basin governments and is responsible for policy decisions.  The Science Division has equal 
authority to the Council over scientific and technical issues in order to implement the agreed 
upon policies. 
Conclusion	  
 The Model Compact is included in this discussion for its comprehensive treatment of 
transboundary water issues.  The group of experts who drafted and commented on the Model 
Compact brought varied and extensive experience to its development.  It is as comprehensive a 
management tool as can be designed.  It is geared toward future development while protecting 
existing uses.  Unlike existing compacts within the United States, it includes the tribal 
governments within the basin and the United States.  Its provisions are worthy of study and 




Chapter	  Eleven:	  Three	  International	  Watercourses	  without	  
Agreements	  	  
 Three international watercourses without basin-wide agreements are examined in this 
section: the Nile, Amu Darya/Syr Darya, and the Tigris/Euphrates.	  606  The examination uses 
four criteria; 1) communication among the basin states, 2) data gathering and exchange of 
information, 3) common goals and agreement on management principles and 4) the institutional 
authority and capacity to implement basin goals and management principles. 
 The four criteria are hierarchical in that communication is the platform upon which the 
states may exchange data and information.  The data and information about the basin are 
essential to setting common goals and management principles.  Any basin institutions use these 
to achieve management flexibility. 
Nile	  
The Nile is one of the most famous rivers in the world.  It forms a basin of approximately 
1,170,000 square miles (3,030,286 km2).607 It is comprised of the Blue Nile with headwaters in 
Eritria and Ethiopia and the White Nile with headwaters historically thought to be Lake Victoria 
but now considered the Kagera River whose headwaters are in Burundi.  The two branches have 
very different characteristics and flow patterns before joining in a confluence in Khartoum, 
Sudan.  The Nile then flows through Sudan and Egypt before forming the large delta region at 
the Mediterranean.   
                                                
606 This section is based on Living with Change in Transnational Basins: Some Typical Cases, Malin Falkenmark, 
Margaret Vick, & Charlotte de Fraiture publication forthcoming. 
607 Stephen C. McCaffrey , THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 258 (2007). 
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The states within the Nile basin are parties to numerous agreements.  Of note are the 
agreement in 1929 between Egypt and Great Britain/Sudan608 and the 1959609 agreement 
between Egypt and Sudan dividing the waters of the Nile;610 and the more recent agreements for 
management of the Kagera River basin611 and for the coordinated and sustainable management 
of Lake Victoria.612 
Egypt is the dominate state within the basin having used the waters of the Nile for 
irrigation for an estimated 5000 years.  Experts anticipate that the population in the basin may 
increase by 100% during the next 50 years further increasing the water stress within the basin.613  
The upstream states are looking forward to future development of the Nile while the downstream 
states are interested in protecting existing development and looking forward to expanding 
development to meet future needs.  This creates a situation where the upstream states view water 
security as the ability to meet development potential and the more highly developed downstream 
states view water security as the protection of existing uses and the recognition of prior 
agreements. 
It has been said that nothing flows among the Nile basin states except water.614  This 
truism is no longer valid though linkages of trade and transportation among the basin states 
                                                
608 Exchanges of Notes between the U.K. and Egypt in regard to the Use of the Waters of the River Nile for 
Irrigation Purposes, Cairo, May 7, 1929, 93 L.N.T.S. pg. 44.  
609 Agreement between the United Arab Republic and the Republic of Sudan for the Full Utilization of the Nile 
Waters, Cairo, Nov. 8, 1959, 453 U.N.T.S. 51. 
610 See McCaffrey 2007 supra note __, 263 and ROBERT O. COLLINS, THE NILE (2002) for a discussion of these early 
agreements. 
611 1977 and 1981 Agreements 
612 Agreement to Initiate Program to Strengthen Regional Coordination in Management of Resources of Lake 
Victoria, 5 August 1994, Kenya, Tanzania, United Republic of Uganda, Transboundary Freshwater Dispute 
Database available at http://ocid.nacse.org/tfdd/treaties.php , East African Community, Protocol for Sustainable 
Development of Lake Victoria Basin, signed Nov. 29, 2003, effective July 2005, Republic of Kenya, Republic of 
Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania available at 
http://www.ecolex.org/ecolex/ledge/view/RecordDetails;DIDPFDSI?id=TRE-002034&index=treaties. 
613 Falkenmark supra note __. 
614 Regional Saying. 
≈179≈ 
 
remain limited.  Communication and the exchange of water data within the basin now occur on a 
regular basis through the efforts of the Water Ministers of the Nile basin states.   
Communication among the Nile Basin states began at the technical level through the 
Hydrometeorological Survey of the Catchments of lakes Victoria, Kyoga and Albert (Hydromet) 
(1967-1992).  Hydromet was succeeded by the Technical Cooperation Committee for the 
Promotion of the Development and Environmental Protection of the Nile Basin (TECCONILE) 
(1992-1999).  A Council of [Water] Ministers of 9 of the 10 basin states formed the Nile Basin 
Initiative (NBI) which continues the work of the TECCONILE.615  
 The NBI developed a shared vision “[t]o achieve sustainable socio-economic 
development through the equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common Nile Basin water 
resources.”  Creation of a shared vision was a major undertaking.  It provides agreed upon 
common goals and principles for management of the basin.  The states agree that socio-economic 
development must be sustainable, that the states are to equitably utilize the water resources and 
equitably utilize the benefits of the water resources which are common to the basin states.   
The Shared Vision is implemented through cooperative programs, stakeholder 
involvement and education.  The Council of Ministers agreed upon the complete text of a 
Cooperative Framework Agreement, a basin-wide Cooperative Framework.616 However, Egypt 
maintains that a provision regarding historical uses remain in the text of the Cooperative 
Framework Agreement.  The Ministers from the other states agreed to address the issue at a later 
time in an annex.  With this most recent action the Cooperative Framework is before the 
governments of the basin states for consideration. 
                                                
615 McCaffrey 2007, supra note __, 271-272. 
616 This agreement does not include Egypt and the representative of Sudan was not present at the meeting where this 
action was taken.  Positive steps towards Establishing a Permanent River Basin Commission, NBI News, available 
at http://www.nilebasin.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=131&Itemid=1 . 
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Common goals are articulated by the NBI at a project specific level but the principles for 
addressing future water scarcity created by population growth, climate change, and demand for 
increased food production have not been addressed. The NBI does not have the requisite 
authority to address change until the states enter a basin-wide agreement which vests such 
authority.617 
Amu Darya/Syr Darya	  
The Amu Darya and Syr Darya feed the Aral Sea.  The Amu Darya enters the southern 
Aral Sea after flowing 1490 miles (2400 km) from the headwaters Vakhsh and Panj Rivers in 
Tajikistan and Kyrgystan.618 The Syr Darya rises in the mountains of Kyrgystan and flows1550 
miles (2500km) through the Central Asian countries of Tajikistan, Usbekistan and Kazakhstan. 
Most of the time water from the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya does not reach the Aral Sea 
creating what has been described as the world’s worst environmental disaster.619 
Most of the current development within the Amu Darya/Syr Darya basin occurred when 
the region was part of the former Soviet Union.  The break-up of the Soviet Union and the 
formation of separate states resulted in concentrated development in upstream states and the 
consequences of that development felt as environmental and economic harm in the downstream 
states.  Population growth during the next 50 years is projected to be much greater upstream 
exacerbating the upstream-downstream disparities and water stress.620  
The post-Soviet states within the basin entered the first agreement regarding water in 
1992.  This agreement recognized and confirmed the legal status of water allocations as they 
                                                
617 Since 1959 the basin states have entered several agreements for limited purposes.  McCaffrey 2007 supra note 
__, 271-272 
618 McCaffrey 2007 supra note __, at 275-276. 
619 Aaron T. Wold & Joshua T. Newton, Case Study of Transboundary Dispute Resolution: Aral Sea, available at 
http:///www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/Aral_Sea_New.htm 
620Falkenmark, supra note __. 
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existed under the Soviet regime621 and created the Interstate Commission for Water Coordination 
(ICWC) to manage transboundary waters and assume the responsibilities from the former 
Ministry of Water Resources of the USSR.622  The ICWC continues the policies of the Soviet 
Basin Water Organizations for Amu Darya and Syr Darya.  Numerous other institutions and 
organizations have been established to address the environmental crisis of the Aral Sea.  These 
organizations provide opportunities for communication and data exchange and for sharing 
information about the operation of existing works but do not address management of the basin.  
The basin states have not agreed upon common goals or principles for water use.  Each 
state developed water laws reflective of their upstream or downstream position and in support of 
the major water sectors within their respective territories.623  The existing institutions do not have 
the authority to change water use within any state or to change the regulation of works on the 
international waters.  These remain in the management of individual states or private and sectoral 
groups.  Regional economics and markets for water remain major issues preventing agreement 
among basin states. 
Euphrates/Tigris	  
The Euphrates and Tigris Rivers both originate in Turkey join at the Shatt-al-Arab 
waterway a short distance before flowing into the Persian Gulf.  The Tigris forms the border 
between Turkey and Syria before flowing through Iraq where it receives a contribution of water 
from the Kuran River which originates in Iran.  The Euphrates River also originates in Turkey 
                                                
621 A.D. Ryabtsev,  10 Years of Regional Collaboration in Shared Water Resources Management of Central Asia, 
prepared for 3rd World Water Forum, Regional Cooperation in Shared Water Resources in Central Asia, Kyoto, 
March 18, 2003 available at www.adb.org/Documents/Presentations/RC_Shared_Water/Ryabtsev.pdf . 
622 VICTOR DUKHOVNY & VADIM SOKOLOV, LESSONS ON COOPERATION BUILDING TO MANAGE WATER CONFLICTS 
IN THE ARAL SEA BASIN, UNESCO, IHP, WWAP IHP-VI Technical Documents in Hydrology PC CP series no. 11 
(2003), Victor Dukhovny & Vadim Sokolov, Water Resrouces Management Strategy for the Aral Sea Basin: 
Problems in Preparation, available at http://oieau.fr/ciedd/contributions/at2/contribution/sokolov.htm . 
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and flows south through Syria and Iraq.  The region is characterized by war and political struggle 
at this time of political occupation of Iraq by the United States, Kurdish efforts at independence 
from Iraq and Turkey and Syrian conflict with its neighbours.  
The upstream state of Turkey is the water hegemon in the basin with control of large 
multipurpose dams and plans for more works as part of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP).  
These projects include the Ataturk Dam, the ninth largest in the world624and the Birecik Dam.   
Turkey customarily provides notice to downstream states that major works are underway, 
but there is not cooperation or coordination for planned measures and water diversions that 
impact the entire basin.  The lack of cooperation led to several water related crisis including 
complete cessation of the flow of the Euphrates River to fill Ataturk Reservoir625 and formal 
objections lodged by both Syria and Iraq to construction of Birecik dam. 
Several decades ago the states within the basin participated in discussions. The first 
technical meeting among the major basin states of Turkey, Syria and Iraq was held in 1965 to 
discuss dam construction and operation.  From 1965 until circa 1992 a Joint Technical 
Committee (JTC) met to exchange data and to develop a tripartite river basin agreement.  In 
1992, when an agreement had not been reached, the JTC discontinued meeting.  At this time, 
there is not a regularized exchange of basic data on precipitation, water use, or water quality.  
Recent news reports indicate this may be changing.  Regional newspapers reported that 18 
representatives from Turkey, Syria and Iraq held a technical meeting of in March 2008 for the 
purpose of forming a basin water institute.626  
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 Major construction continues within the basin without an agreement among the states.  
The states have different views on basic principles.  Turkey asserts sovereign rights to develop 
water resources within its territory627 and has claimed that the Euphrates and Tigris are not 
international rivers because neither forms a boundary between two states.628 In addition, Turkey 
considers the Euphrates and Tigris to be one watercourse system and requires that negotiation 
address the entire basin. 
 On the other hand, Iraq and Syria have asserted that the Euphrates and the Tigris should 
be treated as separate rivers for purpose of negotiations.  Iraq and Syria assert rights to 
volumetric allocations and want “guaranteed” delivery downstream.  If these basic differences 
are not sufficient to foreclose an agreement, negotiators have linked Kurdish separatists activities 
with the water negotiations further increasing distrust among the states.629   
 The reports of formation of a basin water institute are encouraging in that the states are 
communicating.  We do not know if the water institute will come to fruition providing a regular 
mechanism for communication, data gathering and exchange of information. 
Conclusion 	  
The three basins discussed herein, are examples of the many basins throughout the world 
without basin-wide agreements.  As we face water stress from increased population and 
increased standards of living which require increased water for food production we must work to 
allocate water resources carefully and according to agreed upon goals and principles.  It may 
sound simple, but as is illustrated in the Euphrates/Tigris basin, communication is the first step 
and not as easy as it sounds. 
                                                
627 M. Rende The Global Water Shortage and Turkey’s Water Management, Proceedings of the Symposium by the 
Regional Centre on Urban Water Management, Policies and strategic options for water management in the Islamic 
countries, Tehran 15 -16 December 2003, UNESCO Technical Documents in Hydrology/No. 73 (2003).  
628 Kibaroglu & Ünver 2000 
629 McCaffrey 2007, supra note __, 328. 
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 The agreements among the Senegal basin states offer examples of the introduction of key 
water sharing principles in incremental steps.  The first agreement in 1963 included broad 
development goals and established a basin-wide institution.  It is through this institution that 
communication and data sharing took place to permit cooperation for the development of the 
multi-purpose dams for the benefit of all states.  Different organizational structures and different 
development principles were adopted over a period of 40 years culminating in the 2002 Water 
Charter.  It is the spirit of cooperation among the states based on an early identification of shared 
benefits that permits the institutions to develop along with the river resources. 
The Amu/Syr Darya basin is dominated by upstream irrigation interests creating 
ecological damage and water shortages downstream.  The Senegal Basin agreements may offer 
guidance in this basin as well.  The water sharing arrangement in the Senegal is based on use by 
sectors, not a division among states.   If sector allocations are agreed upon a provision permitting 
an analysis of reasonableness is needed.  The 1997 UN Convention provides at Article 5 that 
states shall use an international watercourse in “an equitable and reasonable manner” with a 
“view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilization and benefits therefrom.”630The Model 
Compact requires states to enforce a standard of “reasonable beneficial use” of its apportionment 
from the transboundary resource.  This is defined as “the application of water to a beneficial use 
in an amount reasonably necessary to satisfy such use….”631  The Commission created under the 
Model Compact has the authority to reduce the state apportionment in the event of a finding that 
the state is not enforcing this standard.632  This standard has been in effect in the United States 
since the passage of the Reclamation Act of 1902 and though there has not been significant 
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enforcement, it is a widely recognized standard.633  It is a standard such as this, and the authority 
to enforce it, that will create water savings and conservation within a basin such as the Amu/Syr 
Darya that is over-appropriated. 
Recent reports from the Tigris/Euphrates basin indicate an increased willingness to share 
technical information.  The upstream hegemonic position of Turkey makes them a critical 
participant in negotiations.  There are sub-basin bilateral agreements among the states which may 
provide a starting point for negotiations.  The GAP Ministry in Turkey and the Irrigation 
Ministry in Syria entered an agreement in 2001 for training and exchange of experts.  Iran and 
Iraq entered an Agreement in 1975 regarding the use of Frontier Watercourses.  Turkey and Iraq 
signed an agreement in 1946 with provisions relative to the regulation of the Tigris and 
Euphrates and tributaries. Within the Colorado River basin the “bilateral agreement” between 
Colorado and New Mexico for the La Plata River, a small tributary, is incorporated within the 
Upper Basin Compact without upsetting the allocations and management regime established 20 
years previously.634   
A different circumstance is presented in the Nile Basin.  Two historic agreements to 
which Egypt is a party present circumstances upon which the basin states cannot agree.  An 
exchange of notes in 1929 between Egypt and the Great Britain provide that use of the waters of 
the Nile shall not “infringe Egypt’s natural and historical rights in the waters of the Nile and its 
requirements of agricultural extension.”635  In 1959 Egypt and Sudan entered an agreement to 
fully utilize the waters of the Nile and to agree on a unified position in negotiations over the Nile 
                                                
633 Id., Art V(G)cmt., 47 Nat. Resources J. at 73-75. 
634 Upper Colorado Basin Compact, Art. supra note __.  
635 Exchanges of Notes between the U.K. and Egypt in regard to the Use of the Waters of the River Nile for 
Irrigation Purposes, Cairo, May 7, 1929, 93 L.N.T.S. pg. 44.  
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waters.636  Unlike the tributary agreements within the Colorado River basin and the bilateral 
agreements on the Tigris/Euphrates Rivers, the 1959 agreement regarding the Nile allocates the 
full flow of the river between the two states.  To give this agreement full effect arguably prevents 
development in other basin states.  During the negotiations for a Cooperative Framework 
Agreement it is the treatment of “historic” agreements that creates a conflict among the states.  
The law of treaties and the succession of states all become involved in these discussions.  At the 
meeting of the Council of Water Ministers on May 22, 2009 the Ministers reached agreement on 
the text of the Cooperative Framework Agreement except for the provisions relating historic 
rights and uses.637   
The Model Compact contains provisions for the protection of existing uses, however, this 
assumes that the basin is not yet over-allocated or in extreme water stress like the Nile basin.  
Egypt is the hegemonic state within the Nile Basin and appears to be forcing the other basin 
states to proceed without their participation.  The resolution of the issue of historic agreements 
may be resolved through judicial or other means. 
Conclusion	  to	  Part	  III	  
	  
 The simplest things may be the most effective for basin-wide management: 
communication, coordinating watercourse data and the exchange of information on water and 
land use.  Yet it is this information that may be difficult for states to disclose even though it is 
critical to basin-wide equitable and reasonable utilization.  Through negotiated agreements 
                                                
636 Agreement between the United Arab Republic and the Republic of Sudan for the Full Utilization of the Nile 
Waters, Cairo, Nov. 8, 1959, 453 U.N.T.S. 51. 




institutions may be formed which provide a regular and routine forum for communication and 
exchange of information. 
Agreements and institutions may be as complex as those governing the Colorado River or 
as progressive in their ownership of river works as the OMVS in the Senegal basin or still in the 
formative stages as in the Nile Basin.  However, basin-wide institutions are key to avoidance of 
environmental catastrophe and adjusting to changing natural and human conditions. 
The legal structure of the Colorado River basin and that of the Senegal Basin offer 
interesting contrasts.  Within the Colorado system most local water uses are based on the 
principle of prior appropriation which is incorporated into state law.  More recently reserved 
rights for federal lands including those held in trust for Indian tribes have been quantified and 
incorporated within the federal management of the main stream and the state management of 
local water uses.  In the Colorado system the states and the federal government negotiated 
volumetric allocations of water with general principles for the allocation of surplus water and 
adjusted allocations in times of shortage.  It is these general principles that have been called upon 
to adapt to change within the basin.  The technical institution for river management, the federal 
Bureau of Reclamation, developed in cooperation with the states, criteria for water allocation 
when the volume of water is not sufficient to meet the volumetric allocations.  This process 
included opportunities for participation by all users and stakeholders within the portion of the 
basin affected by shortages.  The participation took place not under the provisions of any water 
agreement but under the requirements of a different federal law, the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA)638 which mandates that an environmental impact statement be prepared for 
major federal actions.  It is the NEPA requirements that brought stakeholders and the public into 
the decision making process. 
                                                
638 42 U.S.C. §4321 et seq. 
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The Colorado Basin is over-allocated with each user having a stake in its management.  
Adoption of the shortage criteria was the result of extensive data collection and years of 
negotiations among the basin states and major stakeholders.  It was precipitated by a common 
understanding of the necessity for a change in river management to meet the changed 
circumstances of drought within the basin. 
The Senegal Basin presents a different set of circumstances and a different response.  In 
1963 the top levels of government of the basin states viewed the River as a path to development.  
The concepts of what to do were accepted early, hydropower production, increased irrigation and 
navigation, and the institutions were formed to accomplish these goals.  As the governments 
developed so did the institutions and this is reflected in the sequence of basin agreements.  The 
adverse consequences of dam development are not unique to the Senegal River.  What was 
unique was the fact that this occurred in the late twentieth century and not the nineteenth century 
and that the negative consequences came close to defeating the basin development goals.  The 
effect of having an existing institution for data collection and cooperation resulted in the PASIE 
data gathering and the changes made through the 2002 Water Charter which incorporates the 
latest developments in management of international watercourses. 
Within the Senegal Basin the local water uses were not protected by law and not given 
consideration when “bigger and better” plans for the watercourse were developed at the top 
levels of government.  At the time of dam construction the local users did not have a voice.  The 
consequences had an impact back up to the states in decreased food production, displaced 
population, food scarcity and increased disease.  These remain major concerns within the basin 
ten years after dam construction.  The strength and support of the basin institutions provide a 
process to address the devastation cooperatively and the capacity to implement change. 
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The basins without basin agreements are at various stages of cooperation and 
negotiations.  The role of users and local laws and the sustainability of the watercourse as a 
natural system must be included in the international negotiations.  The 1997 UN Convention and 






 Water law may be viewed as the set of rules for human interaction with the hydrologic 
cycle.  Water law promotes the particular policies in place at the time the laws are developed.  
Water laws that develop at the local level, from the bottom up, were examined in Part One.   
These include prior appropriation which promotes settlement and irrigation of arid lands:639 
acequias promoting community development,640 and subaks641 supporting food production and 
cultural cohesiveness.  Water law includes customs such as those by which the mayordomo 
opens the headgates in New Mexico and the rice societies that encourage and support cultivation 
and prayer in Bali and Sri Lanka. Water law includes the statutes and regulations adopted at 
multiple levels of government to promote, limit, and protect water uses.  These laws reflect the 
preferences of the societies in which they develop.   
Water law also includes compacts and treaties entered at the highest levels of government 
in order to utilize transboundary waters, resolve conflicts, and promote goodwill.  This body of 
law includes the international principles that have crystallized as customary international law 
binding on all states.  Each level of water law is applied to the same watercourse at the same 
time.  It is the duty of water planners, water managers, and the negotiators of watercourse 
agreements to know and understand the plurality of laws that simultaneously regulate a single 
source of water. 
                                                
639 See Chapter 1 supra at 14. 
640 Id. at 17. 
641 Id. at 24. 
≈191≈ 
 
Effective domestic water institutions are as important to managing an international 
watercourse as are the basin institutions among states.  A basin-wide treaty is only effective if all 
users adhere to it.   
 This dissertation explores water law at the bottom and at the top of a legal pluralistic 
system.  Each water use and each water law within a hydrologic basin affects all others.  One 
cannot forget local laws when negotiating an international agreement and one cannot ignore 
international agreements when allocating local resources.  All must be integrated within a 
management system in order to obtain optimal and sustainable development of hydraulic basins 
for our welfare and survival.  
 How can this occur?  First, the sooner water sharing institutions are established and water 
sharing agreements negotiated the better are the chances of resolving or preventing international 
water disputes.  The OMVS in the Senegal Basin demonstrates that new data, changing 
circumstances and unintended consequences may be resolved through existing institutions.642   
Second, strong domestic institutions help address change. The basin institution regulating 
the Colorado River is addressing drought and climate change by adopting shortage criteria for 
operations in the lower basin.643  Third, the effectiveness of an institution is determined by the 
extent of its authority.  The International Boundary and Water Commission created by the United 
States and Mexico has broad decision making authority absent objection by the State Parties.   
However, these institutions do not have authority to regulate water users. 
 One intra-state dispute between a state official and water users illustrates the complexity 
of integrating water law among interstate agreements, institutions, and users. 
                                                
642 See Chapter 9 supra at 164. 
643 See Chapter 8 supra at 160. 
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Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Company644 
Hinderlider involves a dispute between an irrigation company and the Colorado State 
Engineer over use of the La Plata River.  M.C. Hinderlider is the Colorado State Engineer 
charged with administering the waters of the state and with administering the terms of the La 
Plata River Compact with the state of New Mexico.  The plaintiffs are corporate owners of a 
ditch used to divert water to irrigate land in southern Colorado.  The La Plata River is a small 
watershed which originates in the mountains of southwestern Colorado and flows south into New 
Mexico before joining the San Juan River near Farmington, New Mexico645 which then flows 
into the Colorado River.  The flow is dependent on snowmelt from the La Plata Mountains in 
Colorado646 and fluctuates between high flows in the spring and low flows in the late summer 
and fall. 
In 1922 the states of Colorado and New Mexico entered the La Plata River Compact 
which apportions the water using three different mechanisms depending on the seasonal 
fluctuations.647  This is a simple compact648 apportioning the flow of this small stream as equally 
as possible between the states.  Gaging stations are installed and allocations are made based on 
the availability of water.  The natural characteristics of the river are incorporated in the terms of 
the Compact649 and the State Engineers of Colorado and New Mexico are authorized to adjust 
                                                
644 Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Company, 304 U.S. 92 (1938), Hinderlider v. La Plata & 
Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 70 P.2d 849 (Colo. 1937), and La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 25 P.2d 187 
(Colo. 1933).  See State v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 73 P.2d 997 (Colo. 1937) for a discussion of 
Colorado legislation to permit the State to intervene in this litigation. 
. 
  
645 La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co. v. Hinderlider, 25 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1933). 
646 Hinderlider supra note 6 at 97. 
647 La Plata River Compact 1922, see Chapter 8 supra at 152.  
648 The Compact consists of seven articles, two of which pertain to the measurement and allocation of the water 
under the supervision of the State Engineers. 




the flow to permit maximum beneficial use of water in each state.  Article II(3), the provision in 
question, calls for “rotating” water deliveries between the states during low flows:  
[W]henever the flow of the river is so low that in the judgment of the state engineers of 
the states, the greatest beneficial use of its waters may be secured by distributing all of its 
waters successively to the lands in each state in alternating periods, in lieu of delivery of 
water as provided in the second paragraph of this article, [one-half of the mean flow at 
the Hesperus station for the preceding day, but not to exceed one hundred cubic feet per 
second;] the use of the waters may be so rotated between the two states in such manner, 
for such periods, and to continue for such time as the state engineers may jointly 
determine….650 
 
This provision permits the maximum amount of water to be used in each state during low flows 
when the percentage of conveyance loss is the greatest.   
When State Engineer Hinderlider implemented Article II(3) of the Compact by shutting 
the headgates in Colorado the  La Plata River and Cherry Creek Ditch Company (Ditch 
Company) sued him.  Plaintiffs asserted several legal theories each of which was based on 
protecting the state law water rights of the Ditch Company as they were perfected, adjudicated, 
and decreed according to the prior appropriation laws of the state of Colorado.  The basic 
conflict was between the prior appropriation water rights of the user and the interstate equitable 
apportionment effectuated by the La Plata River Compact.   
 The Hinderlider case provides a fitting example of the contentious relationship between 
water laws which develop from the bottom-up, such as the doctrine of prior appropriation which 
is the basis of the Ditch Company’s rights, and water law which emanates from the top-down, 
such as the equitable apportionment contained in the La Plata River Compact.   In addition, the 
institutional arrangement created by the La Plata River Compact is worth examining for the 
potential conflict created when one state officer is charged  both with enforcement of local law 
and with administration of the Compact. 
                                                
650 Id. at Art. II(3). 
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The La Plata River Compact provides that the State Engineers from each state must 
cooperate in the installation and operation of the gaging stations and the “exchange of records 
and data and publication of facts.”651  They are authorized to adjust the allocation during periods 
of low flow,652 and they “may formulate rules and regulations for carrying out the provisions of 
[the] compact, which, when signed and promulgated by them, shall be binding until amended by 
agreement between them or until terminated by written notice from one to the other.”653 
Mr. Hinderlider was an officer of the state of Colorado.  The Ditch Company sued Mr. 
Hinderlider in state court for taking its right to water when he shut their headgate in violation of 
the state court water decree.  Mr. Hinderlider prevailed at the trial court by asserting compliance 
with the requirements of the Compact.  The Ditch Company succeeded in having that decision 
overturned by the Colorado State Supreme Court after which Mr. Hinderlider was enjoined from 
giving effect to Article II(3) of the Compact.   
The Colorado Supreme Court held that the Ditch Company has property rights which are 
a freehold interest and that Mr. Hinderlider took those rights without due compensation when he 
implemented Article II(3) of the Compact.  The Colorado Supreme Court went on to cite 
provisions of the Colorado Constitution, the Colorado Water Code and the adjudication decree of 
the Colorado state court to support its decision654 all of which it held Mr. Hinderlider violated.  
While acknowledging that the Compact is a compromise between conflicting claims of the states 
of Colorado and New Mexico, the Colorado Supreme Court took a very strong position for the 
protection of the rights of the users.  Citing to previous decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court for equitable apportionment of water the Colorado Supreme Court stated: 
                                                
651 La Plata River Compact, Art. 1. 
652 Id. Art. II(3). 
653 Id. Art. III. 
654 La Plata River & Cherry Creek ditch Co. v. Hinderlider, 25 P.2d 187, 188 (Colo. 1933). 
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They [equitable apportionment cases655] do not touch the right of a state by compact, 
without notice, hearing, or compensation, to take property from one of its citizens and 
give it to another state or its citizens as a mere matter of expediency, without regard to 
the legality of their claims thereto, and in total disregard of existing constitutional, 
statutory, and judicial prohibitions.656 
 
 These are strong statements about the state law of Colorado, the law Mr. Hinderlider was 
obligated to obey.  However, Mr. Hinderlider, represented by the Colorado Attorney General, did 
not accept this ruling, and he continued the appeal for an additional five years before eventually 
overturning the Colorado Supreme Court in the United States Supreme Court. 657 
  The holding in Hinderlider provides the underlying principle to determine the 
relationship between local water law and interstate or international water law.  “As [each state] 
possessed the right only to an equitable share of the water in the stream” the local water law 
cannot grant or award “any right greater than the equitable share.”658  The local users cannot 
obtain or hold rights to use water in a greater amount than the equitable share of the state. 
Hinderlider also demonstrates the difficulties inherent in reaching a balance between the 
local users and an equitable apportionment among states.  Interstate water negotiations are 
political processes subject to local as well as interstate pressures which do not abate with the 
conclusion of an agreement.  The rationality of states to manage a shared watercourse for optimal 
and sustainable utilization depends on strong political will and the power to support that will.  
Using these basic facts we can hypothetically change key decisions of Mr. Hinderlider to 
explore further the relationship between local law and an interstate agreement.  The La Plata 
River Compact gives the State Engineers of Colorado and New Mexico discretion to manage the 
waters of the La Plata River to maximize beneficial use.  What if Mr. Hinderlider acquiesced in 
                                                
655 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46 (1907) and Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U. S. 419 (1922). 
656 La Plata supra note 16 at 189 (Colo. 1933). 
657  Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938). 
658 Id.  at 108. 
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the demands of the local users to maximize water availability within the state of Colorado.  If he 
did not comply with the specific Compact requirements for deliveries of either 100 m3/sec, 
Article II (1), or for delivery of one half the flow as measured at the Hesparus gage, Article II 
(2), the state of New Mexico could bring an action against Colorado to enforce the terms of the 
Compact.  
 However, if Mr. Hinderlider did not agree with the New Mexico State Engineer to 
implement the provisions of Article II (3) permitting water deliveries to rotate between the states, 
or if he is enjoined from doing so, it is possible that the first priority users in the upstream state 
of Colorado benefit. The decision to maximize beneficial use in both states as permitted by 
Article II (3) requires a joint decision based on the professional judgment of the state engineers.  
In the absence of agreement, the flow is divided according to Article II (2) with one half for use 
in Colorado.  The balance of the flow may or may not be sufficient to reach the users in New 
Mexico given conveyance losses. 
 While the Hinderlider case illustrates the importance of measures to provide flexible 
management in support of the implementation of an interstate agreement to maximize beneficial 
use, additional provisions could strengthen the management mechanisms.  The integrity of the 
individuals to uphold the letter and spirit of the agreement may be balanced with more specific 




Historically water law developed at the local level to resolve local allocation of the 
resource as that resource became stressed.  The principles of equitable apportionment among 
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states of the United States developed as a principle of federal common law approximately 100 
years ago.  Only in the past three decades has international water law crystallized in response to 
the increasing stresses placed on international watercourses.   
We live in a globalized world in which the political thought about water must grow to 
recognize the interconnectedness of all riparian states and that the natural system of a 
watercourse disregards political boundaries.  Too often water is still considered a local resource 
with states asserting sovereignty and attempting to protect local uses without an appreciation of a 
broader picture of the natural system within a river basin.  Until the political atmosphere at the 
local and international levels becomes more aligned with natural conditions it may become 
increasingly difficult to conclude water sharing agreements as demand increases, local uses 
remain central to national economies, and the resource becomes more stressed.   
A watercourse is a single resource, governed and managed according to multiple laws.  
These laws must be integrated in order to share this single, vital resource equitably and 







 This paper used thousands of words to examine legal structures for water allocation from 
the bottom up and the top down.  The law of international watercourses is still developing as 
watercourses around the globe become stressed and uses in one state impact users in other 
riparian states.  This paper has demonstrated that international law, the law governing the 
interaction among states, is not the singular authority governing international watercourses and it 
has shown that the users, and the local legal regimes governing use, must be considered.  
However, even the most cooperative and inclusive legal regimes and basin institutions and the 
most developed local to international laws remain incomplete and unacceptably inadequate if 
people within a basin remain without clean water.  Above all, water is a vital human need.  
